

Political Science 671: Methods of Political Research

POLS 671

**“Paternalistic culture and welfare attitudes in the Russian Federation and the
United States of America”**

Sleptcov Nikita

Introduction

A paternalistic attitude toward a government and expectations from the government to be “a father” of the nation, to provide for the people in case of need, to protect it from harm, even to employ those unemployed have been discussed by philosophers starting from Confucius and later through Hobbes and to modern communitarians (Gaus and Kukathas, 2004). Some nations allegedly express paternalistic attitudes more vividly than the others. Ex-president of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev wrote in his famous article “Go Russia!” in 2009,

“The widespread paternalistic attitudes are in the society. There is the belief that all problems should be resolved by the state or someone else, but not everyone in his or her place. The desire to “make yourself” step by step, to achieve personal success is not our national habit. Hence, there are the lacks of the initiative, new ideas, unresolved issues, the poor quality of public debate, including the critical views. Public acceptance and support are usually expressed in silence. Objections are very often emotional, biting but superficial and irresponsible. Well, these phenomena have been here for more than one hundred years” (Medvedev, 2009)

Paternalistic attitudes are useful when politicians want to obtain quick popular support for policies using populism (Abts and Rummens, 2007). However, when it comes to the long-term economic development, to an entrepreneurship, paternalism becomes an obstacle. Support of the welfare state seems now a natural drift of developed and, to some extent, wealthy nations but when “the welfare ideology” is used in countries where democratic culture has not yet taken roots, it may lead to growing dependency and the “violation of the autonomy of the individual” (Matthews, 1986). Therefore, paternalism and support of welfare may correlate each other.

Literature Review/Theory Development

Paternalism Conceptualized

The connection between cultural patterns and behavioral attitudes are in the focus of political and social scientists. A huge variety of policies and regulations in the USA and other countries are considered to be paternalistic and controversial for that reason. For example, there are laws that require motorcyclists to wear helmets and passengers in cars to fasten seatbelts. Government agencies may regulate both prescription and recreational drugs. Taxes are levied on tobacco, and bans on trans-fats have been enacted. Participation in pension programs, such as Social Security in the United States, is mandatory (Woodard 2015). All of those measures can be thought of as manifestations of the governmental paternalism.

Culture in general and political culture, in particular, has a very distinct attribute – to persist and perpetuate itself through history via socialization (Chilton, 1988). Paternalistic culture, therefore, may be thought of as a product of the long period of existence within a given society. The problem of paternalism is understood from different angles.

Western scientists, following famous work *On Liberty* of John Stuart Mill, who wrote, “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.” (Mill, 1974/1859) Therefore, only interventions to stop an individual from harm to others can be justified, never to promote their good (Le Grand and New, 2015). Paternalism as a political concept in that sense can mean interference with choices or actions, targeted against the will but for the own good of

the person interfered with (Archard, 1990; Schramme, 2015; Weiss, 1985)¹, limitation of liberty (De Marneffe, 2006), illiberal, coercive, arrogant and patronizing act (Paul Burrows, 1993).

However, in a broader sense the paternalism can be understood as the special relationships of a father to a child (Fotion, 1979). Such patron-client relationships (Alston and Ferrie, 1999) may be aimed by the political leadership to attempt to supply the needs or to regulate the life of the community (Sankowski, 1985) and, hence, create the dependency. A paternalistic act is, therefore, one in which the protection or promotion of a subject's welfare is the primary reason for attempted or successful coercive interference with an action or state of that person (Carter, 1977). Russian scientists, whether by tradition or other reasons, generally stress dependency on the governmental support of different kinds as the main feature to distinguish paternalistic culture. Some of them highlight the historical background and the heritage of “vogdism” (the cult of a leader) as perpetuating paternalistic attitudes in the society².

