FEDERAL STATE AUTONOMOUS INSTITUTION OF HIGHER
EDUCATION
“MOSCOW STATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(UNIVERSITY)
OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION”
B.A. in Government and International Affairs
School of Government and International Affairs
Department of Diplomacy
Graduate Qualification Work
in the field of study 41.03.05 International Relations (Bachelor
level)
Topic:
«The Use of Religion by Political Leaders as a Tool to Gain
Public support for Warfare »
Done by:
student Nuraziz Misirov
SGIA, Year 4, Group 1
Superv
isor:
Dr. Anton Gumenskiy
Associate Professor, World Politics Department
Moscow State University of International Relations
Discussant:
Dr. Tim Potier
Associate Professor, World Politics Department
Moscow State University of International Relations
Moscow – 2020
Table of contents
Оглавление
Abstract of the thesis............................................................................................. 3
Introduction............................................................................................................. 4
I.
Prerequisites for conflict in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR.............................7
1. Historical background. People who were expelled from their homes...7
2. The role of religion in Chechen life and its influence on the formation
of ethnic identity............................................................................................... 11
II.
The politicisation of Islam in Chechnya..................................................14
1. The use of religion during the presidency of Dudayev. Chechen
Wahhabism......................................................................................................... 14
2. The incompetent policy of Aslan Maskhadov..........................................19
III. The Chechen crisis in terms of international relations. The
Probability of the Third Chechen War...............................................................28
1. The Second Chechen War from the perspective of international
relations.............................................................................................................. 28
2. The Probability of the Third Chechen War..............................................30
Conclusion............................................................................................................. 33
Bibliography.......................................................................................................... 36
2
Abstract of the thesis
Abstract of the thesis "The Use of Religion by Political Leaders as
a Tool to Gain Public Support for Warfare" by the student
Misirov Nuraziz. This study illustrates the use of religion, in this
particular case, Islam, by the Chechen political elite of those
years to mobilize the Chechen people for war against the Russian
Federation in order to separate Chechnya from it. The diploma
thesis is also devoted to the study of the Chechen crisis in the
context of international relations.
The student thoroughly studied the process of evolution of the
methods of propaganda by Chechen politicians, and identified
the reasons for the choice of the religious factor as the main
emphasis for agitation of people to participate in the war. In
carrying out this kind of research, the student analysed a large
number of news articles obtained from the website of the "
Kommersant " newspaper, as it turned out that among the other
news resources, only the " Kommersant " has a convenient
system for searching archive news.
During the study of this topic through the prism of international
relations, the student discovered gross mistakes made by the
government of the Russian Federation during the signing of a
peace treaty with representatives of the self-proclaimed Islamic
Republic. By making such mistakes, the Russian government
actually recognized the independence of Ichkeria. Because of
this, the second Chechen war can be considered an international
military conflict in which Chechnya was a victim.
In the last chapter of the diploma, the author also studied the
role of Islam in modern Chechnya and the possibility of new
military confrontations between Russia and the Chechen
Republic. In addition, the conclusion provides recommendations
for further study of religion as a manipulative instrument in the
context of the two Chechen wars.
3
Introduction
This thesis is dedicated to studying the use of religion as a
manipulative tool by politicians to start a war and then justify it.
The objects of study are the first and second Chechen wars that
engulfed Russia in the 1990s. The aim of the thesis is to study
and reveal how political leaders use religion as a bargaining chip
when waging warfare against other countries to avoid backlash
from the public. The purpose of this case study is to highlight the
role of religion as an ideological and propaganda instrument
during the first and second Chechen wars. I will use the case
study method to study the two Chechen wars.
Religion in itself is a controversial and contradictory topic for
study and discussion. Being a system of views based on belief in
supernatural forces, including a set of moral norms and types of
behavior aimed at containing the animal nature of man, religion
has been often used by politicians as a tool to start wars and
justify military actions. However, "slogans that are used to wage
war" and "causes of war" are completely different things. The
fact that absolutely any military propaganda declares that its
participation in warfare is caused by kindness and justice does
not imply that the cause of all wars is kindness and justice. Of
course, officially wars are launched for the sake of restoring the
violated justice, protecting the oppressed, punishing the villains,
bringing peace and order, helping the victims, in other words, for
4
the noblest and most sublime reasons. It would be naive to think
that these noble motives are the reason for wars.
In my opinion, the increased interest in religious wars and their
leaders is a natural phenomenon of modern historiography. First
of all, it is connected with those political processes that took
place in the world in the last decades of the XX century and at
the beginning of the XXI century: ethno-confessional conflicts in
different parts of the world, strengthening of Islamic
fundamentalism and local wars that broke out here and there. At
the same time, the issue of participation of the army and the
military in social conflicts remains relevant in modern conditions.
When a social conflict takes the form of an armed confrontation,
whether it is a riot, revolution or civil war, the way out of such
crisis situations largely depends on the position of people who
own weapons and are organized in a force designed to ensure
the solution of state problems.
Secondly, increased attention to such realities of the past as
manifestations of public consciousness and reflection of major
historical events in it. This circumstance is determined by the
peculiarities of modern culture, within the framework of which
there is a growing interest in the humanitarian component of the
historical process. It significantly influences the emphasis of
cognitive interest and research attention from the events,
phenomena and processes of individual reality to the phenomena
of individual and mass consciousness, to the state of individual
and public culture of certain historical epochs.
The relevance of the topic of the diploma thesis is largely
determined by the increasing number of religious wars in the last
few decades. However, very often religious wars are not at all
what they seem.
Religious wars, however, are not only the history of ideological,
social and political conflicts, but also the history of their amazing
personalities. For this reason, I will pay special attention to the
study of personalities, such as Dzhokhar Dudayev, who led to
5
unleashing the wars examined in my work. In my thesis I will
analyze how the authorities use religion to manipulate people's
minds and try to find out why in the cases I examined most
religious people were easily manipulated.
