Роль осознания воздействия маркетинговых стимулов в формировании реакции потребителя

Головачева Ксения Сергеевна

Роль осознания воздействия маркетинговых стимулов в формировании реакции потребителя

Работа посвящена рассмотрению роли осознания потребителем воздействия маркетинговых стимулов в формировании реакции на данные стимулы. На базе обзора литературы осуществляется анализ ключевого для модели понятия «осознание воздействия», производится систематизация факторов и последствий осознания потребителем воздействия маркетинговых стимулов, определяется значение осознания воздействия маркетинговых стимулов в деятельности потребителей и фирм. С помощью экспериментального исследования потребителей осуществляется тестирование некоторых теоретических положений применительно к тактике уменьшения размера продукта (package downsizing). Результаты исследования демонстрируют, что уменьшение размера продукта может быть выгодной тактикой с точки зрения сохранения продаж, но может привести к репутационным потерям в условиях осознания потребителями воздействия со стороны фирмы.

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Вуз: Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет (СПбГУ)

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Головачева Ксения Сергеевна

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Федеральное государственное бюджетное образовательное учреждение высшего профессионального образования Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет Институт «Высшая школа менеджмента» РОЛЬ ОСОЗНАНИЯ ВОЗДЕЙСТВИЯ МАРКЕТИНГОВЫХ СТИМУЛОВ В ФОРМИРОВАНИИ РЕАКЦИИ ПОТРЕБИТЕЛЯ Выпускная квалификационная работа обучающегося на программе подготовки научно-педагогических кадров в аспирантуре «Экономика и управление» по направлению подготовки 38.06.01 «Экономика» 3 года очной формы обучения за счет средств федерального бюджета ГОЛОВАЧЕВОЙ Ксении Сергеевны ______________________________ (Подпись) Научный руководитель: к.э.н., доцент СМИРНОВА Мария Михайловна Санкт-Петербург 2016

Оглавление Введение …………………………………………………………………………………………3 Глава 1. Теоретические основы проблемы осознания потребителем воздействия маркетинговых стимулов ……………………………………………………………………..8 По материалам научного доклада «When Consumers Activate Persuasion Knowledge: Review of Antecedents and Consequences». Working Paper # 5 (E)–2016. Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg State University: SPb, 2016. Глава 2. Исследование роли осознания потребителем воздействия со стороны фирмы в формировании реакции на уменьшение размера продукта ..........................................25 2.1. Уменьшение размера продукта как ценовая тактика ………………………25 По материалам статьи «Цена и размер продукта как альтернативные инструменты влияния на поведение потребителей на рынке товаров повседневного спроса». Маркетинг и маркетинговые исследования 6 (2014): 424432. 2.2. Результаты эмпирического исследования роли осознания потребителем воздействия со стороны фирмы в формировании реакции на уменьшение размера продукта ……………………………………………………………………..33 По материалам научного доклада «Consumer Response to Unit Price Increase: the Role of Pricing Tactics and Consumer Knowledge». Working Paper # 14 (E)–2015. Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg State University: SPb, 2015. Приложения……………………………………………………………………………………47 Приложение 1. Апробация результатов исследования на XVI Апрельской международная научная конференция «Модернизация экономики и общества», 7-10 апреля 2015 года, Москва, Россия………………………………………………….47 Приложение 2. Апробация результатов исследования на конференции 6th EMAC Regional Conference, WU Vienna, Austria, September 16-18, 2015…………………...61 2

Введение Актуальность темы исследования. Изучению потребителей отводится важное место в маркетинговой науке и практике. Фирмы вкладывают значительные ресурсы в исследования особенностей восприятия и оценки потребителями рыночных предложений, а также их поведения на рынке. Понимание данных аспектов позволяет фирмам предпринимать стратегические и тактические действия, обладающие большей убедительностью для потребителей и, как следствие, большей эффективностью для самой фирмы. Потребители, подобно фирмам, также накапливают информацию и знания о рынке и механизмах его функционирования через личный опыт взаимодействия с рынком, средства массовой информации или другие источники. При этом имеющиеся у потребителей знания об используемых фирмами инструментах воздействия во многом определяют последующую реакцию потребителей на маркетинговые стимулы и поэтому представляют непосредственный интерес как с практической, так и с теоретической точки зрения. Исследователями было неоднократно доказано, что потребители, обладающие различным объемом и содержанием знаний об используемых фирмами маркетинговых инструментах воздействия, по-разному реагируют на маркетинговые стимулы, с которыми они сталкиваются на рынке. В частности, при контакте с маркетинговым стимулом реакция потребителя на данный стимул будет обусловлена тем, воспринимает ли потребитель его как намеренную попытку воздействия со стороны фирмы, или, выражаясь иначе, осознает ли он воздействие маркетингового стимула. Осознание воздействия маркетингового стимула влечёт за собой изменение реакции потребителя на данный стимул1. Особый интерес представляет собой изучение роли осознания потребителями воздействия со стороны фирмы при взаимодействии с маркетинговыми стимулами, которые потенциально могут ввести потребителя в заблуждение. Феномен «введение в заблуждение» имеет место тогда, когда представления потребителей о том, «как должно быть» не сходятся с тем, «как есть» в действительности 2. Примером маркетинговой тактики, которая может ввести потребителя в заблуждение, является уменьшение размера 1 Friestad M., Wright P. The persuasion knowledge model: How people cope with persuasion attempts //Journal of consumer research. – 1994. – С. 1-31. 2 Russo J. E., Metcalf B. L., Stephens D. Identifying misleading advertising //Journal of Consumer Research. – 1981. – С. 119-131. 3

продукта (package downsizing). Данная тактика часто используется фирмами, чтобы “скрыть” увеличение цены продукта: вместо открытого увеличения цены за упаковку продукта, производители уменьшают количество продукта в упаковке так, что цена за упаковку продукта остается на прежнем уровне. При этом цена за единицу веса или объема продукта увеличивается. Потребители в силу многих причин часто не обращают внимания на вес упаковки продукта и не осознают того факта, что цена за единицу веса или объема продукта увеличилась1. Таким образом, они продолжает приобретать продукт, что, несомненно, является благоприятным фактом для фирм, практикующих подобные маркетинговые тактики, но неблагоприятно сказывается на благосостоянии самих потребителей. Однако потребители не находятся «в вакууме» и постоянно накапливают знания о маркетинговых инструментах, используемых фирмами, на основании собственного опыта или внешней информации. Таким образом, со временем потребители в большей степени склонны осознавать воздействие на них маркетинговых стимулов. В связи с этим представляется актуальным изучение того, как осознание потребителями воздействия со стороны фирм влияет на реакцию потребителя на различные маркетинговые стимулы и уменьшение размера продукта, в частности. Степень разработанности проблемы. Интерес к изучению феномена осознания потребителями воздействия со стороны фирм постоянно усиливается, что подтверждается растущим количеством исследований в данной области. Существующие исследования затрагивают широкий спектр маркетинговых стимулов, используемых в области рекламы 2, ценообразования3, связей с общественностью 4, прямых продаж5, управления брендами6, ритейл-маркетинга 7 и др. Исследования тактики уменьшения размера продукта (package downsizing) представлены в крайне ограниченном количестве в академической литературе по маркетингу. Существуют исследования, в которых доказывается, что уменьшение 1 Gupta O. K. et al. Package downsizing: is it ethical? //Ai & Society. – 2007. – Т. 21. – №. 3. – С. 239-250. 2 Jewell R. D., Barone M. J. Norm violations and the role of marketplace comparisons in positioning brands //Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science. – 2007. – Т. 35. – №. 4. – С. 550-559. 3 Hardesty D. M., Bearden W. O., Carlson J. P. Persuasion knowledge and consumer reactions to pricing tactics //Journal of Retailing. – 2007. – Т. 83. – №. 2. – С. 199-210. 4 Foreh M. R., Grier S. When is honesty the best policy? The effect of stated company intent on consumer skepticism //Journal of Consumer Psychology. – 2003. – Т. 13. – №. 3. – С. 349-356. 5 Williams P., Fitzsimons G. J., Block L. G. When consumers do not recognize “benign” intention questions as persuasion attempts //Journal of Consumer Research. – 2004. – Т. 31. – №. 3. – С. 540-550. 6 Van Horen F., Pieters R. Consumer evaluation of copycat brands: The effect of imitation type //International Journal of Research in Marketing. – 2012. – Т. 29. – №. 3. – С. 246-255. 7 Lunardo R., Mbengue A. When atmospherics lead to inferences of manipulative intent: Its effects on trust and attitude //Journal of Business Research. – 2013. – Т. 66. – №. 7. – С. 823-830. 4

размера продукта оказывает позитивное влияние на прибыльность фирм 1. В то же время, есть исследования, согласно которым уменьшение размера продукта может иметь негативные последствия для фирм в условиях, когда потребители осознают, что упаковка продукта была уменьшена, что проявляется в ухудшении репутации фирмы в глазах потребителей2, снижении покупательских намерений в отношении продукта и распространении негативной информации о фирме, использовавшей данную тактику 3. С учетом высокой актуальности вопроса для российского рынка, а также его ограниченного развития в существующей литературе была сформулирована цель исследования. Целью исследования является изучение влияния, которое оказывает осознание потребителем воздействия со стороны фирмы на формирование реакции на уменьшение размера продукта в контексте российского рынка. Для достижения указанной цели были поставлены следующие задачи исследования: 1) Изучить сущность феномена «осознание воздействия» с позиции существующих теорий потребительского поведения; 2) Определить степень разработанности вопроса осознания потребителями воздействия маркетинговых стимулов в контексте уменьшения размера продукта; 3) Эмпирически протестировать, как осознание воздействия со стороны фирмы влияет на реакцию потребителя на уменьшение размера продукта; 4) Разработать практические рекомендации по применению полученных в рамках исследования выводов в управленческой практике. Объектом исследования является реакция потребителей на уменьшение размера продукта. Предметом исследования является роль осознания воздействия маркетинговых стимулов в формировании реакции потребителя. Структура исследования подчинена поставленным задачам. В первой главе производится теоретический анализ феномена «осознание воздействия» с позиции существующих теорий потребительского поведения. Во второй главе определяется степень разработанности вопроса осознания потребителями воздействия маркетинговых стимулов 1 Cakır M., Balagtas J. V. Consumer response to package downsizing: Evidence from the Chicago Ice Cream Market //Journal of Retailing. – 2014. – Т. 90. – №. 1. – С. 1-12. 2 Kachersky L. Reduce content or raise price? The impact of persuasion knowledge and unit price increase tactics on retailer and product brand attitudes //Journal of Retailing. – 2011. – Т. 87. – №. 4. – С. 479-488. 3 Wilkins S., Beckenuyte C., butt M. Consumers’ behavioural intentions after experiencing deception or cognitive dissonance caused by deceptive packaging, package downsizing or slack filling //European Journal of Marketing. – 2016. – Т. 50. – №. 1/2. 5

в контексте уменьшения размера продукта, реализуется эмпирическое исследование и разрабатываются практические рекомендации. Теоретическую и методологическую базу исследования составляют работы российских и зарубежных авторов в области теории маркетинга, маркетинговых исследований, поведения потребителей и поведенческой экономики. При проведении исследования используются общенаучные методы познания и методы статистического анализа. Информационная база исследования в к л ю ч а е т в с е б я р е з ул ь т а т ы экспериментального исследования потребителей. Основные результаты работы. В данной работе предпринята попытка рассмотреть феномен осознания потребителями воздействия маркетинговых стимулов, объединив различные его аспекты в единый концептуальный конструкт, а также систематизировать его факторы и последствия. Проведенный обзор существующих исследований показал, что, когда потребитель интерпретирует маркетинговый стимул как намеренно инициированную фирмой попытку воздействия, то он, во-первых, более критически оценивает его, препятствуя тому, чтобы маркетинговый стимул произвел «задуманный» эффект, и во-вторых, изменяет свои оценочные суждения относительно связанных с попыткой воздействия продуктов или фирм. Сформулированные на основании проведенного обзора литературы заключения протестированы на примере тактики уменьшения размера продукта (package downsizing) в контексте российского рынка. Результаты исследования демонстрируют, что уменьшение размера продукта может быть выгодной с точки зрения сохранения продаж тактикой, но может привести к репутационным потерям в условиях осознания потребителями воздействия со стороны фирмы. Теоретическая значимость исследования. На основании обзора существующих теоретических и эмпирических работ, во-первых, раскрывает сущность феномена осознания потребителем воздействия маркетинговых стимулов и, во-вторых, обобщает факторы, обуславливающие возникновение феномена, и последствия его возникновения для потребителей и фирм. Практическая значимость исследования. С учетом выявленной в работе значимости осознания потребителями воздействия маркетинговых стимулов для функционирования фирм, представляется логичной и актуальной рекомендация включить 6

данный феномен в число изучаемых и постоянно контролируемых показателей со стороны фирм. Глава 1. Теоретические основы проблемы осознания потребителем воздействия маркетинговых стимулов 7

По материалам научного доклада «When Consumers Activate Persuasion Knowledge: Review of Antecedents and Consequences». Working Paper # 5 (E)–2016. Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg State University: SPb, 2016. Companies invest significant resources in consumer research. Understanding the peculiarities of consumer behavior in the market allows companies to take strategic and tactical actions that are more convincing for consumers and, as a consequence, more effective for the firm. Consumers, like companies, accumulate information and knowledge about the market mechanisms through personal experience, media exposure or other sources. A special type of knowledge consumers develop over time is persuasion knowledge that includes consumer beliefs about marketing tactics used by firms to influence consumers. Interest in research on persuasion knowledge is constantly increasing, as evidenced by the growing number of articles in this area (see Appendix 1). Existing research on the role of persuasion knowledge in consumer response to marketing stimuli embraces a wide range of marketing tools used in the field of advertising [Jewell, Barone, 2007], pricing [Hardesty et al., 2007], public relations [Foreh, Grier, 2003], interpersonal selling [Williams et al., 2004], brand management [Van Horen, Pieters, 2012], retail marketing [Lunardo, Mbengue, 2013], and others. In spite of the fact that the studies are linked by common theoretical construct "persuasion knowledge", they are mostly fragmented and cover different aspects of the construct. Moreover, research results are quite diverse and there is a need of systematization. The purpose of this article is to develop an integrated model that clarifies the role of persuasion knowledge in consumer response to marketing stimulus. The article gathers empirical evidence on the problem of persuasion knowledge activation for the purpose of further theory development. Firstly, it sheds light on how different aspects of phenomenon are addressed in the extant studies, and shows how the studies are connected. Secondly, the author systematizes the antecedents and consequences of persuasion knowledge activation. Ultimately, future research directions are highlighted in the article. In the first section of the article the author introduces persuasion knowledge model (PKM) [Friestad, Wright, 1994] as well as its adaptation to the consumer behavior context. The second section includes analysis of key concepts related to PKM and their relationships. The third and fourth sections summarize the antecedents and consequences of persuasion knowledge activation respectively. The article concludes with possible practical implications and promising directions for future research in this area. Consumer Response to Marketing Stimuli: Persuasion Knowledge Perspective Interactions with consumers are the core of marketing practice. Inter alia, interactions include marketers’ attempts to persuade and influence consumers using stimulus related to 4Ps [Kotler, Keller, 2012]. Consumer response to this stimulus is dependent upon a variety of individual and external factors, and persuasion knowledge is one of them. The term “persuasion knowledge” was firstly coined in the seminal article by Friestad and Wright [1994]. The authors positioned persuasion knowledge as a part of a broader model – Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM) – that embraces the key elements and mechanisms involved into persuasion episodes (see Figure 1). 8