Hence, we see the problem of paternalism as a twofold problem: on the one hand, it is Mill's idea of non-intervention in autonomy of individuals for the sake of promoting their well-being; on the other hand, very close to the previous one, the idea that due to such interventions the government cultivates dependency in the society which could conceivably lead to support of the government. The paternalistic idea that the government has the responsibility to provide for its citizens is engraved in individual consciousness as a result of historical identity. Therefore, these social values are reflected in human attitudes (Arikan and Ben-Nun Bloom, 2015; Davidsson and Marx, 2013; Hall, 1986; Mau, 2004; Rothstein, 1998; Van Oorschot, 2007). The role social values can potentially play as a fundamental

¹ Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in Edward N. Zalta, ed, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2006), online at <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism/> (visited Jan 3, 2006)

² For more information see Alekseev S.S. Theory of Law. - 2nd ed. M.: BECK, 1995

contextual influence in shaping individual attitudes towards redistribution has not been studied thoroughly (Dion and Birchfield, 2010). Social or cultural values may be defined as values representing the society's shared ideas about what is good, right and desirable (Schwartz, 1999). Social values also shape individuals into certain ways of thinking (Triandis, 1994) because they serve as a standard for judging events (Smith et al., 2006). Welfare policy, therefore, can be understood as a way of integrating the individual into the society (Arikan and Ben-Nun Bloom, 2015; Esping-Andersen, 1990), as opposed to promoting individual autonomy and self-reliance. Therefore, social insurance and welfare policy often represent a tension between two important values: liberty and security (Freeden, 2003). Consequently, individuals socialized in settings that stress a collective responsibility for the security and well-being of others may be more willing to accept governmental intervention in the economy to provide for the needy groups in the society (Arikan and Ben-Nun Bloom, 2015). Ideological affiliation may also play a significant role in shaping individual attitudes toward welfare. While the left generally supports redistribution of resources (Arikan and Ben-Nun Bloom, 2015; Piurko et al., 2011), the rights tend to promote values of individualism and self-sufficiency, therefore rejecting governmental intervention and allocation (Arikan and Ben-Nun Bloom, 2015; Jacoby, 1994). Nonetheless, I argue that ideological may not always play a significant role in the support of the welfare. Not in every society the political ideology is a significant part of decision-making and behavior. Therefore, it is rather paternalism that plays a more distinct role in that.

Paternalism as a Value: How it Shapes Public Opinion

Some scholars express agreement that individual way of thinking, values, and behavior are influenced and even shaped by broader social values (Smith et al., 2006; Tom

W. Smith, 1987). Individuals tend to use terminology and refer to principles central to their society's shared values when discussing policy preferences, even if their personal value orientations conflict with those of the society (Arikan and Ben-Nun Bloom, 2015; Feldman and Zaller, 1992). Despite sharp societal disagreements, citizens of the same country may show more than a little consensus on certain issues since they share a common moral vocabulary (Bellah et al., 1985). For example, both the American public and the media tend to attribute poverty to lack of individual effort and laziness, thereby placing responsibility on the individual, while citizens of most European countries tend to blame contextual factors like luck or social and economic conditions (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Iyengar, 1991; Semetko and Mandelli, 1997). Similarly, political actors in different countries emphasize different concerns when considering the proper role of government in the economy (King, 1973). Paternalism as a broader political and cultural context may stimulate certain types of values and attitudes through socialization (Glinchikova, 2011). But what are these values? What does the paternalism as a cultural treat stimulate in individuals? Another Russian researcher S. Litvinova highlights that paternalistic policies stimulate the desire for dependency and lack of autonomy which threatens the very democratic principle. Moreover, she adds additional attitudes such as "sense of community and unity, a common good and a sense of local patriotism" (Litvinova, 2005, p. 18).

Researchers associate the appearance of certain types of individual traits with paternalistic attitudes. Amongst these traits are: strong identification with hiring organization and the "deep dependence" on a range of issues of the everyday life, a sense of responsibility, "the syndrome of social powerlessness", and "social infantilism" (J.N. Lapygin, J.L. Adelman, 1996).