My research work consists of three chapters. In the first chapter,
I will discuss the theoretical part of my work. In it I will study the
main features of the Chechen people, the role of religion in their
life and the historical factors that led to the beginning of the
conflict in this region of the North Caucasus. Also, in this part I
will review Stalin's policy towards the Chechens in the 1940s,
and analyze the weakening of the Soviet Union's policy towards
religion in the 1980s, because in my opinion these two factors
were one of the triggers for the revival of interest in religion in
Chechnya and its further radicalization.
In the second chapter, I will focus on the analysis of the methods
of propaganda that were used during the two wars in Chechnya.
In it I will compare the agitation and propaganda styles of such
leaders of the supporters of the independence of Chechnya as
Dzhokhar Dudayev and Aslan Maskhadov. In this way, I will try
to carefully analyze the words and messages they used at the
beginning and the end of the Chechen conflict in order to put
pressure on the weak points of their people to make it easier to
convince them to take part in military actions. Here the main
emphasis will be on news published during the period when all
these events took place in the territory of present-day Chechnya
and interviews with the heads of the Chechen Republic of
Ichkeria.
In the third chapter of my diploma thesis, these conflicts will be
analyzed by me from the perspective of international relations
and international law and I will consider the mistakes made by
the Russian authorities, which in turn contributed to the
escalation of the situation at the time and the strengthening of
the role of Islam as one of the pillars on which the Chechen
separatists relied. The positions of various international
6
organizations in relation to these wars will be considered by me
in this part of my thesis. Also, in this chapter I will analyze the
probability of a next Chechen war.
After that, at the end of my thesis I will write the conclusions
that I made during my research on this topic.
As one of the main sources of information, I chose the
monograph
" Chechnya:
Life
in
a
War-Torn
Society"
by
Academician-Secretary of the Department of Historical and
Philological Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences V. A.
Tishkov.
The book "Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the
Caucasus", edited by Moshe Gammer, one of the major experts in
the sphere of religious and political history of the North
Caucasian region, also was a very useful source of information
for me.
Another main source of information that I used to write my thesis
was the book “CHECHNYA: TOMBSTONE OF RUSSIAN POWER”
by Anatol Lieven.
Some of the documents I used were:
1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union;
Constitution of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria;
The text of the Khasavyurt Accord;
The text of the Moscow Peace Treaty.
I also used a lot of news articles published in the 1990s, during
the Chechen crisis. To get access to them I used the website of
the "Kommersant" newspaper.
In addition, I used the " Novaya Gazeta" newspaper archive for
1997 and 1998.
7
I.
Prerequisites for conflict in the Chechen-Ingush
ASSR
1. Historical background. People who were expelled from
their homes.
I decided to begin my theoretical analysis of the two wars in
Chechnya with the clarification of the underlying causes of these
conflicts. In order to cope with this task, I think it would be
reasonable to draw attention to the historical factors that
Ekaterina Sokirianskaia called " clusters of historical memory " 1,
which had a strong influence on the emergence of Chechen
identity as such, and on the attitude of both Chechens and
Vainakh peoples in general to the Russian state. According to
Sokirianskaia, there are three of such clusters: "memories of
grievance", "memory of success" and "memory of life in a
multicultural environment". It is not difficult to determine that
the first of the above-mentioned areas is most involved in the
events that took place in the 90s of the twentieth century.
In the context of the "memory of grievances", common memories
of the military resistance of the Russian Empire and Turkey
during
the
Caucasian
wars
can
be
considered.
Forced
collectivization and forced expulsion of Vainakh peoples in the
1940s could also be attributed to this memory area. However,
E. Sokirianskaia, “Ideology and Conflict: Chechen Political Nationalism
prior to, and during, Ten Years of War,” in: Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and
the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder, ed. by M. Gammer,
Routledge, New York, 2008, p. 104.
1
8
when we talk about these "memories", we need to keep in mind
the fact that the other peoples of the North Caucasus, as well as
Chechens, experienced these events throughout their history.
After the revolutionary events of October 1917 and the formation
of a new socialist state instead of a monarchy, chaos and
destruction reigned in Russia. At that time there were attempts
to divide the territory of Russia, for example, to unite territories
of the Dagestani and Tersk regions into the North Caucasian
autonomy.
In
December
1917,
a
joint
declaration
of
the
Military
Government and the Central Committee of the Union of United
Highlanders
on
the
establishment
of
the
Tersk-Dagestani
government representing the Tersk Cossack army and the Union
of
United
Highlanders
of
the
North
Caucasus,
declared
"autonomous states" of the South Eastern Union of Cossack
Troops, Caucasian Highlanders and free peoples of the steppes
was published. Their example was decided to be followed by
other neighboring regions. The "autonomous states" themselves
existed until the Bolsheviks' victory in the civil war, and in 1921
became part of Soviet Russia. By the second half of the 1920s,
the North Caucasus region was divided and divided into
administrative territories on the basis of nationality. The
determining factor in that division was the numerical superiority
of the ethnic group among the inhabitants of a given region. All
that division was based on the principles of feudalism, which
rested
on
ethnic
superiority.
This
factor,
in
turn,
only
exacerbated the problems arising from the differences and
disagreements between the regions, while sharpening mutual
misunderstanding and animosity between representatives of
9
different nationalities. Of particular note is the fact that, unlike
the Union Republics, autonomous regions and republics were not
sovereign states as was written in the Constitution of the Soviet
Union. Consequently, in comparison with their "older brothers",
the autonomous republics and autonomous regions that were
part of the USSR were severely curtailed in their rights,
including cultural ones. The fact that in autonomous republics
and regions education was available only in the Russian
language is a proof of this fact. The situation was exactly the
same for Chechens and Ingush, whom, by the way, in January
1934 the Soviet authorities decided to unify into an autonomous
region, which, in turn, after the adoption of the constitution of
the Soviet Union in 1936 was transformed into the ChechenIngush Autonomous Republic. Here, we can notice one extremely
curious detail: The Soviet Union, like many states consisting of
diverse parts, relied on the method of fomenting enmity between
its parts; in other words, state power in the USSR was built on
the principle of "divide and rule". In addition, despite the fact
that the Soviet Union was declared as a socialist state, it formed
a ruling class, the so-called nomenclature. And to some extent, it
was the presence of these two factors that had a decisive
influence on the concentration of power in the hands of the
ethnically constructed establishment. If we talk about Chechnya
in particular, the authorities there were mainly represented by
well-educated people, who later had a strong influence on the
political and ethnic mobilization of the population.