Figure 1. Persuasion Knowledge Model Source: [Friestad, Wright, 1994] Persuasion (and influence) is a process that involves an agent and a target. The term "targets" refers to those people for whom a persuasion attempt is intended (e.g., consumers, voters). The term "agent" represent whomever a target identifies as being responsible for designing and constructing a persuasion attempt (e.g., the company responsible for an advertising campaign; an individual salesperson). Persuasion attempt describes the target's perception of an agent's strategic behavior in presenting information designed to influence someone's beliefs, attitudes, decisions, or actions (e.g., ad, sales presentation, or message). Persuasion episode implies a directly observable part of persuasion attempt, from consumers’ point of view. For instance, if a consumer, when confronted with a particular advertising message, treats it as a company's attempt to persuade the consumer to buy the advertised product, the contact with an advertising message, per se, is regarded as a persuasion episode impacts and consumer thoughts about the nature, motives, and causes of persuasion tactics are perceived persuasion attempt. When the target recognizes persuasion attempt, he tries to cope with it. Coping can be in form of maintaining control over the outcome or more active resistance to a persuasion attempt. Whether the consumer recognizes persuasion attempt or not, depends on consumer knowledge about an agent, topic, and persuasion, per se. Agent knowledge may be information regarding manufactures’ credibility [Artz, Tybout, 1999]; topic knowledge may be information about brands [Wei, Fischer, Main, 2008] or issues raised in the message (e.g. environmental issues) [Xie, Kronrod, 2012]. The authors pay special attention to persuasion knowledge which is “a set of interrelated beliefs about (a) the psychological events that are instrumental to 9

persuasion, (b) the causes and effects of those events, (c) the importance of the events, (d) the extent to which people can control their psychological responses, (e) the temporal course of the persuasion process, and (f) the effectiveness and appropriateness of particular persuasion tactics” [Friestad, Wright, 1994]. The following elements (aspects) of persuasion knowledge are worth being highlighted:  Recognition of persuasion attempt implies beliefs related to a mere acknowledgement that the marketing stimulus is used as a persuasion tool;  Inferences of persuasion motives are beliefs about the possible end goals of marketer;  Beliefs about the effectiveness of marketing tactics relate to how much the marketing stimulus may affect his mental processes and behavior;  Beliefs about the appropriateness of marketing tactics are based on the comparison of the marketing tactics with the "rules of the game", including notions of fairness which are typically built into the culture, meaning they are shared by many members of the sociocultural environment in which the consumer lives. Persuasion knowledge is an important construct for consumers, because almost every interaction with marketing stimulus can be regarded as a persuasion episode, in which the company is trying to convince consumers that the product possesses some qualities, that the company is socially responsible, etc. and, thus, influence consumers’ behavior (for example, to persuade consumers to purchase the product). At the moment of interaction with a specific marketing stimulus consumer may use his accumulated knowledge to interpret the marketing stimulus and form an appropriate response to it. Consumers differ in the volume and content of persuasion knowledge (between-subject differentiation), which partly explains the differences in the interpretations, and consequently, in the reactions of different consumers to the same marketing stimulus. Furthermore, persuasion knowledge is a dynamic structure that may change over time due to various factors, so the consumer may have different volume and content of persuasion knowledge (within-subject differentiation) at different times, and interprets and responds to the same marketing stimulus differently. To illustrate how consumer knowledge can influence the perception of a marketing stimulus, we refer to the study of Kasherski and Kim [2010], who examined consumer perceptions of different price presentation. They asked respondents "Why do you think some retailers indicate the price taking into account the cost of delivery (inclusive prices), while others indicate the cost of delivery separately (partitioned prices)?”. Some respondents interpreted inclusive prices as a deliberate concealment of price structure that prevents the correct assessment of the price, and preferred partitioned price presentation; others perceived partitioned prices as a format that makes the consumer focus on the base price of the product and leads to an underestimation of the total costs, and preferred inclusive prices. Differences in interpretations suggest that different consumers have different views how different pricing tactics affect them and why firms use some tactics, which is, inter alia, due to differences in persuasion knowledge. Consumer response to a marketing stimulus depend on whether the consumer perceives it as a deliberate persuasion attempt. Recognition of persuasion attempt entails a change in the consumer reaction to a given stimulus (“change of meaning” [Friestad, Wright, 1994]). To demonstrate this principle, we can refer to research on children perceptions of advertising. For example, Robertson and Rossiter [1974] found that when watching television commercials children can identify two types of advertising intents: informational ("commercials are designed to transmit facts and information") and persuasive ("commercials are designed to affect consumer attitude to the product or consumer buying behavior"). It was found that with age children more often prescribe to the advertising persuasive intents as opposed to informational intents, thus changing the interpretation of the commercial over time. Along with the change of 10

meaning there are changes in children’s reaction to commercials: reduced confidence and deteriorating attitude towards commercials, decreased motivation to buy the advertised product, etc. Persuasion knowledge is not the only factor that influences consumer interpretation of marketing stimuli. Figure 2 is a diagram integrating the antecedents and consequences of consumer persuasion knowledge activation, which, in the author’s opinion, provides a comprehensive understanding of the role of persuasion knowledge activation in the consumer response to marketing stimuli. In more detail the model elements will be reviewed in the following paragraphs. Figure 2. Antecedents and Consequences of Persuasion Knowledge Activation Source: [Friestad, Wright, 1994; Campbell, Kirmani, 2008] Persuasion Knowledge: Terminological Analysis Understanding the role of persuasion knowledge activation in consumer response to marketing stimuli is impossible without a clear understanding of distinctions and relations between the terms “accumulated persuasion knowledge” and “situationally activated persuasion knowledge” as well as their elements. Heretofore, accumulated persuasion knowledge is considered as consumer persuasion-related beliefs which the consumer has at a specific point in time and which have been accumulated on the basis of previous marketplace experiences or external information, and situationally activated persuasion knowledge is beliefs activated at the moment of exposure to a marketing stimulus [Campbell, Kirmani, 2008] (see Figure 2). When exposed to a marketing stimulus, consumers may activate thoughts about the persuasion nature of a stimulus (How does the marketer persuade me?), about the firm’s motives (Why does the marketer try to persuade me?), about the effectiveness and appropriateness of persuasion attempts (To what extent is a persuasion attempt effective and appropriate?). Undoubtedly, the distinction between the above mentioned elements is conditional and is undertaken in order to facilitate understanding of the possible directions of consumers’ thoughts. Researchers have shown that the more persuasion knowledge and expertise consumers possess, the more likely they recognize marketing tactics as persuasion attempts [Verlegh et al., 2013]. However, it is not universal. For instance, even when consumers know that firms can exaggerate the positive properties of the product in advertising to influence the consumer's opinion, they can fail to recognize the persuasion attempt at the moment of exposure to a 11

particular advertisement and believe the advertising information on the properties of the product under the influence of other factors. Reinforcing and developing the ideas set out in the PKM, the researchers operate with a variety of terms, which are to some extent related to the concept of persuasion knowledge. An attempt to systematize the terminology used in the literature is undertaken in Table 1. 12

Table 1. Overview of the Terms Related to Persuasion Knowledge Definition Elements of persuasion knowledge Nature of the construct + Advertising skepticism [Obermiller, Spangenberg, 1998] General tendency to distrust advertising messages. + Situational skepticism [Foreh, Grier, 2003] Situational state of distrust to others and their motives. + + Dispositional skepticism [Foreh, Grier, 2003] General tendency to distrust others. + + Sentiment toward marketing [Gaski and Etzel, 1986] General tendency to think that firms are customeroriented or not. + Inferred sincerity of the motives [Yoon, Gürhan-Canli, Schwarz, 2006] Judgements related to how agent’s stated motives correspond to real motives. + + Inferences of hidden motives [Campbell, Kirmani, 2000] Judgements about the presence of agent’s hidden egoistic motives. + + Prior knowledge about agents’ motives [Verlegh et al., 2013] Consumer knowledge about agents’ motives that has been accumulated prior to a particular episode of Situationally activated + Accumulated Psychological state when a consumer assumes that an agent might have some hidden motive. Fairness judgments [Fein 1996; Ferguson, et al., 2011] Suspicion Effectiveness judgments Inferred motives Source Awareness of persuasion tactics Term + + + + + + + + 13

consumer-agent interaction. Perceived effectiveness Perceived harm Inferences of manipulative intent Perceived deception Perceived procedural fairness [Xie, Johnson, 2015] Consumer judgements related to how a tactic might influence himself and others. + [Xie, Madrigal, Boush, 2015] Expected severity of negative consequences cause by a marketing tactics. + [Campbell, 1995] Consumer judgements that an agent might have an intent to persuade or influence consumer in an inappropriate and manipulative manner. + + + + + + [Xie, Madrigal, Boush, 2015] An extent to which a marketing tactic is perceived as deceptive or misleading. + [Kukar-Kinney, Xia, Monroe, 2007] Consumer judgements related to the correspondence of marketing tactics, procedures, and processes to the existing norms and rules. + Subjective persuasion knowledge [Bearden et al., 2001] Pricing tactics persuasion knowledge [Hardesty et al., 2007] + Subjective consumers’ evaluation of their knowledge of marketing tactics. + + + Consumer knowledge of different pricing tactics used in the marketplace, their influence mechanisms, and agents’ intents behind their usage. + + + + 14

Terminological analysis revealed a significant number of terms used by researchers to describe consumers' perceptions of persuasion attempts. This terminological diversity can be explained with, at least, several reasons: a) The use of different terms to describe similar concepts in different contexts Inter alia, differences in terminology occur due to the existence of different research traditions. For example, researchers in the field of advertising used the construct "skepticism" long before the PKM [Nelson, 1975]. Researchers in the field of pricing have traditionally used the construct "fairness" to describe consumer judgments about the appropriateness of price setting procedures, price presentations, and established price levels [Campbell, 1999]. The later constructs "inferences of manipulative intent" and "perceived deception" are conceptually similar constructs used in another context. b) The use of different terms to describe different aspects of the phenomenon Researchers used a variety of ways to categorize consumer inferences of firms’ motives. In particular, in the studies there have been used such dichotomous categories as "private vs public interests“ [Foreh, Grier, 2003], "increase profits vs compensate of costs of production“ [Campbell, 1999], and others. Similarly, researchers of skepticism revealed a variety of aspects of the phenomenon: situational skepticism, suggesting the presence of the consumer of certain feelings or thoughts at some point of time, and dispositional skepticism associated with the general consumer attitudes to the world [Foreh, Grier, 2003]. c) The use of different operationalization approaches Using different operationalization approaches is not a problem, per se. The difficulties arise when measurement scales relate to incommensurate concepts that are masked by a single term. For example, persuasion knowledge in the studies of Bearden et al. [2001] and Hardesty et al. [2007] is defined similarly, but operationalized using different scales which essentially measure the two different types of persuasion knowledge - subjective ( "what consumers think they knows") and objective ( "what consumers really know"). The use of different terms to describe similar concepts, due to differences in the historical trajectory of scientific fields, or the desire to highlight a particular aspect of the phenomenon does not bring to complications, provided that there is a clear understanding of the relationships between these concepts. Despite that, researchers have repeatedly argued for a more "economical" attitude towards the usage of terminology to avoid the theoretical and empirical contradictions caused by terminological negligence [Campbell, Kirmani, 2008]. Antecedents of Persuasion Knowledge Activation It is important to note that the accumulated consumer persuasion knowledge cannot always result in activation of persuasion-related inferences in a particular situation. The differences in the ability of consumers to activate persuasion knowledge can be due to a variety of factors, including: a) Individual characteristics Among the characteristics that have an impact on the ability to recognize persuasive nature of marketing stimuli, the age and field of consumer professional activities have been identified [Boush, Friestad, and Rose 1994; Friestad and Wright 1995]. Kirmani and Zhu [2007] examined the role of regulatory focus (regulatory focus characterizes the individual's strategy for achieving their goals) and came to the conclusion that consumers focused on achieving positive results are more likely to realize the persuasive nature of marketing stimuli than consumers focused on minimizing negative results. b) Marketing stimulus characteristics 15

Some marketing incentives are more likely to be perceived as persuasion attempts. For example, commercials, wherein the disclosure of the advertised brand occurs only at the end with the purpose to attract consumer attention by creating a sense of suspense, are perceived by consumers as more manipulative than traditional commercials, where disclosure of the brand comes in the beginning [Campbell, 1995]. Partitioned prices that have already been mentioned in the article are more often perceived by consumers as "created with the intention to convince and influence" than inclusive prices [Kachersky, Kim , 2010]. c) Situational characteristics For example, Campbell and Kirmani [2000] have shown that persuasion knowledge activation depends on whether the individual acts as a direct recipient or the observer of persuasion episode. The cognitive intensity of the situations differs. The recipient usually spends more cognitive resources to solve problems arisen within the episode than an observer. Thus, the recipient will have fewer cognitive resources to spend on persuasion-related inferences than the observer, so the observer is more inclined to recognize persuasion attempts than a direct participant in the episode of exposure. Consequences of Persuasion Knowledge Activation In the existing literature there is a significant number of attempts undertaken to investigate the response of consumers to various marketing stimuli in a situation of persuasion knowledge activation. Research of the consequences of persuasion knowledge activation covers a wide range of marketing tools used in various fields of marketing practices. Despite the diversity of marketing stimulus, consumer response is exhibited in a limited number of “coping tactics”: 1) Critical assessment of the product offering, counterargument and counterbehavior (the formation of attitudes and behaviors that are contrary to those instigated in the marketing stimulus); 2) Less favorable assessment of the marketing stimulus (in comparison with a situation where the consumer does not recognize persuasive nature of marketing stimulus); 3) Less favorable assessment of the product; 4) Weakening of consumer intentions and behaviors in relation to the product; 5) Less favorable assessment of the company initiating marketing tactics; 6) Less favorable assessment of related subjects (e.g. the sponsored event; distributor’s products); 7) Supportiveness of the legal regulation of marketing activities. Examples of the above stated coping responses are given in Table 2. 16

Table 2. The Effect of Persuasion Knowledge Activation on Consumer Response to Marketing Stimulus Marketing area Advertising Pricing Interpersonal selling Marketing stimulus Source Comparative advertising [Jewell, Barone, 2007] Guilt appeals [Hibbert et al., 2007; Cotte et al., 2005] Brand placement [Wei et al., 2008] Advertising frequency [Campbell, Keller, 2003] Price increase [Campbell, 1999] Tensile price claims [Hardesty et al., 2007] Baseline omission [Xie, Johnson, 2015] Asking intention questions [Williams et al., 2004] Main findings Within-category comparisons were perceived as a more appropriate tactic and were thus more effective in positioning the focal brand than were between-category comparisons. Guilt arousal is positively related to donation intention, and that persuasion and agent knowledge impact the extent of guilt aroused. Manipulative intent and the respondents' skepticism toward advertising tactics in general are negatively related to guilt arousal but that their affective evaluation and beliefs about a charity are positively related to feelings of guilt. However, there is a positive direct relationship between perceived manipulative intent and the intention to donate. Persuasion knowledge activation can negatively affect consumer evaluations of embedded brands; however, negative effects are qualified by perceived appropriateness of covert marketing tactics and by brand familiarity. Further evidence indicates a condition under which activation can actually have a positive effect on consumer evaluations. Negative thoughts about tactic inappropriateness were seen to arise with repetition, particularly for an ad for an unfamiliar brand, driving, in part, the decreases in repetition effectiveness. When participants inferred that the firm had a negative motive for a price increase, the increase was perceived as significantly less fair than the same increase when participants inferred that the firm had a positive motive. Perceived unfairness leads to lower shopping intentions. Individuals with higher levels of pricing tactic persuasion knowledge (PTPK) were shown to have more knowledge-related thoughts regarding pricing tactic information and exhibited more purchase interest following exposure to tensile claim offers than those with low levels of PTPK. Consumers tend to perceive baseline omission as more effective on others than on themselves. The self-others difference is more salient among consumers with more persuasion knowledge. Consumers’ concerns about its effectiveness on themselves, rather than on others, better predict their supportiveness to regulate the use of baseline omission. When persuasive intent is attributed to an intention question, consumers adjust their behavior as long as they have sufficient cognitive capacity to permit conscious correction. When respondents are educated that an intention question is a persuasive attempt, the behavioral impact of those Type of response* 2, 3 1, 2, 4, 5 2, 5, 6 2, 3 2, 4 4 7 1 17

Public Relations Branding Product policy Sponsorship [Foreh, Grier, 2003] Video news releases [Nelson, Park, 2015] Brand imitation [Van Horen, Pieters, 2012] Brand names and slogans [Laran et al., 2011] Versioning [Gershoff, Kivetz, Keinan, 2012] [Brown, Krishna, 2004] Default options Retailing Atmosphere of the retail store [Lunardo, Mbengue, 2013] questions is attenuated. Consumer evaluation of the sponsoring firm was lowest in conditions when firm-serving benefits were salient and the firm outwardly stated purely public-serving motives. The potential negative effects of skepticism were the most pronounced when individuals engaged in causal attribution prior to company evaluation. Viewers’ beliefs about and perceptions of credibility in a news story are altered when they acquire persuasion knowledge about VNRs and learn that the source of the story was an unedited VNR. Consumers consider feature imitation to be unacceptable and unfair, which causes reactance toward the copycat brand. Yet, even though consumers are aware of the use of theme imitation, it is perceived to be more acceptable and less unfair, which helps copycat evaluation. Brands cause priming effects (i.e., behavioral effects consistent with those implied by the brand), whereas slogans cause reverse priming effects (i.e., behavioral effects opposite to those implied by the slogan). For instance, exposure to the retailer brand name “Walmart,” typically associated with saving money, reduces subsequent spending, whereas exposure to the Walmart slogan, “Save money. Live better,” increases it. The production method of versioning may be perceived as unfair and unethical and lead to decreased purchase intentions for the brand. A default option can invoke a consumer's “marketplace metacognition,” his/her social intelligence about marketplace behavior that leads to different predictions than accounts based on cognitive limitations or endowment: in particular, it predicts the possibility of negative or “backfire” default effects. Incongruent store environments urge consumers to make inferences of manipulative intent from the retailers, and that those inferences negatively influence consumer's perception of the retailers' integrity, and attitudes toward the atmosphere and the retailers. 5 2 2, 3 1 2, 4 1 5 *The number in the row corresponds to the following coping tactics: [1] Critical assessment of the product offering, counterargument and counterbehavior; [2] Less favorable assessment of the marketing stimulus; [3] Less favorable assessment of the product; [4] Weakening of consumer intentions and behaviors in relation to the product; [5] Less favorable assessment of the company initiating marketing tactics; [6] Less favorable assessment of related subjects; [7] Supportiveness of the legal regulation of marketing activities. 18

Correction of judgment and behavior usually occurs in a direction opposite to that intended with marketing stimulus. Instead of the expected favorable attitude to the product and higher purchase likelihood, when consumers perceive marketing stimulus as a persuasion attempt, they tend to react in the opposite way: less favorable attitude toward the product, the manufacturer, as well as intermediaries involved in the process. This, as a result, reduces purchase likelihood and accelerates switching to competitive offerings. Moreover, the lack of trust between the consumer and the firm can lead to resistance to buy not only a particular product, but all products related to the firm [Reichheld, Schefter, 2000]. However, it is worth noting that despite the dominant number of adverse consequences for businesses resulting from persuasion knowledge activation, there is a precedent when persuasion knowledge activation had a positive impact on the assessment of the brand [Wei et al., 2008]. The above examples demonstrate the importance of consumer perceptions of marketing stimulus for consumers themselves, companies that initiate marketing activities, and intermediaries that implement marketing activities (e.g., distributors and media agencies). Let us consider in more detail the possible outcomes of firm-consumer interactions when persuasion knowledge is activated and inhibited (see Figure 3). Figure 3. Matrix of Firm-Consumer Interaction Outcomes An equivalent interaction can take place when neither the company intends to persuade the consumer, nor the consumer mistakenly attributes persuasion intent to marketing stimuli. However, this situation is very unlikely in the context of modern highly competitive environment wherein marketers use a wide arsenal of marketing tools to attract attention and retain customers. An equivalent interaction also occurs when a firm intention fully understood by the consumer and the firm correctly evaluates consumer persuasion knowledge that may affect its response to the tactics used. When a company has no information about consumer persuasion knowledge, it is in a vulnerable position, since the expected efficiency of the marketing stimulus may differ from the real effect produced by the use of the stimulus. That point highlights the importance for companies to study consumers under a new angle: not only consumers’ perceptions of companies and products are important, but also their perceptions of marketing tools used by companies. If the firm lacks understanding of this aspect, it could lead to a kind of "marketing myopia“ [Levitt, 1960]. A situation when the consumer is not aware of persuasion intent, as a rule, leads to an unfavorable outcome for the consumer (e.g., psychological dissatisfaction or financial losses).