Moreover, as a result of the socio-psychological research of attitudes towards the phenomenon of power E.P. Belinsky and O.A. Tihomandritskaya selected the components of paternalism as a socio-political pattern:

1. The personification of power and its mystification;
2. Shifting personal responsibilities from themselves to political leadership who has powers;
3. The desire of being taken care of and protected by the authorities;
4. The attitude to the law, which manifests itself in the legal nihilism (E.P. Belinsky and O.A. Tihomandritskaya, 2003).

Therefore, paternalism can be seen as a broader cultural attitude that stimulates certain values which influence political behavior. Being a part of the culture, it is reproduced in all areas of the society. It not only does characterize political but also social, occupational and personal life. State dependency which paternalism strives to promote, has made the loyalty (and not the success, efficiency, and initiative) subordinate criterion for distribution of wealth. Nurturing a dependent individual is the main purpose of paternalistic policies; someone who will always need a state, a government to hope for, to ask for help and to obey when the state commands so.

Differences Across Context Two Cases (the US and Russia)

Russian case

Many political scientists, especially from Russia, would agree on the paternalistic nature of Russian political culture (Ermolenko, 1991; Naumov and Puffer, 2000; Baranov, 2003; Smeal, 2013). Nikolay Baranov sees roots of the paternalistic political culture of Russians in extended Russian patriarchal family where there may be a couple of dozens of

members. The authority of the head of such a family – the “father” – was unquestionable (Baranov, 2003). Such an order was reasonable and explainable – Russian climate with short summer forced people to do many different types of agricultural works at the same time. The only possible and adequate mechanism which was able to reach the goal was strong authoritarianism. Baranov writes,

“The concentration of command functions of the authority, in this case, the head of the patriarchal family, leaves all members of the household only a function of obedience. In such a situation, a person has no need to feel the autonomy, he or she shifts the responsibility for their own destiny to the family, the state, the government, he or she moves away from the individual responsibility, and thus from freedom” (Baranov, 2003, p. 136).

In Russia, the head of a family had full responsibility for each member of the family but those relationships resembled ownership (S.S. Sulakshin, V.E. Bagdasarian, Y.U. Zachesova, Y.E. Meshkov, 2009). Russian Orthodox Church supported such an order. Thus, paternalism has become an axiom, a cultural archetype embodied in the Russian mentality and political culture. The traditions preserved in folk, peasant culture also characterized the culture of the educated elite of Russian society. The liberalism of the European-style, spread after the bourgeois-democratic revolutions in Europe, transformed under the pressure of internal and external circumstances. Russian victory in the war with Napoleon strengthened national pride, consolidated society and acted as a stimulus in the search for its way of development.

Paternalism as a basic foundation of the Russian Empire was implemented in the following categories: diligence, supervision, protection, grace, helping those in need, donation, relief, and indulgence (Lantcov, 2009).

Baranov continues,

“The history of the Soviet period confirms the stability of the formed paternalistic traditions. All children of primary school age were Octobrists - grandchildren of Lenin. A quarter-century the country was ruled by the “father of the peoples” – Joseph Stalin. Party bodies carried out the functions of guardianship, supervising, encouraging and punishing citizens guided by the norms of the moral code of the builders of communism, and not the Constitution of the USSR” (Baranov, 2003, p. 140).

The urgency of the problem of paternalism remains confirmed by the events of the modern days, when the prevailing situation of the post-Soviet period has demonstrated the need people have for the custody of the state, ensuring a social assistance and protection that they regard as something a priori, as a mandatory feature of power. Paternalistic tradition can be attributed to the “collective unconscious”, that is the archetype of the culture learned in the process of socialization, and that controls peoples’ behavior at a subconscious level.