However,
the
Chechens
themselves
mainly
refer
to
the
deportation of their people by Stalin and Beria to Central Asia as
the main factor in the emergence of protest sentiment. The mass
10
resettlement of the Vainakh people to Siberia and the territory of
today's Republic of Kazakhstan, whom the Soviet authorities
accused of assisting the enemy forces of Nazi Germany, took
place from February 1944 to March of the same year. The
Chechen-Ingush republic, as such, ceased to exist after that.
However, one should not forget that the Vainakh peoples are not
the only ones who were deported. Representatives of other
ethnic groups such as Crimean Tatars, Koreans, Balkars and
others were also resettled. The fact that to this day there is no
reliable data on the total number of people who were deported or
killed
is
disappointing. Nevertheless,
according
to
official
statistics of the USSR, in February and March 1944 more than
600 thousand people who lived in the North Caucasus region
were deported from their historical homeland. Such a huge
number of people were relocated in terrible conditions. The
deportees
were
transported
on
trains
that
were
heavily
overcrowded. It is worth taking into account the fact that the
entire process of expatriation took place in winter, which
resulted in the death of more than 150,000 Ingush and Chechens
in those inhuman conditions, due to illness, low temperatures
and malnutrition, which at that time was one third of the total
number of Vainakh population. The deported ethnic groups
received permission to repatriate only in the 1950s after Joseph
Stalin died and under the leadership of the General Secretary of
the CPSU Central Committee, Nikita Khrushchev, the process of
eliminating Stalin's cult of personality began in the country.
Moreover, on February 26, 2004, the European Parliament
recognized the deportation of Chechens and Ingush as an act of
genocide.
11
In addition to the above, it should be added that the concept of
freedom, the so-called " Marsho", plays an extremely important
role in the life of Chechens. In his book "The Lone Wolf and the
Bear: Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule",
Moshe Gammer, a major specialist in the history of Islam in the
North Caucasus, describes this idea as "a central concept in both
Chechen culture and the Chechen psyche. While Chechen
nationalists attribute modern political meanings to this word, its
traditional meaning goes far beyond the meanings typical of
Western or Islamic culture. In the Chechen language, the word
also has connotations of "peace" and "well-being" 2. In his book,
Gammer also reflects on the fact that for Chechens to accept
Russian rule could mean "something more than a loss of freedom
in its Western sense: it meant a loss one’s of manhood and, more
important – one’s soul". I think it is quite plausible that an
understanding of the mechanism of these ideas can help to
understand the fierce nature of Chechens, and to clarify such a
long history of Chechen resistance.
To sum up this paragraph, it is worth mentioning the importance
and great role of these historical facts in explaining the
enormous dissatisfaction of the inhabitants of this tiny region in
the North Caucasus with the Russian authorities. These are the
facts that allow us to see the true reasons and the quintessence
of bloody armed confrontations between Chechens and federal
troops of the Russian Federation. Without understanding these
factors, it may become impossible to understand the root causes
of these conflicts, because without this knowledge the entire
M. Gammer, The Lone Wolf and the Bear: Three Centuries of Chechen
Defiance of Russian Rule, C. Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd., London, 2006, pp.
6-7.
2
12
conflict in Chechnya will seem completely senseless. The facts
and reasons I mentioned led to the formation of the psychology
of the outcast nation in Chechens, which of course only played
into the hands of those people who later tried to unite Chechens
on the basis of their ethnic identity. Chechen self-identity is a
manifestation of the so-called " multi-identity". As evidence, the
religious affiliation of Chechens can be cited as an example.
Islam, as the main religion in the North Caucasus, acquires its
specific features in Chechnya. Here I am mentioning Sufism. The
role of the religious factor, in particular Sufism, will be discussed
in the next paragraph.
2. The role of religion in Chechen life and its influence
on the formation of ethnic identity
At the beginning of this paragraph, I would like to underline the
fact that, compared to other nations such as Azerbaijanis, Tatars
and Central Asian nations, North Caucasians converted to Islam
much later. The adoption of Islam in Chechnya took place in the
late 18th century. This situation leads to the idea that Islam itself
did not play a decisive role in the emergence of Chechen identity.
Much more interesting is the fact that Islam, which underwent
various transformations in Chechnya, found a new form there,
becoming a Sufi Islam. Sufism, being a mystical movement within
the framework of traditional Sunni Islam, renounced some Sharia
laws, preferring "adat" to them, which is the set of rules for
Muslims, used as a counterbalance to Sharia. In the 19th
century, a system of Sufi tariqats - Naqshbandiya and Qadiriya
provided for the establishment of an Islamic state called the
13
Caucasian Imamate3. This state was one of the few examples in
the history of the region when the Sufi traditions there were able
to acquire a fundamental religious status. It should be noted that
Sufi tariqats are strikingly different from one another. There is
no need to go far for an example: in the 20th century, the tariqat
of Naqshbanidiya was fully supportive of jihad, while Qadiriya's
tariqat was skeptical about the ideas of jihad but loyal to Russia.
Surprisingly, in the last decade of the 20th century, these two
branches of Sufism experienced significant ideological changes.
Supporters of the Qadiriya supported Dudayev and his followers,
and actively supported the idea of jihad, while the Naqshbandi
branch opposed the regime of Dudayev and other separatists 4.
Particular attention should be paid to "gazavat" declared by
Chechen separatists against Russia and federal troops, as it
differs from canonical jihad in its focus on attacking nonbelievers, while jihad is declared in case of need to protect their
possessions, homeland, etc. from an external aggressor. The
second difference between gazavat and jihad is the source of
decision making. The leadership of a tribe, city or state must
make a decision before engaging in armed conflict. The decision
to start a jihad rests solely with the highest clergyman, who may
be the High Mufti, Shaykh al-Islam or another cleric of the
highest rank. This is explained by the fact that it is the spiritual
leader who, having great knowledge in the field of religion, is
able to adequately assess the possibility and necessity of starting
an armed struggle. The decision to declare a gazavat can be
made not only by a cleric, but also by a secular ruler.