It can occur when the consumer has insufficient amount of knowledge and experience. Such a situation may arise in the case of immature consumers (children and adolescents) [Robertson et al., 1974], consumers in the new or emerging market, who have not yet developed immunity to the marketing tactics of influence used by companies and are easily influenced by marketing tools [Feick , Gierl, 1996; La Ferle, Kuber, Edwards, 2013]. It is worth noting that despite persuasion knowledge allows consumers to use the arsenal of coping tactics in response to marketing persuasion attempts, it may not always be properly activated. As previously mentioned, the consumer may attribute to the firms’ actions ulterior motives even in the absence of such intentions on the side of the firm [Koslow, 2000]. The reasons for such an outcome may be a false attribution of the recipient caused by excessive skepticism about marketing in general, about certain marketing tools, such as advertising, about certain products or firms. This situation, of course, is problematic for the company, because it reduces the effectiveness of a marketing stimulus. It can also lead to consumers’ disadvantages, because it distorts objective information and prevents consumers from selecting the best alternative. Conclusion Consumer persuasion knowledge plays an important role in the consumer response to various marketing stimuli. A review of the empirical studies has shown that, when consumers interpret marketing stimuli as persuasion attempts, firstly, they evaluate these marketing stimuli more critically and, secondly, modify their judgements and behavior with respect to marketing stimuli, related products and firms. Generally, this leads to adverse consequences for firms. However, it is not justified to claim that persuasion knowledge activation always results in unfavorable outcomes for companies. For instance, when consumers perceive persuasion attempt as "fair" or "appropriate", they cannot modify their behavior. Different persuasion-related beliefs as well as its antecedent and consequences are discussed in the article. Given the persuasion knowledge has a significant effect of consumer response to marketing stimuli, it is reasonable for firms to include it in the list of permanently tracked consumer characteristics. Together with economic, demographic and other characteristics of consumers, persuasion knowledge can be regarded as a basis for consumer segmentation, so that firms can tailor marketing stimuli to each group of consumers. In addition to taking persuasion knowledge as given, firms can take an active part in their formation and management with the help of marketing communications and consumer education. Despite the variety of empirical studies on persuasion knowledge, the conceptual core of the phenomenon remained unchanged and almost did not get a theoretical extension since the introduction of the concept into scientific discourse in 1994. Furthermore, some empirical studies have generated conflicting results, which provides fertile grounds for further researching and strengthening the theoretical foundations of persuasion knowledge. It seems promising to further test the relationship between accumulated and situationally activated persuasion knowledge, which has been done only once so far in [Verlegh et al., 2013]. It is also worth examining how persuasion knowledge change over time. The need to include into the economic theory some factors that take into account the ability of economic agents to learn their surroundings and change their economic behavior based on acquired information has been announced long before the PKM [Simon, 1959]. In the PKM it becomes even more appealing to undertake longitudinal studies that trace consumer persuasion knowledge over time, because consumers are not "in a vacuum": they constantly update their knowledge and, in turn, alter the reaction to a marketing stimulus. Thus, the consumer reaction to the same marketing incentive may be different at different times, which certainly should be considered marketing practices in the planning and implementation of marketing activities aimed at consumers. 20

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Глава 2. Исследование роли осознания потребителем воздействия со стороны фирмы в формировании реакции на уменьшение размера продукта 2.1. Уменьшение размера продукта как ценовая тактика По материалам статьи «Цена и размер продукта как альтернативные инструменты влияния на поведение потребителей на рынке товаров повседневного спроса». Маркетинг и маркетинговые исследования 6 (2014): 424-432. Растущая конкуренция на многих рынках товаров и услуг заставляет компании постоянно искать новые способы привлечения внимания и интереса потребителей. Сохранение и упрочнение рыночных позиций невозможно без понимания поведенческих реакций потребителей на принимаемые фирмой маркетинговые решения. Превращение потребителя в центральную фигуру на высококонкурентных рынках подчеркивает важность изучения поведения потребителей с точки зрения потребности бизнеса и необходимость выявления новых паттернов их поведения, способных повлиять на деятельность компании. Несмотря на долгую традицию изучения потребительского поведения, актуальность данной области исследований продолжает оставаться высокой. Ограниченность экономического подхода, преобладавшего на более раннем этапе развития науки о потребителе и потреблении, способствует обращению интереса современных ученых к междисциплинарным исследованиям, опирающимся на социологические, психологические и антропологические методы. Использование междисциплинарного подхода дает возможность комплексно посмотреть на поведение потребителя, позволяя конструировать модели потребительского поведения, наиболее точно и подробно описывающие реальную картину. В данной работе исследуется вопрос влияния на потребителя таких маркетинговых инструментов, как цена и размер продукта. На основании обзора существующих работ по данному вопросу определяется степень разработанности проблемы, и выявляются малоизученные направления исследований, которые являются перспективными как с теоретической, так и с практической точек зрения. Покупательское поведение потребителей на рынке товаров повседневного спроса Под покупательским поведением потребителей, как правило, понимается совокупность психологических процессов и физических действий отдельных лиц или групп лиц, которые имеют место при осуществлении ими покупки товаров и услуг с целью конечного потребления [3]. Согласно определению покупательское поведение потребителей можно условно разделить на психологическую (когнитивную/аффективную) и поведенческую компоненты. Психологическая компонента может выражаться в отношении к продукту/ бренду/ производителю, суждениях о качестве продукта и др., а поведенческая компонента, связанная с действиями потребителя в отношении продукта – в намерении покупателя совершить покупку, готовности платить за продукт определенную цену, выбор продукта из ряда альтернатив и др. Процесс покупки товаров повседневного спроса часто характеризуется низкой степенью вовлеченности. В результате чего потребители не производят глубокого поиска и анализа информации о продукте, а полагаются на такие внешние индикаторы, 25

как цена продукта, упаковка продукта (в том числе ей размер), страна-производитель, известность бренда продукта и др. Влияние цены и размера продукта на поведение потребителей: текущее состояние вопроса Цена как объект изучения экономической науки имеет длинную историю. В микроэкономике цена продукта является основополагающим фактором, определяющим потребительский спрос на продукт, наряду с доходом потребителя ценами на конкурентные товары (товары-заменители). Раздел микроэкономики, в котором изучается вопрос о том, какой товар или набор товаров выбирает потребитель при заданных ограничениях, называется теорией потребительского выбора и спроса. Согласно закону спроса, для большинства товаров между ценой и спросом на продукт существует обратная зависимость: снижение цены провоцирует за собой увеличение спроса на продукт при прочих равных условиях. Для того чтобы измерить реакцию покупательского спроса к изменению цены используется коэффициент эластичности спроса, который определяется как процентное изменение количества спроса, деленное на процентное изменение цены. Подход к влиянию изменения цены на поведение потребителя, используемый в маркетинге, несмотря на схожесть по ключевым вопросам, несколько отличается от микроэкономического подхода, в том числе своей терминологической базой. Так, спрос на продукт обусловлен восприятием потребителями ценности продукта, которая в свою очередь зависит от соотношения воспринимаемых выгод (размер продукта, качество продукта и др.) и воспринимаемых затрат на приобретение продукта (цена, время, потраченное на приобретение и др.) [16]. Продукты, обладающие более высокой воспринимаемой ценностью для потребителя, как правило, пользуются большим потребительским спросом: из двух одинаковых по своим характеристикам и предоставляемым выгодам альтернатив потребитель предпочтет тот, цена на который ниже. Производя оценку изменения цены, потребитель не просто количественно измеряет изменение своих выгод, но и делает суждения относительно того, было ли данное изменение справедливым или несправедливым, существенным или несущественным, большим или маленьким, что в конечном итоге также оказывает влияние на спрос на данный продукт [1]. Также в маркетинге появляется понятие референтной цены – цены, на которую потребитель ориентируется и с которой сравнивает цену интересующего его товара. При этом базой для формирования референтной цены может служить не только уровень цен на рынке и цены аналогичных товаров, но и внутренние субъективные представления потребителя о цене, предшествующий опыт приобретения продукта [9]. В отличие от цены, проблема влияния изменения размера продукта на покупательское поведение потребителей не получила широкого распространения в научной литературе. Но востребованность данного инструмента является высокой: компании прибегают как к увеличению (product supersizing), так и к сокращению размера единицы продукта (product downsizing). Поскольку от размера продукта (при прочих равных условиях) во многом зависят выгоды, которые получит потребитель от покупки, размер продукта и уровень спроса на продукт для большинства продуктов связаны прямой зависимостью. Существует ряд работ, в которых производится сравнительное исследование чувствительности покупательского спроса к эквивалентным изменениям цены и размера продукта. Результаты некоторых исследований представлены в Таблице 1. 26

Таблица 1. Сравнение чувствительности потребительского спроса к изменению цены и размера продукта1 Исследование [Hardesty, Bearden, 2003] [Mishra, Mishra, 2011] [Gourville, Koehler, 2004] [Cakir, Balagtas, 2013] [Imai, Watanabe, 2014] Характер изменения ценности продукта Увеличение Увеличение Уменьшение Уменьшение Уменьшение Метод исследования Категория продуктов Модераторы Лабораторный эксперимент Зубная паста Мыло Размер предоставляемой выгоды 1) Высокий 2) Умеренный и невысокий Полезность продукта для здоровья: 1) Полезные для здоровья продукты 2) Вредные для здоровья продукты Лабораторный эксперимент Лабораторный эксперимент Панельные сканнер-данные Панельные сканнер-данные Панельные сканнер-данные Черничные маффины с низким содержанием жиров (как относительно полезный для здоровья продукт) и шоколадное печенье (как вредный для здоровья продукт), реализуемые в кофейнях Starbucks Кофе Результаты E(price) > E(size) E(price) = E(size) E(price) < E(size) E(price) > E(size) - E(price) > E(size) Мороженое - E(price) > E(size) Различные категории товаров потребительского спроса - E(price) = E(size) Готовые обеды Хардести и Берден [6] осуществили серию лабораторных экспериментов с товарами повседневного спроса. В одном из экспериментов авторы исследуют эффективность различных форматов промо-акций на примере тюбика зубной пасты размером 5,2 унций, который изначально предлагался по цене $2,59 (или $0,5 за унцию). Они сравнивают реакцию потребителей на ценовую скидку в размере 10%, 25% и 50% от прежней цены с предложением 10%, 25% и 50% бонусного количества зубной пасты соответственно по прежней цене. По результатам эксперимента потребители оказались одинаково чувствительны к ценовой скидке и бонусному продукту в размерах 10% и 25%, однако при предложении 50% скидки от прежней цены и 50% бонусного продукта по прежней цене потребители отдали предпочтение первому варианту. Авторы заключают, что в условиях, когда размер предоставляемой выгоды высок, потребитель более чувствителен к уменьшению цены, чем увеличению количества продукта; когда же размер получаемой выгоды воспринимается как невысокий или умеренный, потребитель одинаково чувствителен и к изменению цены, и к изменению количества продукта. Стоит отметить, что с точки зрения экономики 50% скидка от прежней цены за упаковку продукта и 50% бонусного продукта по прежней цене не являются эквивалентными предложениями, так как в первом случае цена за 1 унцию продукта составляет $0,25, а во втором – $0.33. В связи с этим, предпочтение потребителем скидки в размере 50% увеличению размера продукта на 50% при прежней цене является экономически рациональным выбором. Однако расчет коэффициентов ценовой эластичности спроса позволяет более точно и глубоко проанализировать реакцию потребителей на соответствующие предложения и выявить паттерны поведения, отклоняющиеся от общепринятых в классической экономической теории взглядов. Пример расчета коэффициентов на основании данных, полученных в исследовании Хардести и Бердена, приведен в Таблице 2. 1 В качестве показателей чувствительности спроса использованы коэффициент ценовой эластичности спроса при изменении номинальной цены за упаковку продукта E(price) и коэффициент ценовой эластичности спроса при изменении размера продукта E(size) (пример расчета коэффициентов приведен далее в тексте статьи). 27

Таблица 2. Расчет коэффициентов ценовой эластичности спроса при изменении номинальной цены за упаковку продукта и размера продукта1 Формат промоакции Наименование показателя Стоимость одной унции продукта Ценовая скидка Уровень спроса E(price) Стоимость одной унции продукта Бонусный продукт Уровень спроса E(size) Составлено по [Hardesty, Bearden, 2003]. Размер скидки/ бонуса 25% 25% 0.37 0.37 10% 0.45 15.34 18.33 18.33 -1.10 0.45 16.05 50% 0.25 23.05 -0.79 0.40 0.40 18.00 18.00 -1.09 0.33 20.37 -0.75 Важно подчеркнуть, что при расчете ценовой эластичности спроса используется цена за универсальную меру продукта (грамм, миллилитр, унция и др.), а не номинальная цена за упаковку продукта, поскольку именно цена за универсальную единицу отражает реальную стоимость продукта. Как можно увидеть в Таблице 2, абсолютное значение эластичности потребительского спроса при одинаковых изменениях цены за унцию, когда изменение представлено в виде 50% ценовой скидки, больше, чем когда оно представлено в виде предложения 50% дополнительного продукта (|-0.79| > |-0.75|); когда же размер скидки меньше и равен 25%, то значения ценовой эластичности при изменении номинальной цены за упаковку продукта и размера продукта практический равны (|-1.10| ≈ |-1.09|). Коэффициенты ценовой эластичности спроса при изменении номинальной цены за упаковку продукта и размера упаковки продукта в последующих исследованиях осуществляются аналогичным образом. Мишра и Мишра [11], также проведя серию лабораторных экспериментов, заключают, что потребители предпочитают бонусный продукт ценовым скидкам для полезных для здоровья продуктов и обратное для вредных для здоровья продуктов. Авторы связывают это с тем, что потребление дополнительного количества вредного для здоровья продукта ассоциируется у потребителя с негативными последствиями, в связи с чем воспринимаемая ценность подобного предложения снижается, в то время как аналогичное предложение для полезного для здоровья продукта воспринимается потребителем положительно. Гурвилл и Кёлер [5] с помощью лабораторных экспериментов и исследований на основании панельных сканнер-данных выявили, что потребители более чувствительны к увеличению цены, чем уменьшению количества продукта. Сакир и Балактас [4] с помощью модели дискретного выбора оценили изменения спроса на продукт при изменении цены и размера продукта на основе панельных данных, полученных с помощью сканера, об оптовых покупках мороженого домохозяйствами в Чикаго. Главным выводом стало, что потребители менее чувствительны к размеру пакета, чем к цене; эластичность спроса по отношению к размеру пакета составляла примерно одну четвертую величины эластичности спроса по отношению к цене. Причины подобных различий в чувствительности потребительского спроса могут заключаться в существовании визуальных искажений психофизического восприятия и особенностях механизмов «ментального учета». В теории предполагается, что потребители принимают рациональные и логические решения с использованием всей имеющейся информации. Со временем количество информация о продукте, содержащейся на упаковке продукта, значительно возросло. Несмотря на это повышение доступности информации о продукте, исследования свидетельствует о том, что лишь незначительная часть потребителей использует данную информацию, принимая решение о выборе продукта [8]. В результате, потребители не принимают во 1 В таблице рассчитаны коэффициенты точечной эластичности. 28