So long as people sacrifice their autonomy for the sake of what they believe to be common good, which role do democratic values play in this game? Democratic values such as freedom, the autonomy of the individual, responsibility for yourself and so on. Researchers of political behavior in Russia nevertheless agree that like other Europeans, many Russians have become more individualistic and set more specific life goals. Such changes have become quite realistic now that Russians have the opportunity to purchase their homes, buy shares in Russian companies, work, and study in various places, and earn compensation for their work that is limited only by their own abilities, connections, and energy rather than a fixed, low salary. To those who succeed in taking advantage of the new opportunities and in adjusting to the huge changes in the country, Russia is a comfortable place to live: adventurous, risky, but nonetheless pleasant. These people have a decent

education, own more than one apartment or vehicle, have high incomes, travel, and on the whole, share European values. Their personal experience has taught them the worth of such values. Most people, however, have not managed to take advantage of the opportunities created by the transition – whether they are accustomed to state paternalism or because of processes in the “mysterious Russian soul” or because of their age, poor health, and other insurmountable circumstances. They are not affected by many problems that their more affluent and better-educated compatriots encounter daily – corruption, lack of protection of property rights, highhandedness from the defense and security agencies, an unjust judicial system, censorship of the mass media, and so on. So such notions as “human rights,” “civil liberties,” and “democracy” remain abstract for this less privileged segment of the Russian society. Their needs are more down-to-earth while their values are less oriented toward the individualism. It often manifests itself as a willingness to trade personal rights and liberties for promises of better state support and a higher quality of life (Ordzhonikidze, 2008).

Russians’ grasp of “liberalism” is even weaker than their understanding of “democracy,” and they consider it less relevant to their lives. Negative associations are much more widespread, characterizing at least one-fourth of the population. Youth, students, highly educated individuals, entrepreneurs, executives, and specialists more often express positive associations, whereas negative ones come from retirees, housewives, specialists, and socially weak groups. Many people think that Russia does not need liberalism. At the same time, Russian people support presidentialism in its Russian, paternalistic, sense. This shift is especially attributed to socially weak strata: more elderly, educated, and financially less secure respondents. Russians understand that in real life the president controls the military, foreign policy, and is compliant with the Constitution. Russians’ assessments, however, demonstrate a clear gap between the desired and the real

even regarding those areas of presidential authority. The president and the first two deputy prime ministers are considered quite influential, in contrast to the prime minister and other ministers. At the same time, people do not trust the parliament (Ordzhonikidze, 2008).

American case

The United States of America is widely known for maintaining the image of individualistic culture which has always rejected social responsibility of the state over the society. It is peculiar that the author who was the first to notice this American feature was not American. French statesman Alexis de Tocqueville undertook an investigation of young American republic and, as Kaplan says,

“while Tocqueville saw egotism and selfishness as vices, he saw individualism as not a failure of feeling, but as a way of thinking about things which could have either positive consequences such as a willingness to work together, or negative consequences such as isolation, and that individualism could be remedied by improved understanding” (Kaplan, 2005).

Individualism is so embedded in the very fabric of American culture that even American president Herbert Hoover wrote a book “American Individualism and the Challenge to Liberty” which he devoted to defending American individual values³. American individualism and individualistic ideas and beliefs can be traced back to the Revolutionary era (Grabb, Baer, and Curtis, 1999). In the portrayal of the early American value system, personal liberty is highly prized and encouraged but, at the same time, is consistently moderated by a regard for civic responsibility and a respect for the rights of others (Shain, 1994). Iyengar (2005) argues that “while governance is necessary to

³ See Herbert Hoover (1989) “American Individualism and the Challenge to Liberty”. Regina Books – 129.

maintain law and order and protect society from external threats, domestic problems are and should be matters of individual responsibility” and he continues “if people are poor, it is because they lack initiative; people who are unemployed could find work if they tried harder.” (Iyengar 2005, p. 1). American Constitution – though mentioning promotion of the general Welfare (The Constitution of the United States, 1787) – never clarifies what is meant by the welfare, therefore, it still remains vivid phrase in the preamble.

“The American Dream” is a common concept which many people make reference to when they wish to talk about how great the United States and capitalism is. “At its core, the general public’s aversion to anything that smacks of some form of unlimited public assistance that is not tied to work is and has always been rooted in the American Dream” (Schneiderman, 2008). The American Dream is the belief that those who work hard can, and will, get ahead. So if hard work will bring success then those who do not succeed must be trying not hard enough. The irony is that in a system which does not have strong economic ladders the path to get ahead can be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to get ahead. Most people believe government assistance should be temporary and limited but a reliable source of support during hard times, i.e. a safety net. Problems arise when the assistance is too little to do much to help those who need it.