U. Halbach, “Islam in the North Caucasus, available at
[https://journals.openedition.org/assr/18403]
4
Ibid
3
14
It is important to emphasize the fact that after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Russia, in terms of religious and domestic policy,
faced the rebirth of the old and the emergence of many new
religious communities after decades of Soviet atheism. This
sudden process of reviving faith in God was subject to
politicization. This was particularly clear in regions where
religious clashes were taking place. Speaking specifically about
Chechnya, Gammer writes in his book that the religious
renaissance was accompanied by four main processes:
- Islamic renaissance;
- the use of Islam by both the authorities and many opposition
groups;
- the involvement of the Sufi leadership in politics, usually
against their will;
- and the on the stage of the Wahhabis5.
The use of Islam as a factor that could consolidate the masses of
the people was justified by political motives, the cornerstones of
which were the precariousness and insecurity of Chechen society
and the painful experience of Chechen people over the long
history of this ethnic group.
Summing up all the above in this paragraph, it can be concluded
that the inhabitants of Chechnya, and the Caucasus as a whole,
being very loyal to their traditions and customs, managed to
adapt Islam to themselves, creating a new branch of this religion,
which they used several times to bring together the society in
which they lived.
M. Gammer, “Between Mecca and Moscow: Islam, Politics and Political
Islam in Chechnya and Daghestan,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 41, No. 6,
2005, p. 834.
5
15
Political science professor Edward Walker argues that the
Islamic Renaissance in the Caucasus has become "politicized,
fundamentalist, anti-Russian and probably anti-Western in its
orientation6. In order to get to the true reasons why the
separatist movement leaders turned to radical Islamic, antiRussian and anti-Western ideas, it is necessary to briefly analyze
the policies of Dzhokhar Dudayev, Aslan Maskhadov, and Shamil
Basayev. This will be done by me in the next chapter of my
diploma thesis, which is devoted to an empirical analysis of the
events that took place on the territory of the Chechen Republic
of Ichkeria then.
E. Walker, Islam in Chechnya, available at
[https://iseees.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/shared/walker_1998islam.pdf]
6
16
II.
The politicisation of Islam in Chechnya
1. The use of religion during the presidency of Dudayev.
Chechen Wahhabism
Talking about Dudayev, it is necessary to keep in mind the fact
that he originally did not intend to unite Chechens on the basis of
Islam. Dzhokhar Dudayev was a controversial figure in and of
himself, and his actions were illogical in many ways. He lived
most of his life outside Chechnya, served in the Soviet army, had
the rank of general and was married to a Russian woman. It is
important that Dzhokhar hardly spoke Chechen, and as a nonreligious man he did not live as Islam dictates. Dudayev flattened
his failure as a religious figure with the skill of manipulating
people.
His
speeches
always
consisted
of
simple
and
understandable words to the ordinary people' ear. In his
speeches
and
interviews,
he
always
focused
on
such
psychologically painful topics as religion, freedom and the
oppression of the Chechen people by Russia. In his scientific
monograph, Tishkov cites the Chechen resident's words about
Dzhokhar as an example: "Unlike the others, Dudayev was good
because when he spoke on television, all the thoughts he wanted
to convey to people were clear to everyone 7". It should be noted
that Dudayev also benefited from the fact that he was the first
Chechen in the USSR to be given the rank of general. That fact
undoubtedly helped to unite the masses of people around his
persona.
Тишков. В.А. Общество в вооруженном конфликте (этнография
чеченской войны). – М.: Наука. 2001., с.257
7
17
After Dudayev approved the constitution and declared Chechnya
independent, Chechnya was positioned as a state based on
democracy with all its values, including the right to choose
religion. In many interviews Dzhokhar said that he saw Chechnya
as a secular country with rule of law and order. However, there
was no stronger ideological factor in Chechnya for consolidation
of the population to fight for independent Ichkeria than religion.
That is why Islam was the platform that Dudayev and his
supporters used to justify the properness of the separatist
movement that they had started. In his work "Islam in Chechnya"
Edward Walker wrote that the countries of the Western world
discredited themselves in the eyes of Chechens due to the refusal
of the same Western liberal democracies to help Chechnya in the
civil war after the death of communism ideas. However, if we
look at it from a different perspective, it is not difficult to see
that liberal ideas do not fit into the framework of Chechen
culture, which is based on the tradition of Chechens to build
everything around a long-established system of teips. When
Dudayev realized that assistance from developed countries in
separating Chechnya from the Russian Federation was not worth
waiting for, he decided to drill a window to the Islamic world.
Thus, he paid an official visit to Iran, where he called for a holy
war against Russia8.
The inauguration of Dzhokhar Dudayev took place on November
9, 1991, during which he, in the presence of a large number of
representatives of various Islamic religious institutions, put his
hand on the Koran, swore to observe and protect the Islamic
faith. But this did not prevent him, during one of the press
8
E. Walker, op. cit
18
conferences that took place that year, from making a mistake
several times in a row and saying that Islamic practice is to pray
four times a day, whereas in reality the number of prayers that a
person who considers himself a Muslim has to do is five. The
seemingly unremarkable mistakes actually showed a deep
indifference to religion of a man who had ambition to create a
Sharia state.
Despite all the above facts, until the beginning of the first
Chechen campaign in 1994, Chechnya was still a country where
religion was separated from power. It can be seen that the
radicalization of religious ideas held by the political elites of
Ichkeria took place with the escalation of the Chechen crisis.
While during his first speeches and interviews Dudayev spoke
mainly about his intentions to build a democratic state in
Chechnya, after the beginning of the war he began to mention
more and more jihad, Sharia law and the like in his statements.
Moreover, the political leaders of Chechnya began the process of
establishing ties with other states living under Sharia law.