внимание уменьшение размера продукта и оказываются не в состоянии максимизировать свои выгоды. При совершении покупки потребитель часто полагается не на информацию о реальном количестве продукта, а на воспринимаемое количество продукта, при этом восприятие количества продукта может быть искажено под воздействием размера и формы продукта [15]. Учитывая то, что компании не подвергают информацию об уменьшении количества продукта широкой огласке, уменьшение количества продукта может остаться незамеченным потребителем, если воспринимаемый размер продукта остался неизменным. Имаи и Ватанабе [7], изучив данные о потребительских покупках товаров повседневного спроса в 200 супермаркетах в Японии в 2000-2012 гг., пришли к заключению, что уменьшение размера продукта приводит к уменьшению объемов потребления данного продукта. При этом, в отличие от указанных ранее результатов, авторы утверждают, что чувствительность спроса к изменению размера продукта в Японии в 2000-2012 гг. была практически такой же, как и чувствительность к изменению цен. Таким образом, исследования различий между чувствительностью потребительского спроса к изменениям цены и размера продукта имеют противоречивые результаты. Цена и размер продукта как альтернативные маркетинговые инструменты В управленческой практике изменение размера продукта представляет собой инструмент, альтернативный изменению цены продукта. В частности, выбор одной из указанных альтернатив может иметь место при решении следующих управленческих проблем:  Повысить рентабельность продукта, подняв цену продукта или уменьшив размер единицы продукта?  Простимулировать спрос на продукт, временно уменьшив стоимость продукта или увеличив размер единицы продукта? На все более конкурентном и изменчивом рынке с большим количеством товаров-заменителей, доступных практически для любого продукта повседневного спроса, увеличение цены становится рискованной стратегией для производителей и ритейлеров. Оказавшись в такой ситуации, где рост цен может быть губительным для деятельности компании, компании часто прибегают к модификации упаковки продукта и уменьшению содержимого упаковки при сохранении его цены. Мощным стимулом для компаний, чтобы сохранить цену на нынешнем уровне могут послужить концепции референтной цены и ценового порога. Хотя референтная цена может формироваться под воздействием различных факторов, чрезвычайно важным фактором, определяющим ее, является цена, которую покупатель запоминает от предыдущего приобретения конкретного продукта или продукта в категории [12]. Ценовой порог, с другой стороны, представляет собой диапазон допустимых цен на данный продукт [13]. Монро и Кокс [12] показывают, что покупатели при походе по магазинам обычно используют референтную цену в качестве якоря, против которого они оценивают цены на продукты. Для продуктов, которые могут быть легко замещены и где потребители имеют относительно высокий уровень осведомленности о ценах в категории, верхний ценовой порог на эти продукты, как правило, довольно узкий. Учитывая это, увеличение цены продукта, чтобы улучшить рентабельность, теряет свою привлекательность. Не имея альтернативы, кроме как поддерживать статус-кво в области ценообразования, компании вынуждены идти на сокращение размера единицы продукта, чтобы повысить рентабельность. Таким образом, в целях повышения рентабельности продукта многие компании могут повысить цену на свою продукцию или уменьшить размер единицы производимой продукции, сохраняя цену продукции на прежнем уровне. Обе эти 29

практики могут восприниматься потребителем как сокращение воспринимаемой ценности продукта и привести к переключению на другой продукт, в большей степени отвечающий требованиям потребителя. Принимая во внимание возможную негативную реакцию потребителей, производители, как правило, не афишируют факт уменьшения размера продукта. Однако данная практика довольно активно используется многими компаниями в разных странах. По информации, размещенной на портале lenta.ru в июле 2009 [2], «компания Mars уменьшила массу продаваемых в Великобритании шоколадных батончиков «Марс» и «Сникерс» на 7%. Представители компании признались, что эта мера вызвана увеличившимися затратами на производство. Цена на шоколадные батончики осталась прежней, при этом батончики стали весить 58 граммов вместо прежних 62,5 граммов». С точки зрения неоклассической микроэкономики потребители одинаково реагируют на соизмеримые изменения цены и размера продукта. Однако взгляд на данную проблему с позиции поведенческой экономики и маркетинга, активно задействующих знания из психологии, отличается от утверждений, принятых в неоклассической экономике. Подход, используемый в маркетинге и поведенческой экономике, в отличие от неоклассической микроэкономики, носит позитивный характер и позволяет более точно объяснить поведение экономических объектов, максимально приблизив его к реальному поведению. Опираясь на результаты эмпирических исследований, в которых доказывается, что влияние соизмеримых изменений цены и размера единицы продукта на потребителей различно, а именно потребители более чувствительны к изменению цены при неизменном объеме продукта, чем к изменению количества продукта при неизменной цене (см. Таблицу 1), можно предположить, что при необходимости оптимизировать производственные издержки уменьшение размера продукта представляется менее рискованной стратегией, поскольку уменьшение количества продукта в меньшей степени отразиться на потребительском спросе, чем увеличение цены. В случае же выбора метода стимулирования спроса, временное снижение цены приведет к большему увеличению спроса, чем увеличение размера единицы продукта. Несмотря на краткосрочные выгоды ценового стимулирования спроса (больший прирост спроса за счет сокращения цены, чем увеличения размера продукта), подобная стратегия имеет ряд негативных последствий для деятельности компании в долгосрочной перспективе. В частности, частые ценовые скидки увеличивают чувствительность потребителей к цене [12]. Это означает, что в долгосрочной перспективе спрос на продукцию во время отсутствия ценовых скидок может сокращаться до существенно более низкого уровня, чем тот, который наблюдался при такой же цене до момента использования компанией стратегии постоянного ценового стимулирования продукта. В подобных условиях производители становятся «заложниками» созданной собственными силами ситуации: они вынуждены постоянно предлагать скидки потребителям для того чтобы подержать продажи своей продукции на планируемом уровне. Учитывая данные обстоятельства, использование количественных способов стимулирования спроса представляется перспективной альтернативой. Изучение влияния изменений размера продукта, предоставление дополнительного количества продукта, при стимулировании спроса на продукт на чувствительность спроса может открыть новые аспекты покупательского поведения потребителей, предоставив компаниям дополнительные рычаги воздействия на потребителей в высококонкурентной рыночной среде. Также, частое снижение цен может вызывать у потребителя ассоциации с низким качеством продукта, негативно сказываться на имидже бренда и привести к падению капитала бренда (brand equity) [15]. Эмпирические доказательства того, что увеличение размера продукта имеет подобные последствия отсутствуют. 30

Перспективные направления исследований влияния цены и размера продукта на поведение потребителей Поскольку изменения цены и размера продукта могут рассматриваться как альтернативные маркетинговые инструменты, представляется актуальным более глубокое изучение и сравнение влияния данных инструментов на покупательское поведение потребителей. Центральными в данных условиях становятся следующие вопросы: Существуют ли различия в поведении потребителей при соизмеримых изменениях цены и размера продукта на рынке товаров повседневного спроса? Характерны ли данные различия для разных категорий продуктов? Некоторые потенциальные направления исследований влияния изменений цены и размера продукта на покупательское поведение потребителей представлены в Таблице 3. Маркетинговые задачи и методы их решения Таблица 3. Перспективные направления исследований влияния цены и размера продукта на поведение потребителей Стимулирование спроса: снижение цены VS увеличение размера продукта Повышение рентабельности продукта: повышение цены VS уменьшение размера продукта Аспекты поведения потребителей Чувствительность потребительского спроса Отношение к продукту  Сравнение чувствительности  Изучение влияния периодического потребительского спроса к снижению цены увеличения размера продукта на отношение и соизмеримому увеличению размера к продукту и сравнение данной реакции продукта потребителя с реакцией на сопоставимые  Изучение влияния периодического снижения цены увеличения размера продукта на чувствительность спроса в долгосрочной перспективе и сравнение данной реакции потребителя с реакций на сопоставимые увеличения цены  Сравнение чувствительности  Изучение влияния уменьшения потребительского спроса к повышению размера продукта на отношение потребителя цены и уменьшению размера продукта к продукту и сравнение данной реакции потребителя с реакций на сопоставимое увеличение цены Существующие исследования, в которых производится сравнение влияния соизмеримых изменений цены и размера продукта на поведение потребителей фокусируются на изучении непосредственных действий потребителей, которые выражаются в спросе на продукт. Результаты данных исследований имеют противоречивые результаты и требуют дальнейшей более глубокой проработки. Кроме того, феномен «поведение потребителей» не ограничивается лишь изучением потребительского спроса, а включают в себя целый спектр различных элементов. Изучение психологических аспектов поведения также представляется крайне актуальным, поскольку во многом именно скрытые от прямого наблюдения психологические процессы, происходящие в «черном ящике» сознания потребителей, определяют их дальнейшие поступки. Заключение Поведение потребителей представляет собой динамичный и постоянно подвергающийся изменениям феномен. Вопрос влияния цены на поведение потребителя уходит корнями в экономическую теорию, история которой насчитывает не одно столетие, а также активно освещается в литературе по маркетингу. В то же время размер продукта, как альтернативный цене маркетинговый инструмент, практически не освещался ни в зарубежной, ни в российской научной литературе. При этом, распространенность использования данного инструмента в маркетинговой практике довольно широка: в целях повышения рентабельности продукта многие компании сокращают размер продукта, оставляя цену на неизменной уровне, или стимулируют спрос на продукт с помощью предложения дополнительного количества продукта по неизменной цене. 31

Проведение эмпирических исследований, дающих более глубокое понимание механизмов влияния изменений размера продукта на поведение потребителей, даст компаниям более полное представление о последствиях предпринимаемых ими действий и позволит точнее оценивать их результативность и эффективность. Для теории маркетинга исследование данного вопроса также представляется актуальным, поскольку оно позволяет более комплексно осветить механизмы принятия потребителем решения о покупке и выявить аспекты поведения потребителей, отклоняющиеся от предпосылок о рациональности потребителей, принятых в неоклассической экономической теории. Литература 1. Гладких И.В. (2013). Ценовая стратегия компании: ориентация на потребителя. СПб.: Изд-во «Высшая школа менеджмента». 2. Лента.ру. 2009. Британские шоколадные батончики уменьшились из-за кризиса. Режим доступа: http://lenta.ru/news/2009/06/03/shrink/. 3. Arndt, J. (1976). Reflections on research in consumer behavior. Advances in consumer research, 3(1), 213-221. 4. Cakir, M., Balagtas, J. V., & Okrent, A. M. (2013). The Effects of Package Downsizing on Food Consumption. In 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, DC (No. 150680). Agricultural and Applied Economics Association. 5. Gourville, J. T., & Koehler, J. J. (2004). Downsizing price increases: A greater sensitivity to price than quantity in consumer markets. Division of Research, Harvard Business School. 6. Hardesty, D. M., & Bearden, W. O. (2003). Consumer evaluations of different promotion types and price presentations: the moderating role of promotional benefit level. Journal of Retailing, 79(1), 17-25. 7. Imai, S., & Watanabe, T. (2014). Product downsizing and hidden price increases: Evidence from Japan's deflationary period. Asian Economic Policy Review, 9(1), 6989. 8. Lennard, D., Mitchell, V. W., McGoldrick, P., Betts, E. (2001). Why consumers underuse food quantity indicators. The International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research, 11(2), 177-199. 9. Mazumdar, T., Raj, S. P., & Sinha, I. (2005). Reference price research: review and propositions. Journal of marketing, 69(4), 84-102. 10. Mela, C. F., Gupta, S., & Lehmann, D. R. (1997). The long-term impact of promotion and advertising on consumer brand choice. Journal of Marketing research, 248-261. 11. Mishra, Arul and Himanshu Mishra (2011), “The Influence of Price Discount Versus Bonus Pack on the Preference for Virtue and Vice Foods,” Journal of Marketing Research, 48 (February), 196–206. 12. Monroe, K. B., & Cox, J. L. (2001). Pricing practices that endanger profits. Marketing Management, 10(3), 42-46. 13. Monroe, K. B., & Petroshius, S. M. (1981). Buyers' perceptions of price: An update of the evidence. Perspectives in consumer behavior, 3, 23-42. 14. Ordabayeva, N., & Chandon, P. (2013). Predicting and managing consumers' package size impressions. Journal of Marketing, 77(5), 123-137. 15. Yoo, B., Donthu, N., & Lee, S. (2000). An examination of selected marketing mix elements and brand equity. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 28(2), 195211. 16. Zeithaml, V. A. (1988). Consumer perceptions of price, quality, and value: a meansend model and synthesis of evidence. The Journal of Marketing, 2-22. 32

2.2. Результаты эмпирического исследования роли осознания потребителем воздействия со стороны фирмы в формировании реакции на уменьшение размера продукта По материалам научного доклада «Consumer Response to Unit Price Increase: the Role of Pricing Tactics and Consumer Knowledge». Working Paper # 14 (E)–2015. Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg State University: SPb, 2015. 1. Introduction Price increases are a widespread phenomenon in a variety of markets. Such increases can be driven by market factors or by a desire of the company to increase profit margins. Regardless of the purpose of price increases, consumers usually negatively react to them as they has a detrimental effect on their wellbeing. Under the unfavorable economic circumstances, when consumer behavior is characterized by the accelerating rationalization, economizing and the weakening of brand loyalty, the consumer response to price increases can be extremely harsh. To mitigate the negative consumer response to a price increase, companies can manage the way a price increase is presented to the market. Instead of raising the price for a product, the company can decrease the quantity/size of a product and remain the price of the product item unchanged. On the one hand, it allows keeping the product available for consumers; on the other hand, it makes hard to compare prices directly, which could be potentially perceived by consumers as unfair or deceptive (Zaltman, 1978; Hardesty, Bearden, Carlson, 2007). The motivation of marketers behind using pricing tactics that can mislead consumer from making an optimal choice is the possibility to get additional benefits. Marketers may not necessarily be trying to deceive consumers, but they are often affected nonetheless (Manning et al. 1998; Sprott et al. 2003). When describing their lives as consumers, people point out “the confusing, stressful, insensitive, and manipulative marketplace in which they feel trapped and victimized” (Fournier, Dobscha, Mick, 1998). Similarly McGraw and Tetlock (2005) reason: “Consumers who have been gulled into thinking of themselves as part of a corporate family or partnership may feel especially bitter when they discover that the other party was treating them along purely as objects of monetary calculation”. Thus, misleading marketing practices once successfully implemented can become a source of consumer dissatisfaction over time, as consumers learn and develop their marketing expertise together with marketers. Getting financial benefits at the expense of consumers’ welfare due to consumer’s inattention or limited knowledge in something can bring significant losses to the company, once consumers gain persuasion knowledge in the field. The questions the study intends to answer are the following: What are the potential and lost benefits, if any, for companies that use covert pricing tactics as compared to overt pricing tactics? What are the impacts, if any, of covert pricing tactics, both on the short-term and long-term relationships between a company and its consumers? How do the impacts of covert pricing tactics differ among consumers who possess the different kinds of knowledge on the usage of such pricing tactics in the marketplace? 2. Theoretical Background 2.1. The Framing of Price Increases: Total Price Increase vs Product Downsizing The price and its impact on consumers has always been a focal point in the economic and management disciplines. The schools of economic thought united under the aegis of neoclassical economics put the price on one of the central places in their research agenda. 33

They focus on how price changes affect consumer demand for a good, but avoid scrutinizing the underlying psychological processes that lead the consumer to a buying or rejecting decision. Rather, neoclassical economics regards the consumer as a rational agent who is capable to make a precise and unbiased decision to maximize his own wellbeing. The blooming of positive economics armed with the psychological methods expands the narrow neoclassical focus. The consumer is not viewed as a purely rational agent anymore. Indeed, positive economics directs its research efforts towards revealing the real consumer behavior and the circumstances under which the predictions of neoclassical economics fail. In particular, traditional economic models treat price as the monetary sacrifice a consumer makes to acquire a product or service (Stigler, 1987) and assume that an individual should make the same choice when faced with equivalent decision problems. Although these principles have been usefully applied to a variety of marketing problems, recent research on the psychological aspects of pricing suggests that the role of price might be more complex than anticipated by standard economic principles. In particular, a number of studies demonstrated that the way price information is presented, termed price framing (Tversky, Kahneman, 1981), often significantly influences perceptions of deal value. The nature of framing appears to differentially affect consumer perceptions of deals that are equivalent on a unit-cost basis but worded or presented differently (Sinha, Smith, 2000). In the field of pricing research, different frames of the equivalent price deals were compared: multiple vs single price changes (Mazumdar, Jun, 1993; Tsiros, Hardesty, 2013), absolute vs percentage price change formats (DelVecchio, Krishnan, Smith, 2007), product price vs product size changes (Chen, Marmorstein, Tsiros, Rao, 2013; Gourville, Koehler, 2004; Kachersky, 2011), all-inclusive vs partitioned price presentations (Bambauer, Gierl, 2008), etc. The frames of product price vs product size changes to present an equivalent unit-cost change has received their attention in the studies of both price decreases (often for promotional purposes) and price increases. Nevertheless, while the examination of promotion types started relatively earlier and generated more research because of their popularity in the marketplace, the opposite problem has relatively recently entered the scholarly domain. The framing of price increases in an overt (total price increase) or covert way (product downsizing i.e. reducing the volume of product per package without a proportional decrease in package price) leads to different consumer responses to changes that are equivalent on the unit-price basis. In a range of articles that compare the consumer demand sensitivity to an equivalent price increase and product downsizing, it is demonstrated that consumers are more sensitive to price over quantity/size changes because of either their unawareness of product size, inattention to unit prices, or relative uncommonness of product downsizing in the marketplace (Gourville, Koehler, 2004; Cakir, Balagtas, 2014). However, some studies does not prove that the differential sensitivity to differently framed price increases exists (Imai, Watanabe, 2014). Presumably, the difference in the response to overt vs covert unit price increase can be found not only at the level of behavioral achievements, but also at the level of consumer perceptions of alternatives. Numerous studies have shown that consumers’ acceptance of a price, particularly a price increase, depends on considering it “fair” (Kahneman, Knetsch, Thaler, 1986). Packaging, size, or feature differences that make it hard to compare prices directly could be potentially perceived by consumers as unfair or deceptive (Zaltman, 1978). Price fairness judgments involve a comparison of a price or procedure with a pertinent standard, reference, or norm (Xia, Monroe, Cox, 2004). In case of pricing, the overt raise of price per product could be regarded as such a fair standard, because such a way to increase price is clear and does not demand additional cognitive costs to evaluate the extent of price increase. On the contrary, product downsizing can be regarded by consumers as a 34