Lipset contends that the historical beginnings of the United States gave rise to an exceptional society, one guided by an ideology or value system that is unique in the world. He calls this modern, bourgeois, and democratic value system “Americanism”, or “the American Creed” (Lipset, 1963). In his most recent work, Lipset offers a succinct rendering of what he means by the American Creed. He asserts that the American belief system can be described using five key terms: liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire (Lipset, 1996). It is difficult to find complete and consistent definitions for some of these concepts in Lipset's various discussions. Another conceptual issue to

consider is that the first three of these concepts are general in nature, while the other two terms, populism, and laissez-faire, refer more specifically to the political and economic spheres of life. However, it can be contended that there is a single common conceptual thread linking all five of these descriptors of the American Creed. The crux of these five ideas is a paramount belief in the notion that all people should be allowed to pursue their own desired goals and interests in a society that encourages open competition, even conflict, and that is largely free of collective constraints on individual citizens (Lipset, 1968). He argues that Americans are said to be especially averse to having their individual liberty infringed upon by “statist communitarianism” or the intrusions of government (Lipset, 1996). More generally, though, Americans are portrayed as being suspicious of any organization or collectivity that limits their personal freedom⁴. Lipset suggests that the American desire for personal freedom even shapes what some would say is the most communitarian of all human endeavors – religious activity. Religious involvement is particularly significant in the case of the United States because, as Lipset and many other analysts have noted, Americans exhibit a much greater devotion and commitment to religion than most other peoples of the world do (e.g., Lipset, 1963 Alexander, R. M., et al., 1987; Finke Roger, and Rodney Stark, 1992). However, in this case, Lipset suggests that it is a manifestation of a personal freedom and rejection of guidance – to worship one's own God in one's own way – that is sacrosanct for Americans, overriding any pressures for group constraint or conformity imposed by the church organization or religious community. To Lipset, the “Protestant sectarian” nature of American religion is a key

⁴ Numerous illustrations of this alleged American resistance to communitarian restraints and regulations can be found in Lipset's analyses of the present-day United States. For example, Lipset sees this resistance as the explanation for why Americans are more likely than Canadians and other peoples to get divorced, to commit crimes, and to refrain from voting in elections. That is, he interprets these differences as evidence that collective considerations and obligations, such as maintaining a stable marriage or family life, obeying society's laws, or participating in the political system, are less important to Americans than their individual freedom to do as they wish (Lipset, 1996, pp. 13, 26, 46)

indicator of this emphasis on individual choice and is reflected in the large and varied range of churches that exists in the United States. The diversity in American religious organizations is contrasted with the allegedly more monolithic, authoritarian, and often “state-supported” Catholic, Anglican, Lutheran, and Orthodox churches that Lipset says are dominant in most other Christian nations (Lipset, 1996: 19; also Lipset, 1968: 52-53, 248-251). For Lipset religion plays one of the key roles in forming American individualism as an opposition to paternalism. In portraying the American Creed, Lipset states that the set of dominant values in American society is basically synonymous with the concept of “liberalism”. However, here he is referring specifically to liberalism in the “eighteenth- and nineteenth-century meanings” of the term (Lipset, 1996: 31).