It should be also mentioned that the influx of foreign mujahideen,
especially from Arab countries, contributed to the infiltration of
an ultra-radical religious ideology of Wahabism, previously
unknown to Chechens, into Ichkeria9. Wahhabism emerged in
Ichkeria at a time when the Chechen authorities needed more
effective means and methods of involving the masses in combat
operations than government decrees. In other words, it occurred
during a time when fear, loss and hardships of participation in
the armed conflict required religious therapy. Islamic symbols on
separatists helped them to distinguish their like-minded from
9
M. Gammer, “Between Mecca and Moscow… p. 836.
19
their opponents by external attributes. This could explain the
appearance of green headbands on militants, the click "Allah
Akbar!", joint performing of namaz by terrorists and other forms
of religious unity.
According to what Moshe Gammer writes in
his work "Between Mecca and Moscow", it was this war that
started the integration of Islam into politics in Chechnya, which
as a consequence pushed the Wahhabis and their ideology
upwards, which grew into the main problem both in Chechnya
and in the neighbouring republics.
Movladi Udugov and Shamil Basayev were among the most
influential representatives of Wahhabism idea. Udugov, better
known as "Chechen Goebbels10", was an essential element in the
propaganda of radical religious ideologies. According to some
allegations, during the first Chechen war Udugov was the person
who won the information war against Russia. Movladi took an
active part in protest actions in Chechnya with statements about
the superiority of Chechens over all other nationalities. I was
interested by the fact that Udugov, even after establishing
contacts with the people in power in his homeland, did not take
advantage of the moment to obtain a position in the Chechen
state structures. I think this may be due to the fact that he
probably wanted to be at the forefront of the information war.
After coming to power, Dzhokhar Dudayev, who was deeply in
need of a man of outstanding propagandist talents, chose
Movladi to play the role of a certain " retranslator 11" of such
ideas, endowing them with a form as accessible to the masses as
possible. When war broke out in Chechnya, Udugov came to
Удугов, Мовлади Саидарбиевич, available at [https://clck.ru/NiFuX]
Мовлади Удугов: куда пропал «чеченский Геббельс», available at
[https://clck.ru/NiMQi]
10
11
20
President Dudayev with a detailed plan of ideological attacks
against the Russian army. As key part of the strategy he
underlined the special role of the mass media as a war
instrument of information warfare. According to him, the
emphasis should have been on "creating events" rather than
informing the domestic and foreign public about the ongoing
events. In the language of the security services this means
conscious deception, misinformation of people in order to create
the necessary conditions for the life of the Chechen authorities
that have managed to concentrate power, money and weapons in
their hands. Dzhokhar was completely satisfied with the plan,
and he gave his permission for its implementation. Since the
beginning of the first Chechen campaign, Udugov has held many
positions, but the essence of his work has remained the same as
before: the popularization of the policies of Chechen armed
groups, which are densely implicated in religiously and politically
separatism seasoned with anti-Semitism.
Another prominent Wahhabi was Shamil Basayev. Together with
Udugov in 1998 he created so-called "Congress of Peoples of
Dagestan and Ichkeria" that was called to unite peoples living in
the North Caucasus into one Islamic state. The most brutal
terrorist acts during the first Chechen campaign took place
under Basayev's leadership. Here, I am talking about the
hostage-taking in the city of Budyonnovsk in June 1995 and in
the city of Kizlyar in 1996. During these tragic events, the
terrorists wore green headbands with religious utterances, all of
which were a sign that the militants adhered to the ideology of
radical Islam. Both of these terrorist acts were carried out to
attract attention and pressure on the Russian authorities.
21
Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, who was one of the main supporters,
along with Udugov, of the exploitation of Islamic values as a
propaganda tool and a means of struggle for power on the
ideological field, also contributed to the process of merging Islam
and politics. Whether intentionally or not, Yandarbiyev played
the role of some sort of lightning rod that defended Dudayev,
who
was
illiterate
in
terms
of
religion,
from
possible
misunderstandings from the ordinary inhabitants of Chechnya
who were familiar with Islam.
The radicalization of Islam was the result of such factors as a
sudden removal of the decades-old atheist paradigm, economic
decline, and a reassessment of traditional social institutions such
as the Council of Elders. There was a strong decline in trust
towards the Ichkerian authorities, as exemplified by the refusal
of opposition forces to participate in the negotiation process of
the Council of Elders, as they had reason to believe that it was
formed by Dudayev to increase his political influence. In
addition, the opposition accused Dudayev of exploiting the
religion as well as the traditions of the Chechen people for his
own benefit.
It seems to me that this accusation described the whole essence
of Dudayev's policy at the beginning of his rule with absolute
precision. This is confirmed by the fact that in the early 1990s he
tried to mobilize people based on ethnicity, and with the
beginning of the first Chechen war, an Islamic factor was added
to this process.
Analyzing Dudayev's policy and taking the above facts into
account, it can be concluded that Dudayev did not care much
22
about his authority and image in the Middle East countries. This
is confirmed by the wide scope of his foreign visits, as well as by
the reaction of the international community to the Chechen crisis
and to Dudayev as a political leader.
Moreover, in terms of funding from Muslim countries, Dudayev
was inferior to various religious propagandists and others. The
use of religion by Dudayev was intended to increase political
influence
and increase prestige among the population of
Ichkeria. It should be admitted that he was indeed a highly
respected official and had a huge credibility, even though he was
more of a military than a political figure. Nevertheless, all this
did not help him to keep the power in his hands. The democratic
orientations had no effect. The Russian authorities continued to
consider him only a terrorist and not the head of Chechnya.
Realizing that the focus on democracy did not help in any way to
propagate his ideas, Dudayev began changing the direction of
the republic's political and ideological course towards radical
Islam. It is noteworthy that the Islamization of politics, unlike the
past ideas of Chechen political leaders, proved to be incredibly
resilient and capable of consolidating a large number of people
around itself. Simultaneously with the Islamization of political
processes, the politicization of Islam was also taking place in
Chechnya. I think that to some extent Dudayev himself, or rather
his self-distancing from religion, allowed Islam to be used as a
political tool.