manipulative intent of the company to mislead consumers from an optimal choice and thereby gain from consumer limited attention or unawareness. 2.2. Consumer Knowledge on Pricing Tactics Usage Pricing tactics include marketers’ efforts to generate favorable price perceptions regarding their brands, stores, and offerings (Hardesty, Bearden, Carlson, 2007). Marketers use a variety of tactics to attract customers and persuade them to buy the product. Some pricing practices mislead consumers leading to a suboptimal choice. For instance, quantity surcharges implies that unit price of a product packaged in a larger quantity is higher than the unit price of the same product and brand packaged in a smaller quantity, which is contrary to a widespread consumer belief that the unit price of goods packaged in larger quantities is less (Palla, Boutsouki, Zotos, 2010). Obviously, when consumers rely on their beliefs about pricing practice that contradict the actual pricing practice, they burden themselves with additional financial load and decrease their wellbeing. When faced with the practice in routine life the consumer can be unaware of practice usage. The understanding of practice nature can be gained with experience. Consumers are more likely to accurately learn about the persuasive intent behind pricing tactics upon greater exposure to them in the marketplace (Carlson, Bearden, Hardesty, 2007). “Over time consumers develop personal knowledge about the tactics used in these persuasion attempts” (Friestad, Wright, 1994). Friestad and Wright (1994) introduced the Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM) that describes how people's persuasion knowledge influences their responses to persuasion attempts, in particular, how people use their persuasion knowledge to refine their attitudes toward products and marketers. Persuasion knowledge guides consumers' attention to aspects of an advertising campaign or price presentation, providing inferences about possible background conditions that caused the agent to construct the attempt in that way (Friestad, Wright, 1994). When choosing a pricing tactic, producers are per se trying to find a persuading pricing message that will appeal to consumers in a better way. It considers the marketer to be the agent of persuasion, the consumer to be the target of persuasion, and the pricing tactic to reflect the persuasion attempt. Pricing tactic persuasion knowledge (PTPK) represents a form of domain-specific knowledge gained through experience (Hardesty, Bearden, Carlson, 2007). Marketing-literate consumers and those who are not armed with enough marketing knowledge and experience react differently to tactics employed by marketers. After conducting a series of experiments (Hardesty, Bearden, Carlson, 2007) identified that less knowledgeable consumers are more susceptible to such marketing practices as quantity surcharges and tensile claim offers and to making suboptimal decisions. (Kachersky, 2011) investigates consumer reactions to the practice of increasing unit prices of products by either reducing product content or increasing total prices. According to results, higher levels of PTPK lead consumers to infer different motives behind the two types of unit price increases, with content reductions being attributed to firm motives to increase profit margins and total price increases being attributed to firm motives to maintain profit margins in the face of situational factors such as cost inflation. Second, higher levels of PTPK lead consumers to look less favorably on product brands when the product content is reduced compared to when the total price is increased, and that this outcome is driven by inferred motives. Third, in contrast to high PTPK consumers, lower levels of PTPK lead consumers to alter their evaluations not of the product brand but of the retailer. 3. Hypotheses Development When studying the behavior of consumers in the marketplace, the actual behavioral achievements are actually considered to be a consequence of psychological stances of the consumer. The theory of planned behavior proposes that a behavioral intention is formed based on the attitude towards the behavior (Ajzen, 1991), and if projecting the theory into the domain of consumer behavior, a buying intention can depend on such variables as consumer 35

attitude to the product and trust to the producer of the product. The former construct has long been given a crucial role in bringing customer satisfaction, and gaining his loyalty (Olshavsky, Miller, 1972). Similarly, there are studies that describes consumer trust as a pivotal cornerstone and a key factor in the establishment of the relational commitment between firm and consumers (Reichheld, Schefter, 2000). Taking into account the possible misleading effect of the pricing tactic under review, it is possible to include the variables related to consumer fairness perceptions and judgments into the consumer response set. Price fairness being a buyer's judgment of a seller’s price can significantly affect consumer behavior. Price fairness is a consumer’s assessment and associated emotions of whether the difference (or lack of difference) between a seller’s price and the price of a comparative other party is reasonable, acceptable, or justifiable (Xia et al, 2004). Price fairness judgments may be based on previous prices, competitor prices, and profits (Bolton et al., 2003). In this case, the social norms are the rules that the community agrees sellers should follow when setting prices (Garbarino and Maxwell, 2010). Although consumers are able to quickly identify unfair situations, it is conversely more difficult for consumers to assess whether a policy is fair – that is why some studies use the concept of price unfairness instead (Bolton et al., 2003). Whether or not a pricing scheme improves the firm’s profit, the attribution of a negative motive to it will cause the perception of price unfairness (Campbell, 1999). Thus, three theoretically and managerially relevant antecedents of purchase intentions are identified for the analysis: product attitude, producer trust, and price unfairness. When proceeding with the hypothesis development, a more favorable effect of price increase on the specified variables is considered to have higher product attitude and producer trust evaluations, lower price unfairness evaluations, and higher purchase intention scores. In previous studies which compare the demand sensitivity to total price increase vs product downsizing, product downsizing is often proclaimed to be more effective (Gourville, Koehler, 2004; Cakir, Balagtas, 2013; Snir, Levy, 2011); however, there is also an evidence that the effect of these alternative practices could be the same (Imai, Watanabe, 2014). After closer examination of articles that produced the different conclusions, the contradiction can be attributed to (1) firstly, heterogeneity of consumers: consumers in different markets can have different apriori knowledge on pricing tactics used in the market and, thus, are different in terms of their ability to notice the product downsizing and validly evaluate the unit price change; (2) secondly, the time span covered by the analysis: superior effect of product downsizing is observed in the articles that investigate short-term effect of this pricing tactics, while the article that equates the effectiveness of total price increase and product downsizing covers a relatively longer time span. The other stream of studies of consumer reaction to misleading pricing tactics were focused on the question of what happens once consumers notice the unit price increase (Kachersky, 2011). However, it is reasonable to repeatedly suggest that at the point of purchase some consumers are able to activate their internal knowledge to detect the pricing tactics usage, while the others are not. When the pricing tactics usage leaves undetected, consumers will tend to underestimate the price change; thus, consumer reaction to a deal will likely differ as compared to those who are able to detect the pricing tactics usage. Nevertheless, consumers are permanently engaged in information exchanges with other market agents such as companies, consumers or media entities that can provide them with information on pricing tactics usage. Thus, the knowledge on pricing tactics usage can be gained through external sources after the interaction with a product whose price changed has already been accomplished. Such externally invoked knowledge can lead to the modification of consumer response to unit price increase during consequent interactions with the product. It can be supposed that if consumers do not notice the tactic at the point of purchase, they do not modify their response towards the product, but they may have especially harsh reactions if they discover the tactic via a fellow consumer or the media (Kachersky, 2011). 36

To address the existing research gaps and contradictions, there is introduced a conceptual framework that incorporates the consumer heterogeneity and variability over time (Figure 1). Later on, we will refer to the short term as a period when consumers have no external information on the pricing tactics used in the marketplace and can rely only their personal internally invoked knowledge, while in the long term the consumer knowledge on pricing tactics usage can be externally invoked. According to the framework, the presence or absence of consumer knowledge on pricing tactics usage will moderate the consumer response in the short term, while the source of consumer knowledge (externally or internally invoked) will affect the consumer response in the long term when consumers can get additional external information on the pricing tactics usage. Taking into account the specified moderating effects, the marginal effectiveness of product downsizing vs total price increase is expected to be higher in the short term than in the long term. Figure 1. Conceptual Framework Based on the conceptual framework, the following hypotheses are formulated: H1. The marginal benefit of product downsizing vs total price increase on consumer response is higher in the short term than in the long term. H2. The presence or absence of consumer knowledge on pricing tactics usage moderates the consumer response in the short term. H3. The source of consumer knowledge moderates the consumer response in the long term. 4. Research Design 4.1. Method To test the specified hypotheses, the study uses an experimental method. Webexperiment including both within-subject and between-subject designs is employed to compare the behavioral and psychological responses of different consumers to overt vs covert price increases over time. The survey structure is represented in Table 1. Table 1. Survey structure Time Time 1  Description of Interaction All respondents are provided with a concise description of the market situation and the picture of the product with a price (see Appendix 1 (a)): «The Russian company Ostankino sells milk under the brand name "36 cents" on the Russian market. Picture and description of the product are given. Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements» 37

Time 2    Time 3  Respondents are randomly assigned to one of the two conditions (product downsizing vs equivalent overt price increase) in the proportion 60/40. Respondents are still provided with a concise description of the market situation (the same for all respondents) and the picture of the product with a price (different pictures depending on the assigned condition (see Appendix 1 (b) and (c) for product downsizing and overt price increase conditions): «The company decided to implement some changes to the product and adjust its price. Prices of other milk brands have not changed. Picture and description of the product, taking into account the changes are given. Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements” All respondents are asked to evaluate the extent of price change by choosing one of the given options with different percentage changes. The respondents exposed to product downsizing are asked whether they have noticed the size change. Depending on the answer they are divided in the two groups: Treatment 1 – those who detected the size change, and Treatment 2 - those who did not detected the sized change. All respondents regardless of their previous answers are provided with the information on the extent of price increase. The respondents exposed to product downsizing are also informed that the price increase was partly accomplished through the reduction of the product quantity from 990 to 900 ml: «Price per 1 liter increased by 13.6%. This was achieved by reducing product packaging from 990 to 900 ml (only for product downsizing condition). Have you changed your attitude to the product and the manufacturer after receiving this information? To answer this question, please indicate whether you agree with the following statements». At the second interaction (Time 2) the design of the product was slightly changed. It was done to distract consumer attention from the price change. The same redesign was accomplished for both product downsizing and overt price increase conditions. This practice is often used by marketers in the real market settings. Moreover, the general dynamics of the survey resemble the real-world flow of actions: as the prices on the market goes up, consumers modify their market behavior as a response to a price change depending on their personal judgments and perceptions (Time2), and afterwards consumers are provided with the exact information on the market price change that can go from either the official statistical sources, the media or the fellows (Time 3). At each interaction consumers are offered to evaluate whether they agree with particular statements which are intended to measure several conceptual constructs: purchase intention product attitude, producer trust, and price unfairness. The constructs are the same throughout the interaction timeline. Both unidimensional and multidimensional constructs are used. The reliability of multidimensional constructs are quite high at each time (see Table 2). Table 2. Reliability of measurement scales Measures Purchase intention Product attitude Producer trust Price unfairness Items I am ready to pay the stated price for the product. I would purchase this product in the store. I could buy this product on the next visit to the store. I find this product interesting. I like this product. I trust the producer of this product. Time 1 (α) Time 2 (α) Time 3 (α) .86 .89 .88 .78 .84 .92 - - - I consider the stated price of the product acceptable. The price of the product is unreasonably high. .88 .88 .88 I think this price is unfair to consumers. Note. – All items are measured using 7-point Likert scale with the points labeled as 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = moderately disagree; 3 = slightly disagree; 4 = neutral; 5 = slightly agree; 6 = moderately agree; and 7 = strongly agree. The reliability of multi-items scales is measured using Cronbach’s alpha. 38

Considering all the above consumer response variables, it is hypothesized the variables will behave differently in consumer groups exposed to different treatments (overt price increase vs product downsizing) over the consumer-product interaction trajectory. In addition, the different responses are expected among those consumers who detected the product downsizing vs those who did not detect that. Thus, three consumer groups are identified in the study: a) Control group (respondents who are randomly assigned to the total price increase condition); b) Treatment 1 (respondents who are randomly assigned to the product downsizing condition and detected the product downsizing); c) Treatment 2 (respondents who are randomly assigned to the product downsizing condition and did not detect the product downsizing). 4.2. Sample and Context The experiment embraced 71 respondents of whom 48 respondents submitted a questionnaire via a social network in March 2015 and 23 respondents submitted the questionnaire in a printed format in April 2015. The purpose of the study is to investigate how the consumer response changes as a reaction to a unit price change. Consumers who initially gave maximum or minimum scores are deprived of a possibility to further change their opinion in a more positive or negative directions respectively, which can confound the results. To eliminate a possible confounding effect, only overlapping observations were taken for the analysis, while the observations with extremely low and high values at the pretest intervention were excluded. Following this logic, 8 observations were excluded from the analysis (4 observations from the Control group; 2 – from the Treatment 1 group, and 2 – from the Treatment 2 group). The analyses proceeds with 63 observations: 19 observations in the Control group, 22 observations in the Treatment 1 group, and 22 observations in the Treatment 2 group. The questionnaire was provided in Russian and all responded were the residents of Russia. The context of Russia as an emerging market contributes to the research in several ways. Firstly, emerging markets are characterized with high consumer heterogeneity. The diversity with respect to access to products and services tends to be enormous between urban and rural households (Sheth, 2011). Many consumers have no brand or product knowledge. Often, they do not even know how markets operate. Thus, the topicality of the consumer knowledge proves to be very high and managerially relevant. Secondly, the economic turbulence and market changes that take place in Russia in the current time leads to the high price volatility, which put pressure on manufactures, on the one side, and endanger consumers, on the other side. Manufactures have to optimize their market strategies and often raise prices to compensate a high uncertainty. While consumers, in the face of lowering incomes, rationalize their behavior and put a special attention to price-related issues. 5. Results 5.1. ANOVA To test hypotheses the repeated-measures ANOVA is used as a method appropriate to longitudinal experiments in the marketing literature, in general, and exact research questions under investigation, in particular. Prior to running repeated-measures ANOVA, the data was checked for the existence of significant between-group differences at the baseline level (Time 1) using between-group ANOVA. The analysis revealed that there are no baseline differences among groups for all dependent variables: purchase intention (F(2,60) = 0.51, p = 0.60), product attitude (F(2,60) = 0.90, p = 0.41), producer trust (F(2,60) = 0.06, p = 0.94), and price unfairness (F(2,60) = 2.23, p = 0.12). As the analysis does not reveal any differences among groups at the pretest interaction (Time 1), any differences among groups at the following interactions can be attributed to the treatment and moderation effects. 39

Repeated-measures ANOVA was run on each of the consumer response indicators. Means and standard deviations across groups over time are provided in Table 3. Table 4 presents the test statistics of main effects. Table 3. Descriptive Statistics on Consumer Response Measures (Means and Standard Deviations) Dependent variables Purchase intention: Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Product attitude: Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Producer trust: Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Price unfairness: Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Overt price increase (n = 19) Product Downsizing, Presence of Awareness (n = 22) Mean SD Product Downsizing, Presence of Awareness (n = 22) Mean SD Mean SD 3.51 2.96 2.93 (0.98) (1.30) (1.23) 3.86 3.61 3.42 (1.02) (0.99) (1.02) 3.73 3.64 2.98 (1.27) (1.13) (1.13) 4.37 3.82 3.71 (0.86) (1.45) (1.36) 4.11 3.64 3.50 (1.02) (1.01) (0.88) 3.93 3.84 3.48 (1.13) (0.99) (1.10) 4.21 4.05 4.11 (1.40) (1.28) (1.17) 4.09 4.00 3.77 (0.90) (0.95) (1.20) 4.14 4.14 3.36 (1.01) (1.01) (1.33) 4.30 5.19 5.26 (1.37) (1.25) (0.96) 3.71 4.53 4.56 (1.19) (1.05) (1.20) 4.45 4.52 5.05 (1.00) (1.15) (1.03) Table 4. Results of Repeated Measures ANOVA Dependent variables Purchase intention Product attitude Producer trust Price unfairness Between-group effect F(2,60) = 1.14, p = 0.33 F(2,60) = 0.30, p = 0.74 F(2,60) = 0.30, p = 0.74 F(2,60) = 2.02, p = 0.44 Within-group effect F(2,120) = 17.44, p = 0.00 F(2,120) = 14.58, p = 0.00 F(2,120) = 5.57, p = 0.00 F(2,120) = 28.65, p = 0.00 Interaction effect F(4,120) = 2.02, p = 0.09 F(4,120) = 0.89, p = 0.47 F(4,120) = 2.08, p = 0.09 F(4,120) = 3.00, p = 0.02 The results of repeated measures ANOVA indicate that there is a statistically significant within-group effect for all dependent variables i.e. there is a tendency of all consumer response variables to change in the same direction over time within all experimental groups. In particular, there is observed a deterioration of product attitude and producer trust, and acceleration of price unfairness perceptions over time, which results in the reduction of purchase intention. Between-group effect proved to be significant only as a part of interaction effect, which signifies that despite there is a common tendency within all experimental groups to react similarly in response to experimental interventions, the severity of consumer responses to interventions is different among groups. 5.2. Analysis of Mean Differences Since the treatment-by-time interaction is significant, there is a need to explain the interaction. For further insight into the hypotheses, the analysis of mean differences is undertaken. Mean differences of consumer response variables in the short term (Time 2 vs Time 1) and long term (Time 3 vs Time 1) in there experimental groups are depicted in the Figure 2. The statistical significance of mean differences among groups is presented in the Table 5. 40

Figure 2. Mean Differences of Consumer Response Variables across Time Short-Term Effect (Time 2 vs Time 1) Long-Term Effect (Time 3 vs Time 1) Purchase Intention Product Attitude Producer Trust Price Unfairness 41