Attitudes toward welfare have always been controversial in the USA. Timid attempts to introduce elements of welfare before the twentieth century were inconsistent and unstable and often developed on municipal level or even by private companies (Katz, 1996). Main successful endeavor happened during the Great Depression when the government headed by Franklin Roosevelt introduced social programs such as social security and generally involved the state into the economy (Katz, 2013). Economists from the right, using Austrian capital theory often criticize Keynesian stimulus/job creation programs as being paternalistic imposing dependence by the state (Ellerman, 2015). Political conservatives such as Charles Murray have argued that U.S. welfare programs create incentives that are deleterious to the work ethic and the two-parent family structure (Murray, 2015). In Lipset's view, the American Creed explicitly stresses that each individual should enjoy “equality of opportunity and respect,” but not necessarily equality “of result or condition,” and that people should be treated primarily as individuals in this regard, not as members of collectivities (1996: 19). In effect, then, Lipset's use of liberalism is almost the

opposite of what is now meant by the concept, amounting to what many present-day writers call “conservatism” (see Pocklington, 1985: 63-64, 72; Gwyn, 1985: 162).

However, not every scientist or policymaker is prone to criticizing paternalism. A group of social policy scholars and politicians have also known as “new paternalists” stress the possibility of positive behavioral responses that can be fostered by properly designed welfare programs; they argued that government can and should use public support programs to promote certain behaviors such as work and marriage while discouraging others such as out-of-wedlock births and substance abuse. To accomplish these goals, paternalists argue that welfare should not be an entitlement. Rather recipients must accept a certain set of conditions in exchange for assistance and must maintain certain behaviors while enrolled in the program (Mead, 1997).

America, therefore, possesses a very peculiar type of culture. From the one hand, there is a considerable amount of American public who deliberately emphasizes the notion of American individualism and that every individual is the master of his or her destiny. From the other hand, America has one of the highest rates of poverty in the world and almost alone among developed nations does not have a universal healthcare, assuming it is a right and responsibility of the individual to care for themselves. The paternalistic sentiment is not embedded in the “American soul” albeit can be found among Americans.

Hypotheses

In this research I investigate relations between *paternalism* (independent variable), identified broadly as a system of relations in which the authorities provide for the needs of the citizens and *the support of the welfare* (dependent variable). I argue that there may be positive relationships between paternalism and support of the welfare. Therefore, I think that people in countries where the paternalistic attitude is present more explicitly

tend to support welfare measures. To show this, I undertake a comparative analysis of such attitudes in Russia and the USA. Comparative part of the research helps to control for the independent variable and show meaningful relations between two variables.

My choice is explained by widely known American commitment to freedom as the highest value and, hence the rejection of “big government” while Russians, on the contrary, tend to support “big” and active government. Therefore, comparison of attitudes toward welfare in those countries may give an insight about relationships between paternalism and the welfare support.

The Data and methods

My design is non-experimental and involves a survey research. The data to test these hypotheses was obtained from the World Values Survey Wave 6 data covering the 2010-2014⁵. The dataset is a cross-national project with identical questioner that allows for comparison of several countries. It covers a wide range of economical as well as political, social and cultural aspects of human lives.

The dependent variables

The main feature of this set of data is that the necessary question to test the dependent variable is missing. However, there are two variables V96 “*Income Inequality*” (ranging from *Incomes should be made more equal* to *We need larger income differences as incentives for individuals*) and V131 “*Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor*” (ranging from *It is essential for democracy* to *It is not essential to democracy*). Both those variable pertain to the idea of income redistribution from wealthier to poorer population which is essentially a characteristic of the welfare state. Therefore I employ both variables for Russia and the USA. However, for the USA I also

⁵ For more information go to <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp>

| | | | | |
|--|------|-------|-------|-------|
| 7 | 71 | 2,8 | 2,9 | 90,6 |
| 8 | 89 | 3,6 | 3,7 | 94,2 |
| 9 | 45 | 1,8 | 1,9 | 96,1 |
| People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves | 94 | 3,8 | 3,9 | 100,0 |
| Total | 2413 | 96,5 | 100,0 | |
| Missing | 87 | 3,5 | | |
| Total | 2500 | 100,0 | | |

Significantly more Russian respondents agree with that statement “*The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for*” (44,3%) and the pattern is observer according to which there is a decline in the number of those who thinks otherwise. Only 3,9% of Russians think that people should take care of themselves.