Summing up this paragraph, it can be said that Dudayev, who
initially wanted to use only the consolidating power of Islam to
strengthen primarily the nationalist sentiments among Chechens,
probably did not notice that he himself had let out of the lamp a
23
terrible gin, which in the course of further events took the lives
of thousands of people.
2. The incompetent policy of Aslan Maskhadov.
After the end of the first Chechen war, Aslan Maskhadov,
dumbfounded by the incredible consolidating potential of Islam,
which proved its effectiveness during the fierce battles against
Russian government forces, decided not only to cement the
success achieved by the militants, but also to achieve new, even
more impressive results. The political elite of Chechnya, which
had already been left without General Dudayev, was extremely
impressed by the potential of the new ideological basis, which
was essentially a consequence of the merger of ultra-radical
Wahhabi ideology with the nationalist ideas of the first president
of Ichkeria that were injected into the minds of Chechens. Due
to its impressive power and formidable utility, the new ideology
earned the sympathy of terrorists and was used by them as a
political tool for a long time.
In 1997, during the elections, which were called the most honest
and most open by observers, all the leading candidates, who
were Aslan Maskhadov, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and Shamil
Basayev, stated in their election programs the intention to give
Islam the status of the state religion12. I think that the process of
division of Islam that was taking place at that time was, in its
essence, a consequence of the reluctance of the political players
of that time to give up the new complicated religious ideology.
Also, the split of Islam was at the same time combined with an
urgent need to somehow separate from political competitors.
Малашенко А. Русские голосовали за меньшее зло // Независимая
газета. – М.,1997. – 31 января.
12
24
This is where the well-known properties of Islam come into play:
"openness to different interpretations13" and the ability to
"successfully
adapt
to
different
cultures,
situations
and
changes14”.
Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, who worked in the administration of
Dzhokhar Dudayev, who did not attach much importance to the
political beliefs of the first, after the end of the first Chechen
campaign held the post of vice-president and then became acting
president from 1996 to 1997. For Zelimkhan, religion was a
decisive factor in his political career. It is interesting that neither
he nor Movladi Udugov, despite their long political careers, were
able to become an alternative to Dudayev in the eyes of the
Chechen people, although they were very influential persons.
This can be seen from the fact that in the 1997 elections they
both won very few votes. Yandarbiyev received just over 10% of
the vote, while Udugov could not even get 1%. It should also be
noted that people started turning away from Zelimkhan after the
end of the armed conflict in 1996 and signing of the Khasavyurt
Accord. He failed to establish close contacts with either the
Council of Elders or the armed groups. As a result, he did not
have much choice but to gain power legally. Yandarbiyev
understood that in order to continue to have weight in the
political arena, he needed intensive Islamization of Chechnya.
Despite the fact that the majority of Chechens didn't like him,
Yandarbiyev, without even considering the option of gradually
increasing his attractiveness to voters as a politician, began to
Кудряшова И.В. Исламская цивилизационная доминанта и
современное развитие мусульманских политий // Политическая наука. –
2003. – № 2., С. 91
14
Мирский Г.И. Исламизм, транснациональный терроризм и
ближневосточные конфликты. – М.: Изд. дом ГУ ВШЭ, 2008.
13
25
subjugate Islam to himself. His aim was to gain control over
much of the religious movement in Chechnya. By doing so, he
wanted to be at the head of radical Muslims. This makes it clear
why Zelimkhan is considered to be the man who managed to
make Wahhabism in Chechnya a super powerful political force.
Being a Wahhabi leader, he managed to bring to the North
Caucasus a huge number of foreign Islamists who after coming
to Chechnya were used to spread Wahhabi ideas among young
people.
In September 1996, a new criminal code which was almost
entirely
repealed
from
the
Sudanese
Criminal
Code
was
published in a local newspaper15.
At that time the Chechen authorities were hastily establishing
Sharia in the territory of Ichkeria, at the same time introducing
many bans and restrictions. The school curriculum was changed.
According to the new laws, the study of Arabic language and
Islamic laws became mandatory. Moreover, in November 1996,
Zelimkhan, who was then acting president of the republic,
submitted to the parliament a bill to amend the constitution
adopted under Dudayev. Specifically, the bill proposed that Islam
should
be
made
a
state
religion.
Eventually,
Islam
was
announced to be the state religion. In 2004, in an interview with
the
ChechensPress
agency,
Yandarbiyev
said
that
"the
introduction of Sharia law did not lead to a value devaluation,
but, on the contrary, contributed to the value development of the
idea of national independence and a natural restoration and
revival of the spirit in the struggle itself.
After taking such
Р. Беккин, В. Бобровников. Северный Кавказ - не царство благородных
разбойников// Татарский мир. - 2003. - № 19 (29). - декабрь. - С. 8.,
available at [http://www.bekkin.ru/index.php?art=28]
15
26
measures aimed at total Islamization, there was a surge of
religious interest among the population, which was quite natural.
Subsequently, before the elections of January 27, 1997, the
people were already under the influence of Islamist ideas.
Islam, as a political instrument at the time when Aslan
Maskhadov and Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev were in power in the
Chechen Republic, was used to fulfill several tasks. Firstly, to
emphasize the ideological and legislative independence of
Chechnya from Russia; secondly, to integrate into the system of
Muslim countries as quickly and smoothly as possible; thirdly, to
unite the people, as well as for military purposes; and fourthly, to
make it easier to establish contacts with neighbouring North
Caucasian republics, where Islam was also the main religion 16.
Despite the fact that both Askhadov and Yandarbiyev were
supporters of Sharia, they did not get on well with each other. As
a result, it is very difficult to find examples of their joint actions.
One of the few cases of their joint actions that comes to mind is
an agreement on cooperation between one unrecognized state of
Ichkeria and another unrecognized country, the Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan. Askhadov dismissed Yandarbiyev when latter was
on the territory of Afghanistan. Zelimkhan himself said the
following about this occasion: "Aslan Askhadov did not accept
what I was doing abroad. He didn't say it, but did some
unnecessary things that I found offensive and stopped acting on
his behalf. Let's say we weren't incompatible 17".
Игнатенко А. Исламизация по-чеченски // Независимая газета. – М.,
1997. – 20 ноября.