Table 5. Results of Post-Hoc Analysis of Mean Differences Dependent variables Overt price increase Product Downsizing, Presence of Awareness Product Downsizing, Absence of Awareness Purchase intention Time 2 vs Time 1 -0.54 *** -0.26 -0.09 Time 3 vs Time 1 -0.58 *** -0.44 *** -0.74 *** Product attitude Time 2 vs Time 1 -0.55 *** -0.48 *** -0.09 Time 3 vs Time 1 -0.66 *** -0.61 *** -0.45 ** Producer trust Time 2 vs Time 1 -0.16 -0.09 0.00 Time 3 vs Time 1 -0.11 -0.32 -0.77 *** Price unfairness Time 2 vs Time 1 0.89 *** 0.82 *** 0.07 Time 3 vs Time 1 0.96 *** 0.85 *** 0.60 *** Note. – The significance of mean differences is tested using t-statistics. The asterisks signify the following significance levels: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. The analysis of mean differences indicates that in the short run a statistically significant reduction in purchase intention in response to price increase is observed only when consumers are exposed to total price increase, while product downsizing does not lead to a significant reduction in purchase intention for both treatment groups. The short-term stability of purchase intention for the Treatment 2 group is explained by the unchanged antecedents of purchase intention (product attitude, producer trust, and price unfairness). On the contrary, the rapid shrinkage of purchase intention for the Control group is driven by the movement of antecedents (product attitude and price unfairness) to a less favorable direction. Despite the same trajectory of intention antecedents is observed in the Treatment 1 group, the intention does not change in the short run analogously to the Control group. The possible explanation of such a contradiction is that even when consumers are able to detect the product downsizing, they tend to err in their judgments regarding the price change and underestimate the scope of price increase (see Figure 3). Figure 3. Distributions of Consumer Evaluations of Perceived Unit Price Increase (by Groups) Note. –The multiple-choice question “How would you estimate the extent of unit price change?” was asked after consumers were presented with an increased price. The actual unit price increase accounted to 13.6%. No information on actual price increase was provided to consumers at that moment. The differences in consumer response to product downsizing depending on the presence or absence of consumer knowledge in the short run support the hypothesis 2 (H2): consumers who detect product downsizing change their product attitude and price unfairness judgements 42

in the short run, while those who does not detect product downsizing keep all consumer response variables unchanged. In the long run all experimental groups demonstrated a significant shrinkage of purchase intention. However, the Treatment 2 group underwent the most rapid reduction of purchase intention mostly driven by the deterioration of producer trust judgements, which supports the hypothesis 3 (H3) according to that the source of consumer knowledge moderates the consumer response in the long term. Such variability of consumer response to product downsizing over time supports the hypothesis 1 (H1) according to that the marginal benefit of product downsizing vs total price increase on consumer response is higher in the short term than in the long term. 6. Conclusion The study can contribute to the existing research in several ways. Firstly, it interprets the existing research contradictions through the introduction of several moderating variables related to consumer knowledge. Secondly, it tries to go beyond the investigation of short-term effect of covert vs overt pricing tactics by simulating the long-term development trajectory of consumer-product relationships. The analysis revealed that even when consumers are able to detect the product downsizing, they tend to err in their judgments regarding the price change and underestimate the scope of price increase. That could be driven by the limited abilities to conduct valid mathematical calculations when both the nominator and denominator (that is, product size and total package price) change. Even in the absence of product downsizing, consumers did not provide a valid evaluation of price change scope, and product downsizing being a more mentally challenging way to frame a price change accelerates the tendency to make mistakes among consumers. Based on such metal limitations, covert (vs overt) unit price increase is proved to lead to a more positive consumer response in the short term when consumers have no access to external information and can rely only on their internal knowledge on covert pricing tactics usage. In the long term, when consumers have access to external information on covert pricing tactics usage, the effect of covert (vs overt) pricing tactics tends to become less favorable for companies. The long-term effect is moderated by the source of consumer knowledge on pricing covert tactics usage: consumers who managed to internally invoke the knowledge on pricing tactics usage react differently to covert unit price increase in the long term than those whose knowledge on pricing tactics usage was externally invoked. The narrow scope of the study in terms of analyzed sample and product categories being a limitation for the generalization of results becomes an alarm for future research with more broad and representative empirical data. References Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational behavior and human decision processes, 50(2), 179-211. Bearden, W. O., Hardesty, D. M., & Rose, R. L. (2001). Consumer self‐confidence: refinements in conceptualization and measurement. Journal of Consumer Research, 28(1), 121-134. Bolton, L.E., Warlop, L. and Alba, J. (2003). Consumer perceptions of price (un)fairness. Journal of Consumer Research, 29(4), 474-492. 43

Cakir, M., Balagtas, J. V., & Okrent, A. M. (2013). The Effects of Package Downsizing on Food Consumption. In 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, DC (No. 150680). Agricultural and Applied Economics Association. Carlson, J. P., Bearden, W. O., & Hardesty, D. M. (2007). Influences on what consumers know and what they think they know regarding marketer pricing tactics. Psychology & Marketing, 24(2), 117-142. Doney, P.M. and J.P. Cannon (1997). An examination of the nature of trust in buyer-seller relationships. Journal of Marketing,61, April, 35-51. Fournier, Susan, Susan Dobscha, and David G. Mick. 1998. “Preventing the Premature Death of Relationship Marketing.” Harvard Business Review 76 (1): 42-51. Friestad, M., & Wright, P. (1994). The persuasion knowledge model: How people cope with persuasion attempts. Journal of consumer research, 1-31. Garbarino, E. and Maxwell, S. (2010). Consumer response to norm-breaking pricing events in e-commerce. Journal of Business Research, 63(9), 1066-1072. Gourville, J. T., & Koehler, J. J. (2004). Downsizing price increases: A greater sensitivity to price than quantity in consumer markets. Division of Research, Harvard Business School. Hardesty, D. M., Bearden, W. O., & Carlson, J. P. (2007). Persuasion knowledge and consumer reactions to pricing tactics. Journal of Retailing, 83(2), 199-210. Haws, K.L. and Bearden, W.O. (2006). Dynamic pricing and consumer fairness perceptions. Journal of Consumer Research, 33(3), 304-311. Imai, S., & Watanabe, T. (2014). Product downsizing and hidden price increases: Evidence from Japan's deflationary period. Asian Economic Policy Review, 9(1), 69-89. Kachersky, L. (2011). Reduce Content or Raise Price? The Impact of Persuasion Knowledge and Unit Price Increase Tactics on Retailer and Product Brand Attitudes. Journal of Retailing, 87(4), 479-488. Manning, K.C., Sprott, D.E. and Miyazaki, A.D. (1998), “Consumer response to quantity surcharges: implications for retail price setters”, Journal of Retailing, Vol. 74 No. 3, pp. 37399. McGraw, A. P., & Tetlock, P. (2005). Taboo trade-offs, relational framing, and the acceptability of exchanges. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 15(1), 2-15. Morgan, R.M. and S.D. Hunt (1994). The commitment-trust theory of relationship marketing, Journal of Marketing, 58, July, 20-38. Olshavsky, R. W., & Miller, J. A. (1972). Consumer expectations, product performance, and perceived product quality. Journal of marketing research, 19-21. Palla, P. J., Boutsouki, C., & Zotos, Y. (2010). Quantity surcharges and consumer awareness in a new retail environment. International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, 38(5), 320-340. 44

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Appendix 1. Experimental stimulus (a) Stimulus 1 (b) Stimulus 2(a) (c) Stimulus 2(b) Comments (not presented to respondents): Volume – 990 ml Price per 1 liter – 58.60 RUB (Initial baseline level) Volume – 900 ml Price per 1 liter – 66.50 RUB (+13.6% to the baseline – product downsizing) Volume – 990 ml Price per 1 liter – 66.50 RUB (+13.6% to the baseline – overt price increase)

Приложения Приложение 1. Апробация результатов исследования на XVI Апрельской международная научная конференция «Модернизация экономики и общества», 7-10 апреля 2015 года, Москва, Россия Consumer Response To Misleading Pricing Tactics: The Case Of Product Downsizing Author: Kseniia S. Golovacheva, PhD Student (e-mail: golovacheva_k@mail.ru) Contact: Graduate School of Management, Saint Petersburg State University, Volkhovsky Pereulok 3, St. Petersburg, Russia 7. Introduction The academic literature reports multiple cases of marketing practices that are perceived by consumers as unfair or deceptive: unclear advertising claims, ambiguous packaging labels, hidden costs associated with the product usage (Zaltman, 1978). Consumers face these practices at all stages of their buying process. The examples in the field of pricing especially abound. Price increases are a widespread phenomenon in a variety of markets. Such increases can be driven by market factors or by a desire of the company to increase profit margins. Regardless of the purpose of price increases, consumers usually negatively react to them as they has a detrimental effect on their wellbeing. Under the unfavorable economic circumstances, when consumer behavior is characterized by the accelerating rationalization, economizing and the weakening of brand loyalty, the consumer response to price increases can be extremely harsh. To mitigate the negative consumer response to a price increase, companies can manage the way a price increase is presented to the market. Instead of raising the price for a product, the company can decrease the quantity/size of a product and remain the price of the product item unchanged. On the one hand, it allows keeping the product available for consumers; on the other hand, it makes hard to compare prices directly, which could be potentially perceived by consumers as unfair or deceptive (Zaltman, 1978; Hardesty, Bearden, Carlson, 2007). The motivation of marketers behind using pricing tactics that can mislead consumer from making an optimal choice is the possibility to get additional benefits. Marketers may not necessarily be trying to deceive consumers, but they are often affected nonetheless (Manning et al. 1998; Sprott et al. 2003). When describing their lives as consumers, people point out “the confusing, stressful, insensitive, and manipulative marketplace in which they feel trapped and victimized” (Fournier, Dobscha, & Mick, 1998). Similarly McGraw and Tetlock (2005) reason: “Consumers who have been gulled into thinking of themselves as part of a corporate family or partnership may feel especially bitter when they discover that the other party was treating them along purely as objects of monetary calculation”. Thus, misleading marketing practices once successfully implemented can become a source of consumer dissatisfaction over time, as consumers learn and develop their marketing expertise together with marketers. Getting financial benefits at the expense of consumers’ welfare due to consumer’s inattention or limited knowledge in something can bring significant losses to the company, once consumers gain persuasion knowledge in the field. The questions the study intends to answer are the following: How do consumers respond to price increases framed in a misleading vs “honest” way? Do misleading pricing tactics really allow marketers to get additional gains as compared to “honest” tactics? Does the effect of such practices differ among consumers possessing different levels of market knowledge? 47

8. Theoretical Background 8.1. The Framing of Price Increases: Product Downsizing vs Overt Price Increase The price and its impact on consumers has always been a focal point in the economic and management disciplines. The schools of economic thought united under the aegis of neoclassical economics put the price on one of the central places in their research agenda. They focus on how price changes affect consumer demand for a good, but avoid scrutinizing the underlying psychological processes that lead the consumer to a buying or rejecting decision. Rather, neoclassical economics regards the consumer as a rational agent who is capable to make a precise and unbiased decision to maximize his own wellbeing. The blooming of positive economics armed with the psychological methods expands the narrow neoclassical focus. The consumer is not viewed as a purely rational agent anymore. Indeed, positive economics directs its research efforts towards revealing the real consumer behavior and the circumstances under which the predictions of neoclassical economics fail. In particular, traditional economic models treat price as the monetary sacrifice a consumer makes to acquire a product or service (Stigler, 1987) and assume that an individual should make the same choice when faced with equivalent decision problems. Although these principles have been usefully applied to a variety of marketing problems, recent research on the psychological aspects of pricing suggests that the role of price might be more complex than anticipated by standard economic principles. In particular, a number of studies demonstrated that the way price information is presented, termed price framing (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), often significantly influences perceptions of value. The nature of framing appears to differentially affect consumer perceptions of deals that are equivalent on a unit-cost basis but worded or presented differently (Sinha, Smith, 2000). In the field of pricing research, different frames of the equivalent price deals were compared: multiple vs single price changes (Mazumdar, Jun, 1993; Tsiros, Hardesty, 2013), absolute vs percentage price change formats (DelVecchio, Krishnan, Smith, 2007), product price vs product size changes (Chen, Marmorstein, Tsiros, Rao, 2013; Gourville, Koehler, 2004; Kachersky, 2011), all-inclusive vs partitioned price presentations (Bambauer, Gierl, 2008), etc. The frames of product price vs product size changes to present an equivalent unit-cost change has received their attention in the studies of both price decreases (often for promotional purposes) and price increases. Nevertheless, while the examination of promotion types started relatively earlier and generated more research because of their popularity in the marketplace, the opposite problem has relatively recently entered the scholarly domain. The framing of price increases as an overt price change or less visible for the consumer products downsizing (i.e. reducing the volume of product per package without a proportional decrease in package price) leads to different consumer responses to changes that are equivalent on the unit-price basis. In a range of articles that compare the consumer demand sensitivity to an equivalent price increase and product downsizing, it is demonstrated that consumers are more sensitive to price over quantity/size changes because of either their unawareness of product size, inattention to unit prices, or relative uncommonness of product downsizing in the marketplace (Gourville, Koehler, 2004; Cakir, Balagtas, 2014). However, some studies does not prove that the differential sensitivity to differently framed price increases exists (Imai, Watanabe, 2014). Presumably, the difference in the response to overt and covert price increase framings can be found not only at the level of behavioral achievements, but also at the level of consumer perceptions of alternatives. Numerous studies have shown that consumers’ acceptance of a price, particularly a price increase, depends on considering it “fair” (Kahneman, Knetsch, Thaler, 1986). Packaging, size, or feature differences that make it hard to compare prices directly could be potentially perceived by consumers as unfair or deceptive (Zaltman, 1978). Price fairness judgments involve a comparison of a price or procedure with a pertinent standard, reference, or norm (Xia, Monroe, Cox, 2004). In case of pricing, the overt raise of price per product could be regarded as such a fair standard, because such a way to increase price is clear and does not demand additional cognitive costs to evaluate the extent of price increase. On 48

the contrary, product downsizing can be regarded by consumers as a manipulative intent of the company to mislead consumers from an optimal choice and thereby gain from consumer limited attention or unawareness. 8.2. Misleading Pricing Tactics as Persuasion Attempts Pricing tactics include marketers’ efforts to generate favorable price perceptions regarding their brands, stores, and offerings (Hardesty, Bearden, Carlson, 2007). Marketers use a variety of tactics to attract customers and persuade them to buy the product. Some pricing practices mislead consumers leading to a suboptimal choice. For instance, quantity surcharges implies that unit price of a product packaged in a larger quantity is higher than the unit price of the same product and brand packaged in a smaller quantity, which is contrary to a widespread consumer belief that the unit price of goods packaged in larger quantities is less (Palla, Boutsouki, Zotos, 2010). Obviously, when consumers rely on their beliefs about pricing practice that contradict the actual pricing practice, they burden themselves with additional financial load and decrease their wellbeing. When faced with the practice in routine life the consumer can be unaware of practice usage. The understanding of practice nature can be gained with experience. Consumers are more likely to accurately learn about the persuasive intent behind pricing tactics upon greater exposure to them in the marketplace (Carlson, Bearden, Hardesty, 2007). “Over time consumers develop personal knowledge about the tactics used in these persuasion attempts” (Friestad, Wright, 1994). Friestad and Wright (1994) introduced the Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM) that describes how people's persuasion knowledge influences their responses to persuasion attempts, in particular, how people use their persuasion knowledge to refine their attitudes toward products and marketers. Persuasion knowledge guides consumers' attention to aspects of an advertising campaign or price presentation, providing inferences about possible background conditions that caused the agent to construct the attempt in that way (Friestad, Wright, 1994). When choosing a pricing tactic, producers are per se trying to find a persuading pricing message that will appeal to consumers in a better way. It considers the marketer to be the agent of persuasion, the consumer to be the target of persuasion, and the pricing tactic to reflect the persuasion attempt. Pricing tactic persuasion knowledge (PTPK) represents a form of domain-specific knowledge gained through experience (Hardesty, Bearden, Carlson, 2007). Marketing-literate consumers and those who are not armed with enough marketing knowledge and experience react differently to tactics employed by marketers. After conducting a series of experiments (Hardesty, Bearden, Carlson, 2007) identified that less knowledgeable consumers are more susceptible to such marketing practices as quantity surcharges and tensile claim offers and to making suboptimal decisions. (Kachersky, 2011) investigates consumer reactions to the practice of increasing unit prices of products by either reducing product content or increasing total prices. According to results, higher levels of PTPK lead consumers to infer different motives behind the two types of unit price increases, with content reductions being attributed to firm motives to increase profit margins and total price increases being attributed to firm motives to maintain profit margins in the face of situational factors such as cost inflation. Second, higher levels of PTPK lead consumers to look less favorably on product brands when the product content is reduced compared to when the total price is increased, and that this outcome is driven by inferred motives. Third, in contrast to high PTPK consumers, lower levels of PTPK lead consumers to alter their evaluations not of the product brand but of the retailer. 9. Hypotheses Development The problem of product downsizing was raised in a limited number of articles that address the issue of product downsizing impact on consumer demand and compare the demand sensitivity to equivalent price increase and product downsizing (Gourville, Koehler, 2004; Cakir, Balagtas, 2013; Snir, Levy, 2011; Imai, Watanabe, 2014). The results of the studies are contradictory and demand further clarification, in particular, by introducing moderating variables that allow interpreting the differences in the above studies. The study proposes that the consumer 49

ability to detect the product downsizing will moderate the consumer response to that practice. In particular, it is supposed that if consumers do not notice the tactic at the point of purchase, they do not modify their response towards the product, but they may have especially harsh reactions if they discover the tactic via a fellow consumer or the media (Kachersky, 2011). H1. If compared with the overt package price increase, equivalent product downsizing leads to a less reduction in buying intentions for consumers who do not detect the product downsizing, but results in a more rapid reduction of buying intentions when they get external information which confirms the usage of a tactic. H2. Consumers who detect the product downsizing by themselves react to the product downsizing in the same way as to an equivalent overt price increase. In addition, there is a need for further investigation of psychological response of different consumers to misleading pricing. The theory of planned behavior proposes that a behavioral intention is formed based on the attitude towards the behavior (Ajzen, 1991), and if projecting the theory into the domain of consumer behavior, a buying intention can depend on such variables as consumer attitude to the product and trust to the producer of the product. The former construct has long been given a crucial role in bringing customer satisfaction, and gaining his loyalty (Olshavsky, Miller, 1972). Similarly, there are studies that describes consumer trust as a pivotal cornerstone and a key factor in the establishment of the relational commitment between firm and consumers (Reichheld, Schefter, 2000). H3. Consumers who detect the product downsizing by themselves modify their product attitude and producer trust perception in a more negative direction, and do not change their response when they get external information which confirms the usage of a tactic. H4. Consumers who do not detect the product downsizing by themselves do not immediately modify their product attitude and producer trust perception, but deteriorate their response in a more rapid manner when they get external information which confirms the usage of a tactic. Also, taking into account the possible misleading effect of the pricing tactic under review, it is possible to include the variables related to consumer fairness perceptions and judgments into the consumer response set. Price fairness being a buyer's judgment of a seller’s price can significantly affect consumer behavior. However, researchers differentiate between price fairness connected with a price for the product in its static form and pricing fairness that is attributed to the actions taken to realize a price change (Haws, Bearden, 2006). Price fairness is a consumer’s assessment and associated emotions of whether the difference (or lack of difference) between a seller’s price and the price of a comparative other party is reasonable, acceptable, or justifiable (Xia et al, 2004). Price fairness judgments may be based on previous prices, competitor prices, and profits (Bolton et al., 2003). Pricing fairness considers the comparison of the pricing process with social norms (Cox, 2001). In this case, the social norms are the rules that the community agrees sellers should follow when setting prices (Garbarino and Maxwell, 2010). Whether or not a pricing scheme improves the firm’s profit, the attribution of a negative motive to it will cause the perception of pricing unfairness (Campbell, 1999). Both price offered and the rationale for offering a certain price may lead to perceptions of fairness and to negative consequences for the consumer, such as dissatisfaction, distrust, and lower intentions to repurchase (Xia et al., 2004). Although consumers are able to quickly identify unfair situations, it is conversely more difficult for consumers to assess whether a policy is fair – that is why some studies use the concept of price and pricing unfairness instead (Bolton et al., 2003). 50