Table 2.

| Dependent Variables | Relationship | Regression Coefficient | T score | Significance | Adjusted R-squared |
|---|--------------|------------------------|---------|--------------|--------------------|
| V96 “Income Inequality” | P | ,421 | 22,082 | Y | ,176 |
| V131 “Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor” | P | ,139 | 6,3991 | Y | ,017 |
| Independent Variable: <i>Government responsibility</i> | | | | | |

As it is seen from the table 2, there is a significant impact of the independent variable *Government responsibility* on *Income Inequality*. Positive relationship between them conveys the fact that the more Russians support the idea that it is governmental responsibility to ensure all people are taken care of, the more likely they are in support of the income equality. This narrative has been long one of defining Russian political culture that has its roots in socialistic narrative. However, the other dependent variable *Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor*, albeit has significance, shows less assuring result. Russian population seems to be unlikely correlate the taxation

system and government's responsibilities. It can be explained by insignificance of the tax question for public politics. Russian people do not pay many taxes themselves from their income, nor do they have to fill out tax forms. Taxation is never an issue among politicians. It may be the reason why in social consciousness taxation and government are not strongly correlated.

As Table 3 shows, after adding additional independent variables “*Self-positioning in political scale*” to test V96 “*Income Inequality*”, “*Highest educational level attained*”, “*Age*”, “*Scale of incomes*” (see Table 3) together 5 independent variables explain 22,2% of the variance of Income Inequality.

Table 3.

| Independent Variables | Relationship | Regression Coefficient | t score | Significance | Adjusted R-squared |
|---|--------------|------------------------|---------|--------------|--------------------|
| Self-positioning in political scale | P | ,202 | 6,883 | Y | ,222 |
| Government responsibility | P | ,367 | 14,139 | Y | |
| Highest educational level attained | P | ,039 | 1,111 | Y | |
| Age | N | -,015 | -3,970 | Y | |
| Sex | N | -,023 | -,181 | N | |
| Scale of incomes | P | ,138 | 3,652 | Y | |
| Dependent Variable: V96 “Income Inequality” | | | | | |

Apparently, ideology has a significant importance for endorsement of the equal redistribution of income. People, who identify themselves as leftists, tend to support equal income. Unlike political ideology, education albeit has a significant impact on income equality, nevertheless is not that decisive in how people perceive income equality. Sex does not have significant impact on the *Income equality* variable.

Young people in Russia seem to be more willing to agree that income may be less equal. That can be explained by their socialization in modern capitalist Russia where levels of incomes tend to be dependent on one's abilities and willingness to work more and harder to

get more money. Same can be said about wealthier people who earned their income and would not support redistribution.

The United States of America

Table 1.

| Government responsibility | | | | |
|--|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for | 171 | 7,7 | 7,9 | 7,9 |
| 2 | 92 | 4,1 | 4,2 | 12,1 |
| 3 | 140 | 6,3 | 6,5 | 18,6 |
| 4 | 158 | 7,1 | 7,3 | 25,9 |
| 5 | 291 | 13,0 | 13,4 | 39,3 |
| Valid 6 | 195 | 8,7 | 9,0 | 48,3 |
| 7 | 225 | 10,1 | 10,4 | 58,7 |
| 8 | 263 | 11,8 | 12,1 | 70,9 |
| 9 | 215 | 9,6 | 9,9 | 80,8 |
| People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves | 416 | 18,6 | 19,2 | 100,0 |
| Total Missing | 2166 | 97,0 | 100,0 | |
| Total | 2232 | 100,0 | | |

As Table 2 shows, American respondents are less willing to express the paternalistic attitude toward the state. Only 7,9% agree the it is governmental responsibility to make sure that citizens are taken care of. 19,2% said people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves.

Table 2

| Dependent Variables | Relationship | Regression Coefficient | T score | Significance | Adjusted R-squared |
|-------------------------|--------------|------------------------|---------|--------------|--------------------|
| V96 "Income Inequality" | P | ,392 | 22,554 | Y | ,191 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|------|--------|---|------|
| V131 “Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor” | P | ,334 | 17,257 | Y | ,123 |
| Independent Variable: <i>Government responsibility</i> | | | | | |

Table 2 shows that the independent variable *Government responsibility* significantly influences both dependent variables *Income Inequality* and *Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor*. Positive relationships between them signify that there more respondent agree that the government should provide for people the more likely they are to support income equality and higher taxes for richer people.