17
Яндарбиев З. Исламский фундаментализм безопасен // Время
новостей. – М., 2001. – 17 декабря. – № 230., available at
[http://www.vremya.ru/2001/230/4/17592.html]
16
27
Aslan Maskhadov, as a politician, reminded Dzhokhar Dudayev
very much. Especially this similarity was noticeable when
comparing him with Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev. Just like Dudayev,
Aslan had in his biography the experience of serving in the
armed forces of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Maskhadov's
attitude towards religious values was identical to that of
Dudayev. Aslan Maskhadov also had popularity among the
people, as evidenced by the majority of votes he received and, as
a
result,
his
victory
in
the
1997
presidential
elections.
Maskhadov's advantage was the fact that, unlike Dudayev, the
legitimacy of his position in power and the system he had
established on the territory of Chechnya had not been challenged
by anyone, including the federal authorities. However, all these
advantages of Maskhadov did not help him in any way to take
control of the events that were taking place in his country, and
over time he became just a nominal political figure.
Before his presidency, while serving as Prime Minister in the
government headed by Acting President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev,
Aslan Maskhadov did not show excessive fanaticism about the
establishment of an Islamic regime in Ichkeria, as it was done by
Yandarbiyev, for example. However, by the beginning of the
election campaign, as a candidate for the president of Ichkeria,
he went along with the then political conjuncture and, like the
other candidates, promised to build a state based on Sharia law.
Analyzing this situation and taking into account Maskhadov's
manipulative actions aimed at constructing the reputation of a
faithful Muslim, such as the refusal of his real name Aslan in
favor of an arabic Khalid, we can say that Maskhadov was going
to play a political game, the rules of which were not set by him.
28
It is quite logical that Maskhadov hardly found himself in a
situation of zugzwang right after he took office as president of
Ichkeria. Unlike his former rivals in the electoral race, Aslan
Maskhadov did not perfectly know how to influence the people
through religious propaganda. Moreover, Maskhadov's victory in
the election turned out to be in the hands of his opponents, they
were no longer bound and could now fully use the ideas of
Wahhabism as a propaganda tool to launch a new war in future.
Thus, the political elite of Chechnya was divided into three main
groups:
1.
The Moderates. This group included people who supported
the political course of the newly elected president Aslan
Maskhadov;
2.
Radicalists. This group included followers of Shamil Basayev
and Movladi Udugov;
3.
Ultra-radicalists. This group consisted of people who
advocated the integration of Islam into all spheres of life,
including
the
consolidated
political.
around
Representatives
Salman
Raduyev
of
this
and
group
Zelimkhan
Yandarbiyev.
It should also be noted that the system of Sharia courts,
established in 1996 when Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev was in power,
also evolved into a separate influential political power.
Hoping to take control of the chaos that was then reigning in
Chechnya, Aslan Maskhadov, figuratively speaking, sat down at
the helm of a supersonic fighter jet, although he rode a bicycle
all his life, which made his political course excessively chaotic,
rushing from one extreme to the other. Due to the turbulence of
29
Maskhadov's politics, all his potential allies abandoned him.
Among such allies was the Russian government, which, knowing
about the internal political instability in Chechnya, supported
Maskhadov, hoping to take him on its side in the future. The
culmination of their cooperation was the signing of the " Russia–
Chechnya Peace Treaty", also known as the Moscow Peace
Treaty on May 12, 1997. Shamil Basayev and Movladi Udugov
were not happy with this, and both resigned afterwards. The
obsession with Sharia and its laws, which was demonstrated by
all political forces, could not stop the domestic political struggle
in Chechnya. The members of the opposition political forces
began to form political structures to force Aslan Maskhadov to
resign from his office.
Despite the active support of the Chechen Mufti, Akhmat
Kadyrov, who was an opponent of the Wahhabis, Maskhadov did
not stop his chaotic policy and continued to make concessions to
the radicals.
I think it is acceptable to assume that at the initial stage Aslan
Maskhadov was not against the abolition of Sharia law and
regulations in Chechnya, despite the fact that under his
leadership the ideas of Islam continued to be propagated to the
population, for example, the ban on men and women sitting
together in public transport and the ban on the sale of alcoholic
beverages. I fully agree with journalist Igor Rotar, who in his
book "Under the Green Banner of Islam. Islamic radicals in
Russia and the CIS" writes that "Aslan Maskhadov's attempts to
Islamize Chechnya were not very impressive 18". By the way, this
Ротарь И. Под зеленым знаменем. Исламские радикалы в России и
СНГ. – Вып. 12. – М.: АИРО-ХХ, 2001., с.32
18
30
is confirmed by the words of Akhmed Zakayev, who at that time
was the assistant to the President of the Chechen Republic of
Ichkeria on national security and at the same time the secretary
of the Security Council of Ichkeria, who in one of his speeches
said that he wanted to be a Muslim, not an Arab. In his
commentary
Kommersant
on
this
statement
newspaper,
he
to
a
equated
journalist
the
from
the
concepts
of
"Wahhabism" and "Arabization" with each other: "I believe that
Wahhabism, i.e. Arabization, will not work in Chechnya. We are
Muslims, but we are first and foremost Chechens19".
Aslan Maskhadov's desire to pursue a productive policy was
expressed in the prohibition of the spread of those Islamic
movements that could lead to division and enmity in Chechen
society, the abolition of the Sharia Guard and the Islamic Special
Purpose Regiment, the extradition order for the expulsion of
certain foreigners, as well as the consultant to the Chechen
Sharia courts Bagautdin Kebedov, who originally came from
Dagestan; reorganization of personnel in the highest Sharia
court of the Chechen Republic; launching a campaign to
discredit Islamic doctrines unacceptable to Chechnya; and
formation of promising religious and political alliances, etc 20.
However, the intensified activity of Shamil Basayev and his
subordinate Wahhabis at that time brought its own corrections to
the efforts of Aslan Maskhadov to restrain ultra-radical Islamists.
Due to the extra-radical incidents with Basayev, Maskhadov in
February 1999 established a full-fledged Sharia21 in the republic
and reshuffled his team with the aim of its complete Islamization.