H5. Consumers who detect the product downsizing by themselves immediately modify their price and pricing unfairness perception in a more negative direction, while consumers who do not immediately detect the product downsizing increase their price and pricing unfairness perceptions only upon an external notification and in a more rapid way. H6. If compared to an overt price increase, an equivalent product downsizing results in more negative price and pricing unfairness judgments. Finally, it is hypothesized that consumer ability to detect a price change is dependent on the consumer persuasion knowledge. H7. Consumers who are able to detect the product downsizing by themselves possess a higher persuasion knowledge than those who do not detect the product downsizing by themselves. 10. Research design To test the specified hypotheses, the study uses an experimental method. Web-experiment including both within-subject and between-subject designs is employed to compare the behavioral and psychological responses of consumers to product downsizing (misleading pricing tactic) and price increase (“fair” pricing tactic) and, secondly, to identify how the ability to detect product downsizing is dependent on persuasion knowledge. The survey structure is represented in Table 1. Interactions Interaction 1  Interaction 2    Interaction 3  Table 1. Survey structure Description All respondents are provided with a concise description of the market situation and the picture of the product with a price (see Appendix 1 (a)): «The Russian company Ostankino sells milk under the brand name "36 cents" on the Russian market. Picture and description of the product are given. Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements» Respondents are randomly assigned to one of the two conditions (product downsizing vs equivalent overt price increase) in the proportion 60/40. Respondents are still provided with a concise description of the market situation (the same for all respondents) and the picture of the product with a price (different pictures depending on the assigned condition (see Appendix 1 (b) and (c) for product downsizing and overt price increase conditions): «The company decided to implement some changes to the product, as well as adjust its price. Prices of other milk brands have not changed. Picture and description of the product, taking into account the changes are given. Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements” All respondents are asked to evaluate the extent of price change by choosing one of the given options with different percentage changes. The respondents exposed to product downsizing are asked whether they have noticed the size change. Depending on the answer they are divided in the two groups: Treatment 1 – those who detected the size change, and Treatment 2 - those who did not detected the sized change. All respondents regardless of their previous answers are provided with the information on the extent of price increase. The respondents exposed to product downsizing are also informed that the price increase 51

was partly accomplished through the reduction of the product quantity from 990 to 900 ml: «Price per 1 liter increased by 13.6%. This was achieved by reducing product packaging from 990 to 900 ml (only for product downsizing condition). Have you changed your attitude to the product and the manufacturer after receiving this information? To answer this question, please indicate whether you agree with the following statements». 52

Table 2. Construct indicators, measurement items, and reliability of measures Items References Interaction 1 Interaction 2 Interaction 3 (α) (α) (α) Measures Repeated measurements: Product attitude Producer trust Buying intention Price unfairness I find this product interesting. I like this product. I trust the producer of this product. I am ready to pay the stated price for the product. I would purchase this product in the store. I could buy this product on the next visit to the store. I consider the stated price of the product acceptable. The price of the product is unreasonably high. I think this price is unfair to consumers. Pricing I consider such a price increase unfair to consumers. unfairness Single measurements: Persuasion I know when an offer is “too good to be true”. knowledge I can tell when an offer has strings attached. I have no trouble understanding the bargaining tactics used by salespersons. I know when a marketer is pressuring me to buy. I can see through sales gimmicks used to get consumers to buy. I can separate fact from fantasy in advertising. (Perkins, Forehand, 2012) (Morgan, Hunt, 1994; Doney, Cannon, 1997) (Perkins, Forehand, 2012) (Bolton, Warlop, Alba, 2003; Haws, Bearden, 2006) (Haws, Bearden, 2006) .83 .88 .83 - - - .87 .88 .87 .84 .79 .83 not measured - - (Bearden, Hardesty, Rose, 2001) .87 Note. – All items are measured using 7-point Likert scale with the points labeled as 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = moderately disagree; 3 = slightly disagree; 4 = neutral; 5 = slightly agree; 6 = moderately agree; and 7 = strongly agree. The reliability of multi-items scales is measured using Cronbach’s alpha. 53

At the second interaction the design of the product was slightly changed. It was done to distract consumer attention from the price change. The same redesign was accomplished for both product downsizing and overt price increase conditions. This practice is often used by marketers in the real market settings. Moreover, the general dynamics of the survey resemble the real-world flow of actions: as the prices on the market goes up, consumers modify their market behavior as a response to a price change depending on their personal judgments and perceptions (Interaction 2), and afterwards consumers are provided with the exact information on the market price change that can go from either the official statistical sources, the media or the fellows (Interaction 3). At each interaction consumers are offered to evaluate whether they agree with particular statements which are intended to measure several conceptual constructs: product attitude, producer trust, buying intention, price unfairness, and pricing unfairness. The constructs are the same throughout the interaction timeline. Both unidimensional and multidimensional constricts are used. The reliability of multidimensional constricts are quite high at each interaction (see Table 2). Persuasion knowledge is measure only once at the end of the study. Considering all the above consumer response variables, it is hypothesized the variables will behave differently in consumer groups exposed to different treatments (overt price increase vs product downsizing) over the consumer-product interaction trajectory. In addition, the different responses are expected among those consumers who detected the product downsizing vs those who did not detect that. Thus, three consumer groups are identified in the study: a) Control group (respondents who are randomly assigned to the overt price increase condition); b) Treatment 1 (respondents who are randomly assigned to the product downsizing condition and detected the product downsizing); c) Treatment 2 (respondents who are randomly assigned to the product downsizing condition and did not detect the product downsizing). 11. Results 11.1. Sample and Context 42 respondents answered the questionnaire distributed via a social network in March 2015. At the first interaction there were identified 4 observations with considerably lower ratings on all the dependent variables. At the consequent interactions these observations showed the same pattern. These 4 outliers all being in the control group were deleted from the sample. The analyses proceeds with 38 observations: 12 observations in the Control group, 12 observations in the Treatment 1 group, and 14 observations in the Treatment 2 group. Figure 1 illustrates typical development trajectories across the experimental conditions for all dependent variables characterizing the consumer response. The questionnaire was provided in Russian and all responded were the residents of Russia. The context of Russia as an emerging market contributes to the research in several ways. Firstly, emerging markets are characterized with high consumer heterogeneity. The diversity with respect to access to products and services tends to be enormous between urban and rural households (Sheth, 2011). Many consumers have no brand or product knowledge. Often, they do not even know how markets operate. Thus, the topicality of the consumer knowledge proves to be very high and managerially relevant. Secondly, the economic turbulence and market changes that take place in Russia in the current time leads to the high price volatility, which put pressure on manufactures, on the one side, and endanger consumers, on the other side. Manufactures have to optimize their market strategies and often raise prices to compensate a high uncertainty. While consumers, in the face of lowering incomes, rationalize their behavior and put a special attention to price-related issues. Figure 1. Consumer Response Trajectories across Experimental Conditions 54

Treatment 1 (package downsizing – detected) Treatment 2 (package downsizing – unrdetected) Pricing unfairness Producer trustunfairnessPrice Buying intention attitudeProduct Control group (overt package price increase) 11.2. ANCOVA To analyze the data, ANCOVA is used. The choice of the analytical tool is driven by the fact that there may be baseline differences between those in treatment and control groups at the Interaction 1. An imbalance between groups at baseline leads to the biased estimation of treatment effects at the following interaction when the data are analyzed using mixed-design ANOVA. ANCOVA has two major advantages over ANOVA in randomized group experiments. First, it generally has higher power. Second, it reduces bias associated with chance differences between groups that exist before the experiment is carried out. These advantages are realized because the dependent variable means are adjusted to partially account for chance pretreatment differences between the groups. 55

Thus, a set of 3 (control and 2 treatment groups) x 3 (interaction) repeated-measures ANCOVAs was run on each of the consumer response indicators to test hypotheses using methods appropriate to longitudinal studies of relationship development in the marketing literature (Aaker, Fournier, Brasel, 2004). Simple effects that examined the nature of each interaction at single points in time were run; two-tailed tests were used. Means are provided in Table 3; Table 4 presents the simple effects tests. Table 3. Descriptive Statistics on Consumer Response Measures (Means and Standard Deviations) Dependent variables Control group Treatment 1 Treatment 2 (n = 12) (n = 12) (n = 14) Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Product attitude: Interaction 1 4.46 (.29) 4.42 (.26) 4.07 (.30) Interaction 2 4.46 (.34) 4.00 (.26) 4.00 (.27) Interaction 3 4.29 (.33) 3.75 (.23) 3.61 (.33) Buying intention: Interaction 1 3.83 (.28) 4.03 (.31) 4.40 (.29) Interaction 2 3.58 (.32) 4.14 (.24) 4.26 (.24) Interaction 3 3.42 (.36) 3.75 (.31) 3.57 (.22) Price unfairness: Interaction 1 4.28 (.38) 3.81 (.39) 4.48 (.24) Interaction 2 5.11 (.26) 4.39 (.37) 4.64 (.25) Interaction 3 5.19 (.27) 4.33 (.41) 4.79 (.21) Producer trust: Interaction 1 4.25 (.37) 4.33 (.19) 3.93 (.38) Interaction 2 4.33 (.31) 4.17 (.29) 4.14 (.35) Interaction 3 4.42 (.26) 4.00 (.43) 3.64 (.39) Pricing unfairness: Interaction 1 Interaction 2 5.25 (.28) 4.83 (.21) 4.79 (.37) Interaction 3 5.25 (.39) 4.83 (.47) 5.86 (.27) Table 4. Simple Effects Analysis Using A General Linear Model (With Repeated Measures) Procedure Dependent variables Treatment 1 Treatment 2 (Treatment 1 vs Control) (Treatment 2 vs Control) Product attitude: Interaction 2 vs Interaction 1 -.35* .01 Interaction 3 vs Interaction 2 -.05 -.19 Buying intention: Interaction 2 vs Interaction 1 .55** .34 Interaction 3 vs Interaction 2 -.17 -.47* 56

Price unfairness: Interaction 2 vs Interaction 1 Interaction 3 vs Interaction 2 Producer trust: Interaction 2 vs Interaction 1 Interaction 3 vs Interaction 2 Pricing unfairness: Interaction 3 vs Interaction 2 .26 -.01 -.21 .19 -.10 -.03 .27 -.37 .25 1.33*** Note. – Values in the table are the coefficients in the regressions where each dependent variable is regressed against its lagged value (i.d. the value of the same variable at the previous interaction) and binary dummy variables for between-subjects groups: Y (Interaction N) = Y (Interaction N-1) + Dummy (Treatment 1) + Dummy (Treatment 2). A dummy variable for the control group is omitted as its coefficient is reflected in the base value before the lagged variable. The constant was suppressed from all regressions. * p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 For insight into hypotheses 1 and 2, which are concerned with the dynamic of buying intentions in different treatments groups if compared with the Control group, the pattern of buying intention at times 1, 2, and 3 is analyzed. The analysis partly support the hypothesis 1 by revealing that the Treatment 2 group rapidly shrinks their buying intentions when they are notified of the tactic usage (-.47*). The first part of the hypothesis that claims that product downsizing leads to a less reduction in buying intentions for the Treatment 2 group, if compared with the Control group, is supported (insignificant coefficient .34). The hypothesis 2 is not supported as well: unlike the hypothesis, the Treatment 1 group reacts less negatively to price increase than the Control group (.55**). The hypotheses 3 and 4 which covers the dynamics of psychological response (i.d. product attitude and producer trust perception) in different treatments groups are also supported only partly. In particular, it was revealed that the Treatment 1 group modifies their product attitude in a more negative direction when faced with downsizing (-.35*), and do not change their response when they get external information which confirms the usage of a tactic. Any significant difference in producer trust perception was not observed for the Treatment 1 group if compared with the Control group. The Treatment 2 group did not show a significant differences from the Control group in both product attitude and producer trust perception throughout the interactions (coefficients before product attitude and producer trust variables are insignificant in all regressions). The pair of hypotheses related to price and pricing unfairness judgments in different consumer groups come to several conclusions. Firstly, price unfairness have a tendency to raise in all three groups equally from Interaction 1 to Interaction 2: there is a significant coefficient 1.08*** before the base value and no significant coefficients before both treatment dummy variables, which shows that treatments do not deviate from the main tendency. Secondly, there is significant leap in pricing unfairness perception in the Treatment 2 group (1.33***) as compared to the Control group, which means that consumers who do not immediately detect the product downsizing increase their pricing unfairness perceptions rapidly upon an external notification. 11.3. t-test To test whether there are differences in the persuasion knowledge among consumer treatment groups, a simple t-test for mean difference between two independent groups was accomplished. The persuasion knowledge means and standard deviations in two groups are presented in the Figure 2. Figure 2. Persuasion knowledge in Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 groups (means and standard deviations) 57

Two-tailored t-test for two independent groups provides the following statistics: t = 0.35, df = 24. The null hypothesis about mean equivalence is not rejected (p > .10). Thus, there are no significant differences in the persuasion knowledge between consumers who are able and unable to detect the product downsizing by themselves. So the hypothesis 7 is not supported for the current sample. 12. Conclusion In general, the study can contribute to the existing research in several ways. Firstly, it deepens the understanding of price framing by interpreting the existing research contradictions through the introduction of consumer ability to detect a misleading tactic (i.d. product downsizing) as a moderating variable. Secondly, it links a consumer ability to detect a misleading tactic with the level of consumer persuasion knowledge. In particular, the analysis revealed that even when consumers are able to detect the product downsizing, they tend to err in their judgments regarding the price change and underestimate the scope of price increase. That could be driven by the limited abilities to conduct valid mathematical calculations when both the nominator and denominator (that is, product size and total package price) change. Even in the absence of product downsizing, consumers did not provide a valid evaluation of price change scope, and product downsizing being a more mentally challenging way to frame a price change accelerates the tendency to make mistakes among consumers. The study identified that consumers who do not immediately detect the product downsizing increase their pricing unfairness perceptions and decrease buying intentions rapidly upon an external notification. As the same effect is not observed for the price unfairness construct, it can be assumed that price and pricing unfairness should really be treated as separate constructs, which is propagated in some academic literature on consumer fairness judgments (Haws, Bearden, 2006). The study did not reveal a significant difference in the level of consumer persuasion knowledge among consumers who were able and unable to detect a product downsizing. That could raise the questions on the validity of the persuasion knowledge scale used in the study and appeal to the development or adaptation of other scales which are more relevant to the purposes of the study. The possible alternative is the Pricing Tactic Persuasion Knowledge (PTPK) scale developed by Hardesty, Bearden, and Carlson (2007) which tests more objective, rather than subjective persuasion knowledge in the domain of pricing by testing consumer knowledge of concrete pricing tactics used in a particular market. 58