As was mentioned above to show a clearer relationship between paternalistic attitude expressed as government responsibility and attitude toward welfare the index was created combining both variables together.

Table 3

| Dependent Variables | Relationship | Regression Coefficient | T score | Significance | Adjusted R-squared |
|--|--------------|------------------------|---------|--------------|--------------------|
| Index “Liberal value frame” | P | ,365 | 26,420 | Y | ,248 |
| Independent Variable: <i>Government responsibility</i> | | | | | |

The index shows even stronger impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable.

Now, using the index, I will add additional independent variables such as *Self-positioning in political scale*, *Highest educational level attained*, *Age*, *Sex*, and *Scale of incomes* to see how it will affect the index.

Table 4

| Independent Variables | Relationship | Regression Coefficient | t score | Significance | Adjusted R-squared |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|------------------------|---------|--------------|--------------------|
| Self-positioning in political scale | P | ,303 | 14,949 | Y | ,331 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|-------|--------|---|--|
| Government responsibility | P | ,272 | 18,348 | Y | |
| Highest educational level attained | P | ,055 | 1,764 | Y | |
| Age | N | -,002 | -1,103 | Y | |
| Sex | N | -,292 | -3,873 | Y | |
| Scale of incomes | P | ,036 | 1,718 | Y | |
| Dependent Variable: Index "Liberal value frame" | | | | | |

All the selected variables showed their significance in relations to the Index. Altogether, they explain 33,1% of the variance in in the Index. But there is some specificity observed. As the table shows, ideology plays a very important role in explaining people's attitude toward issues of redistribution of income and taxation. People identified with left values tend to support welfare, taxation and income equality while "rights" tend to oppose those. People with higher educational level as well as income level are more likely to back the idea that income should be redistributed and there should be fewer taxes for wealthy people. Negative relationship between *Age* and *the Index* shows that women in the USA are more likely to be in favor of more equal redistribution of income and taxation of wealthier people.

Conclusions

Paternalistic attitude or a system of relations between the people and the state in which the authorities ensure the needs of the citizens, who, in exchange, permit to dictate a certain type of behaviors, both public and private shows its presence in both countries, albeit not equally. Russian population tends to be lining toward the idea that government has to express concern with problems its population has, while American people are less likely to support that claim.

Russian respondents do not seem to juxtapose taxation and income which American respondent do. That can be explained by the fact that most Russians do not pay

taxes themselves (income tax, for example, is withheld from wages by the employers), nor it is the taxation a political issue. At the same time, American political culture was built on the question of taxation and taxes are always a part of public political discussion and agenda.

Age is also important in its relationship to the question to income equality. Russian youth are socialized in a different political regime with capitalist economy. They want to work and earn, hence be better off while older people still think that incomes should be distributed equally, smoothing disparities. In the USA the age is not that important. However, *Sex* is more important in the USA rather than in Russia in its impact on the issue of income equality and taxation. American females are more likely to support flatter income earning. That is not observed in Russian data set.

Also political bias is way more important in its impact on the issues of taxation and income quality in the USA than it is in Russia. It seems in the USA leftists tend to support redistribution of income and taxing the rich more. For Russia the same issue has twice as less significance than it does for the USA. Russian people in general are less politically biased in a sense of ideological cleavages. The plural party system has existed in Russia only for 25 years and it shows a tendency to drift toward the system with one dominant party.

Russian population is quantitatively more paternalistic⁶ than American population is. However, we may see that in both countries those people who express paternalistic attitude tend to support income equality at approximately the same intensity. Hence, regardless of countries, paternalism is tightly connected to welfare, higher taxation of richer people and income equality.

⁶ More than 50% of respondents agree and somehow agree that the government should take care of its population

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