As the current empirical study is initially conducted as a pilot study, an obvious limitation of the research is its small scope which likely resulted in the insignificant effect sizes for some studied variables. The specified limitation is expected to be handled when a full-scale study will be conducted. References Aaker, J., Fournier, S., & Brasel, S. A. (2004). When good brands do bad. Journal of Consumer research, 31(1), 1-16. Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational behavior and human decision processes, 50(2), 179-211. Bearden, W. O., Hardesty, D. M., & Rose, R. L. (2001). Consumer self‐confidence: refinements in conceptualization and measurement. Journal of Consumer Research, 28(1), 121-134. Bolton, L.E., Warlop, L. and Alba, J. (2003). Consumer perceptions of price (un)fairness. Journal of Consumer Research, 29(4), 474-492. Cakir, M., Balagtas, J. V., & Okrent, A. M. (2013). The Effects of Package Downsizing on Food Consumption. In 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, DC (No. 150680). Agricultural and Applied Economics Association. Carlson, J. P., Bearden, W. O., & Hardesty, D. M. (2007). Influences on what consumers know and what they think they know regarding marketer pricing tactics. Psychology & Marketing, 24(2), 117-142. Doney, P.M. and J.P. Cannon (1997). An examination of the nature of trust in buyer-seller relationships. Journal of Marketing,61, April, 35-51. Fournier, Susan, Susan Dobscha, and David G. Mick. 1998. “Preventing the Premature Death of Relationship Marketing.” Harvard Business Review 76 (1): 42-51. Friestad, M., & Wright, P. (1994). The persuasion knowledge model: How people cope with persuasion attempts. Journal of consumer research, 1-31. Garbarino, E. and Maxwell, S. (2010). Consumer response to norm-breaking pricing events in ecommerce. Journal of Business Research, 63(9), 1066-1072. Gourville, J. T., & Koehler, J. J. (2004). Downsizing price increases: A greater sensitivity to price than quantity in consumer markets. Division of Research, Harvard Business School. Hardesty, D. M., Bearden, W. O., & Carlson, J. P. (2007). Persuasion knowledge and consumer reactions to pricing tactics. Journal of Retailing, 83(2), 199-210. Haws, K.L. and Bearden, W.O. (2006). Dynamic pricing and consumer fairness perceptions. Journal of Consumer Research, 33(3), 304-311. Imai, S., & Watanabe, T. (2014). Product downsizing and hidden price increases: Evidence from Japan's deflationary period. Asian Economic Policy Review, 9(1), 69-89. 59

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Приложение 2. Апробация результатов исследования на конференции 6th EMAC Regional Conference, WU Vienna, Austria, September 16-18, 2015 Consumer Response To Misleading Pricing Tactics: The Case Of Product Downsizing Abstract The study investigates how consumers respond to equivalent price increases framed in a misleading vs “honest” way at the example of overt price increase vs product downsizing. The analysis reveals that consumers who detect the product downsizing deteriorate their attitude to the product, but do not decrease their buying intentions, while consumers who do not immediately detect the product downsizing increase their pricing unfairness perceptions and decrease buying intentions rapidly upon an external notification about downsizing. Key words: pricing tactics, product downsizing, misleading effect. 13. Introduction Price increases are a widespread phenomenon in a variety of markets. Such increases can be driven by market factors or by a desire of the company to increase profit margins. Regardless of the purpose of price increases, consumers usually negatively react to them as they has a detrimental effect on their wellbeing. To mitigate the negative consumer response to a price increase, companies can manage the way a price increase is presented to the market. Instead of raising the price for a product, the company can decrease the quantity/size of a product and remain the price of the product item unchanged. On the one hand, it allows keeping the product available for consumers; on the other hand, it makes hard to compare prices directly, which could be potentially perceived by consumers as unfair or deceptive (Zaltman, 1978; Hardesty, Bearden, Carlson, 2007). The motivation of marketers behind using pricing tactics that can mislead consumer from making an optimal choice is the possibility to get additional benefits. Marketers may not necessarily be trying to deceive consumers, but consumers are often affected nonetheless (Manning et al. 1998; Sprott et al. 2003). McGraw and Tetlock (2005) reason: “Consumers who have been gulled into thinking of themselves as part of a corporate family or partnership may feel especially bitter when they discover that the other party was treating them along purely as objects of monetary calculation”. Thus, misleading marketing practices once successfully implemented can become a source of consumer dissatisfaction over time, as consumers learn and develop their marketing expertise together with marketers. Getting financial benefits at the expense of consumers’ welfare due to consumer’s inattention or limited knowledge in something can bring significant losses to the company, once consumers gain persuasion knowledge in the field. The questions the study intends to answer are the following: How do consumers respond to price increases framed in a misleading vs “honest” way? Does the effect of such practices differ among consumers possessing different levels of market knowledge? 14. Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development The price and its impact on consumers has always been a focal point in the economic and management disciplines. Traditional economic models treat price as the monetary sacrifice a consumer makes to acquire a product or service (Stigler, 1987) and assume that an 61

individual should make the same choice when faced with equivalent decision problems. Although these principles have been usefully applied to a variety of marketing problems, recent research on the psychological aspects of pricing suggests that the role of price might be more complex than anticipated by standard economic principles. In particular, a number of studies demonstrated that the way price information is presented, termed price framing (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), often significantly influences perceptions of value. The nature of framing appears to differentially affect consumer perceptions of deals that are equivalent on a unit-cost basis but worded or presented differently (Sinha, Smith, 2000). The frames of product price vs product size changes to present an equivalent unit-cost change has received their attention in the studies of both price decreases (often for promotional purposes) and price increases. The framing of price increases as an overt price change or less visible for the consumer products downsizing (i.e. reducing the volume of product per package without a proportional decrease in package price) leads to different consumer responses to changes that are equivalent on the unit-price basis. In a range of articles that compare the consumer demand sensitivity to an equivalent price increase and product downsizing, it is demonstrated that consumers are more sensitive to price over quantity/size changes because of either their unawareness of product size, inattention to unit prices, or relative uncommonness of product downsizing in the marketplace (Gourville, Koehler, 2004; Cakir, Balagtas, 2014). However, some studies does not prove that the differential sensitivity to differently framed price increases exists (Imai, Watanabe, 2014). The results of the studies are contradictory and demand further clarification, in particular, by introducing moderating variables that allow interpreting the differences in the above studies. This study proposes that the consumer ability to detect the product downsizing will moderate the consumer response to that practice: H1. Consumers who detect and do not detect a product downsizing differently change their buying intentions in relations to a product. Presumably, the difference in the response to overt and covert price increase framings can be found not only at the level of behavioral achievements, but also at the level of consumer perceptions of alternatives. Numerous studies have shown that consumers’ acceptance of a price, particularly a price increase, depends on considering it “fair” (Kahneman, Knetsch, Thaler, 1986). In case of pricing, the overt raise of price per product could be regarded as such a fair standard, because such a way to increase price is clear and does not demand additional cognitive costs to evaluate the extent of price increase. On the contrary, product downsizing can be regarded by consumers as a manipulative intent of the company to mislead consumers from an optimal choice and thereby gain from consumer limited attention or unawareness. Both price offered and the rationale for offering a certain price may lead to perceptions of unfairness and to negative consequences for the consumer, such as worsened product attitude (Xia et al., 2004): H2. Consumers who detect and do not detect a product downsizing differently change their product attitude, price and pricing unfairness perception in relations to a product. Pricing tactics include marketers’ efforts to generate favorable price perceptions regarding their brands, stores, and offerings (Hardesty, Bearden, Carlson, 2007). Some pricing practices mislead consumers leading to a suboptimal choice. When faced with the practice in routine life the consumer can be unaware of practice usage. But “over time consumers develop personal knowledge about the tactics used in these persuasion attempts” (Friestad, Wright, 1994). The understanding of practice nature can be gained with experience or through the external information. Friestad and Wright (1994) introduced the Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM) that describes how people's persuasion knowledge influences their responses to 62

persuasion attempts, in particular, how people use their persuasion knowledge to refine their attitudes toward products and marketers. Persuasion knowledge guides consumers' attention to aspects of an advertising campaign or price presentation, providing inferences about possible background conditions that caused the agent to construct the attempt in that way (Friestad, Wright, 1994). It is hypothesized: H3. Consumers who detect a product downsizing correct their product judgments and behavior immediately, while consumers who do not detect a product downsizing change their behavior only after they are notified of product downsizing usage. H4. Consumers who detect a product downsizing possess a higher persuasion knowledge than those who do not detect the product downsizing. 15. Research design To test the specified hypotheses, the study uses an experimental method. Webexperiment including both within-subject and between-subject designs is employed to compare the behavioral and psychological responses of consumers to product downsizing (misleading pricing tactic) and price increase (“fair” pricing tactic) and, secondly, to identify how the ability to detect product downsizing is dependent on persuasion knowledge. The survey structure is represented in Table 1. Table 1. Survey structure Interactions Interaction 1 Interaction 2 Interaction 3 Description  All respondents are provided with a concise description of the market situation and the picture of the product with a price.  Respondents are randomly assigned to one of the two conditions (product downsizing vs equivalent overt price increase) in the proportion 60/40. Respondents are still provided with a concise description of the market situation (the same for all respondents) and the picture of the product with a price (different pictures depending on the assigned condition).  All respondents are asked to evaluate the extent of price change by choosing one of the given options with different percentage changes.  The respondents exposed to product downsizing are asked whether they have noticed the size change. Depending on the answer they are divided in the two groups: Treatment 1 – those who detected the size change, and Treatment 2 - those who did not detected the sized change.  All respondents regardless of their previous answers are provided with the information on the extent of price increase. The respondents exposed to product downsizing are also informed that the price increase was partly accomplished through the reduction of the product quantity from 990 to 900 ml. At each interaction consumers are offered to evaluate whether they agree with particular statements which are intended to measure several conceptual constructs: product attitude, buying intention, price unfairness, and pricing unfairness. The constructs are the same throughout the interaction timeline and are measured using 7-point Likert scale. The multidimensional constricts are reliable at each interaction (Chronbach alphas > 0,79). Persuasion knowledge is measured only once at the end of the study. Considering all the above consumer response variables, it is hypothesized the variables will behave differently in consumer groups exposed to different treatments (overt price increase vs product downsizing) over the consumer-product interaction trajectory. In addition, the different responses are expected among those consumers who detected the product downsizing vs those who did not detect that. Three consumer groups are identified in the study: a) Control group (respondents who are randomly assigned to the overt price increase condition); b) Treatment 1 (respondents who are randomly assigned to the product downsizing 63

condition and detected the product downsizing); c) Treatment 2 (respondents who are randomly assigned to the product downsizing condition and did not detect the product downsizing). 16. Results 16.1. Sample 42 respondents answered the questionnaire distributed via a social network in March 2015. At the first interaction there were identified 4 observations with considerably lower ratings on all the dependent variables. At the consequent interactions these observations showed the same pattern. These 4 outliers all being in the control group were deleted from the sample. The analyses proceeds with 38 observations: 12 observations in the Control group, 12 observations in the Treatment 1 group, and 14 observations in the Treatment 2 group. 16.2. ANCOVA To analyze the data, ANCOVA is used. The choice of the analytical tool is driven by the fact that there may be baseline differences between those in treatment and control groups at the Interaction 1. An imbalance between groups at baseline leads to the biased estimation of treatment effects at the following interaction when the data are analyzed using mixed-design ANOVA. Thus, a set of 3 (control and 2 treatment groups) x 3 (interaction) repeated-measures ANCOVAs was run on each of the consumer response indicators to test hypotheses using methods appropriate to longitudinal studies of relationship development in the marketing literature (Aaker, Fournier, Brasel, 2004). Simple effects that examined the nature of each interaction at single points in time were run; two-tailed tests were used. Means are provided in Table 2; Table 3 presents the simple effects tests. Table 2. Descriptive Statistics on Consumer Response Measures (Means and Standard Deviations) Dependent variables Product attitude: Interaction 1 Interaction 2 Interaction 3 Buying intention: Interaction 1 Interaction 2 Interaction 3 Price unfairness: Interaction 1 Interaction 2 Interaction 3 Pricing unfairness: Interaction 1 Interaction 2 Interaction 3 Control group (n = 12) Mean SD Treatment 1 (n = 12) Mean SD Treatment 2 (n = 14) Mean SD 4.46 4.46 4.29 (.29) (.34) (.33) 4.42 4.00 3.75 (.26) (.26) (.23) 4.07 4.00 3.61 (.30) (.27) (.33) 3.83 3.58 3.42 (.28) (.32) (.36) 4.03 4.14 3.75 (.31) (.24) (.31) 4.40 4.26 3.57 (.29) (.24) (.22) 4.28 5.11 5.19 (.38) (.26) (.27) 3.81 4.39 4.33 (.39) (.37) (.41) 4.48 4.64 4.79 (.24) (.25) (.21) 5.25 5.25 (.28) (.39) 4.83 4.83 (.21) (.47) 4.79 5.86 (.37) (.27) Table 3. Simple Effects Analysis Using A General Linear Model (With Repeated Measures) Procedure Dependent variables Product attitude: Interaction 2 vs Interaction 1 Interaction 3 vs Interaction 2 Buying intention: Treatment 1 (Treatment 1 vs Control) Treatment 2 (Treatment 2 vs Control) -.35* -.05 .01 -.19 64

Interaction 2 vs Interaction 1 .55** .34 Interaction 3 vs Interaction 2 -.17 -.47* Price unfairness: Interaction 2 vs Interaction 1 .26 -.21 Interaction 3 vs Interaction 2 -.01 .19 Pricing unfairness: Interaction 3 vs Interaction 2 .25 1.33*** Note. – Values in the table are the coefficients in the regressions where each dependent variable is regressed against its lagged value (i.d. the value of the same variable at the previous interaction) and binary dummy variables for between-subjects groups: Y (Interaction N) = Y (Interaction N-1) + Dummy (Treatment 1) + Dummy (Treatment 2). A dummy variable for the control group is omitted as its coefficient is reflected in the base value before the lagged variable. The constant was suppressed from all regressions. p < .10*; p < .05**; p < .01*** The analysis reveals that the Treatment 1 group reacts less negatively to price increase than the Control group (.55**). While the Treatment 2 group rapidly shrinks their buying intentions only when they are notified of the tactic usage (-.47*). The Treatment 1 group modifies their product attitude in a more negative direction when faced with downsizing (-.35*), and do not change their response when they get external information which confirms the usage of a tactic. The Treatment 2 group did not show a significant differences from the Control group in product attitude throughout the interactions (coefficients before the product attitude variable is insignificant in all regressions). Price unfairness have a tendency to raise in all three groups equally from Interaction 1 to Interaction 2. There are no significant coefficients before both treatment dummy variables, which shows that treatments do not deviate from the main tendency. Secondly, there is significant leap in pricing unfairness perception in the Treatment 2 group ( 1.33***) as compared to the Control group, which means that consumers who do not immediately detect the product downsizing increase their pricing unfairness perceptions rapidly upon an external notification. 16.3. t-test To test whether there are differences in the persuasion knowledge among consumer treatment groups, a simple t-test for mean difference between two independent groups was accomplished. Two-tailored t-test for two independent groups provides the following statistics: t = - 0.35, df = 24. The null hypothesis about mean equivalence is not rejected (p > . 10). Thus, there are no significant differences in the persuasion knowledge between consumers who are able and unable to detect the product downsizing by themselves. So the hypothesis 7 is not supported for the current sample. 17. Conclusion In general, the study can contribute to the existing research in several ways. Firstly, it deepens the understanding of price framing by interpreting the existing research contradictions through the introduction of consumer ability to detect a misleading tactic (i.d. product downsizing) as a moderating variable. Secondly, it links a consumer ability to detect a misleading tactic with the level of consumer persuasion knowledge. In particular, the analysis revealed that even when consumers are able to detect the product downsizing, they tend to err in their judgments regarding the price change and underestimate the scope of price increase. That could be driven by the limited abilities to conduct valid mathematical calculations when both the nominator and denominator (that is, product size and total package price) change. Even in the absence of product downsizing, consumers did not provide a valid evaluation of price change scope, and product downsizing being a more mentally challenging way to frame a price change accelerates the tendency to make mistakes among consumers. 65

The study identified that consumers who do not immediately detect the product downsizing increase their pricing unfairness perceptions and decrease buying intentions rapidly upon an external notification. As the same effect is not observed for the price unfairness construct, it can be assumed that price and pricing unfairness should really be treated as separate constructs, which is propagated in some academic literature on consumer fairness judgments (Haws, Bearden, 2006). The study did not reveal a significant difference in the level of consumer persuasion knowledge among consumers who were able and unable to detect a product downsizing. That could raise the questions on the validity of the persuasion knowledge scale used in the study and appeal to the development or adaptation of other scales which are more relevant to the purposes of the study. The possible alternative is the Pricing Tactic Persuasion Knowledge (PTPK) scale developed by Hardesty, Bearden, and Carlson (2007) which tests more objective, rather than subjective persuasion knowledge in the domain of pricing by testing consumer knowledge of concrete pricing tactics used in a particular market. References Aaker, J., Fournier, S., & Brasel, S. A. (2004). When good brands do bad. Journal of Consumer research, 31(1), 1-16. Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational behavior and human decision processes, 50(2), 179-211. Bearden, W. O., Hardesty, D. M., & Rose, R. L. (2001). Consumer self‐confidence: refinements in conceptualization and measurement. Journal of Consumer Research, 28(1), 121-134. Bolton, L.E., Warlop, L. and Alba, J. (2003). Consumer perceptions of price (un)fairness. Journal of Consumer Research, 29(4), 474-492. Cakir, M., Balagtas, J. V., & Okrent, A. M. (2013). The Effects of Package Downsizing on Food Consumption. In 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, DC (No. 150680). Agricultural and Applied Economics Association. Carlson, J. P., Bearden, W. O., & Hardesty, D. M. (2007). Influences on what consumers know and what they think they know regarding marketer pricing tactics. Psychology & Marketing, 24(2), 117-142. Doney, P.M. and J.P. Cannon (1997). An examination of the nature of trust in buyer-seller relationships. Journal of Marketing,61, April, 35-51. Friestad, M., & Wright, P. (1994). The persuasion knowledge model: How people cope with persuasion attempts. Journal of consumer research, 1-31. Garbarino, E. and Maxwell, S. (2010). Consumer response to norm-breaking pricing events in e-commerce. Journal of Business Research, 63(9), 1066-1072. Gourville, J. T., & Koehler, J. J. (2004). Downsizing price increases: A greater sensitivity to price than quantity in consumer markets. Division of Research, Harvard Business School. 66

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