Москва-Грозный: фундаментальное взаимопонимание, available at
[https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/13730]
20
Игнатенко А. Исламизация по-чеченски // Независимая газета. – М.,
1997. – 20 ноября.
19
31
In addition, at that time there began a sharp change in the
direction of Ichkerian foreign policy towards the Muslim world.
Using the "Islamic card" was a very wrong decision made by
Maskhadov. Nevertheless, despite all the work done to maintain
control over the situation in Ichkeria, Aslan Maskhadov began to
lose his power. This can be confirmed by the entry of Chechen
Islamists into Dagestan in August 1999 and the subsequent
development of those tragic events.
At that time Aslan Maskhadov and other politicians who were in
senior positions did not oppose Shamil Basayev and Amir ibn alKhattab, organizers of the attack on Dagestan, but only
condemned them. This act led to Moscow's disappointment in
Maskhadov. After some time, the Chechen leader explained his
act by thinking that the attacks were organized by the Russian
government22. However, it seems to me that at that time
Maskhadov wanted to consolidate Chechens by his actions,
creating a threat of a new conflict with the Russian Federation.
However, the beginning of the second Chechen war did not lead
to the unification of Chechens or to their mobilization. On the
contrary, under the leadership of the country's Mufti Akhmad
Kadyrov, an anti-war opposition emerged in Chechnya, which
openly opposed both Wahhabits and the official authorities of
Chechnya represented by Aslan Maskhadov. Akhmat Kadyrov
managed to consolidate people, because most Chechens, despite
the rather high popularity of Wahhabism ideas in society and the
large number of adherents of its extremist ideas in the power of
Указ Президента ЧРИ №39 от 3 февраля 1999 г. О введении полного
шариатского правления на территории Чеченской Республики Ичкерия,
available at [https://clck.ru/NiMkC]
22
Умалатов У. Чечня глазами чеченца – М. 2001. – с 230-231
21
32
the republic, were disposed against the establishment of Sharia
in their country and the total Islamization of society as a whole.
This was explained by the fact that Sharia law contradicted
centuries-old and highly valued traditions of the people of
Chechnya. The adoption of these ideas, absolutely alien to them,
could lead to the extinction of their ethnic self-identification,
which had already suffered so much during mass deportation and
the life of most Chechens outside their historical homeland.
Akhmat Kadyrov, on the basis of these facts, called on people to
take action aimed at rapprochement with the Russian Federation
and at depriving Maskhadov and others like him of power, as this
could enable Chechens to return to their usual way of life based
on the customs of Sufism and teips division.
To sum up, the bloody and destructive first Chechen war that
took place on the territory of Chechnya from 1994 to 1996,
which
had
the
greatest
impact
on
the
strengthening
of
Wahhabism and its adherents in the political and ideological
sense, accelerated the process of destroying the moral and
ideological norms and attitudes traditional for Chechen society.
Radical slogans put forward by Wahhabism followers were most
often attractive to the younger generation of Chechens living at
that time. Another important factor was that the Wahhabi
community had considerable financial possibilities. This ideology
did not resonate in the hearts of both highly educated and most
religious
Chechens,
becoming
popular
Chechens with little cultural baggage.
33
only
among
young
III. The Chechen crisis in terms of international
relations. The Probability of the Third Chechen
War
1. The Second Chechen War from the perspective of
international relations
34
The Chechen crisis, in all the works I have studied, is presented
only as a civil war, so no one looks at the events of almost thirty
years ago from the perspective of international relations and
international law. However, having carefully studied everything
that happened at that time, I came to the conclusion that these
wars, at least a second Chechen company, can be considered a
full-fledged international conflict. Further, in this paragraph I
will explain my point of view and try to substantiate it.
On May 12, 1997 the "Treaty on Peace and Principles of
Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen
Republic of Ichkeria" was signed between the Government of the
Russian Federation, represented by the President of the Russian
Federation Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin and the President of the
Chechen
Republic
of
Ichkeria,
Aslan
(Khalid)
Aliyevich
Maskhadov. According to paragraph 2 of the agreement, both
parties were to "Build their relations in accordance with
universally recognized principles and norms of international law,
with the parties cooperating in areas defined by specific
agreements".
Here,
it
is
worth
paying
attention
to
the
terminology that was used. As we can see, the treaty did not
provide for the establishment of contact between its subjects
under the Russian constitution. All relations between the parties
that signed this treaty were to be based on the basis of
international law. In other words, by signing this treaty, the
Russian Federation de facto recognized the sovereignty of the
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. In addition, the treaty says that
the party represented by Maskhadov is called the "Chechen
Republic of Ichkeria", i.e. as it was written in the constitution of
Ichkeria, not Russia. Moreover, the treaty states that it comes
35
into force on the day it is signed, from which we can conclude
that Boris Yeltsin himself, as the President of the Russian
Federation, legitimized the independence of Ichkeria on May 12,
1997. Furthermore, from all the above it turns out that Russia
seized power in a sovereign country by arbitrarily appointing its
man as the head of the republic, and killing the legitimately
elected president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria - Aslan
Maskhudov, who had to join terrorists and wage guerrilla wars
because of the invasion of Russian troops in an attempt to regain
legitimate power according to the results of the 1997 elections,
which, incidentally, were recognized as legitimate by absolutely
all observers and even the Russian government.
The seizure of power in Chechnya can be considered absolutely
illegal also because Russia did not declare war before invading
Ichkeria. The attack on Chechnya cannot be considered as a
response to the armed conflict that took place on the territory of
Dagestan, even though Maskhadov did not agree to participate in
a joint counter-terrorism operation with Russia. Even the fact
that he did not take measures to counter Basayev and his
militants does not give foreign states the right to invade the
territory of the country where the terrorist comes from and to
overthrow the existing legitimate administration. If we take a
closer look at the events that took place then, we can see that
the attack on Dagestani territories by Basayev and his troops
began on August 7 and lasted until August 14 and Russian troops
entered Chechnya on September 30th. I consider admissible,
that Maskhadov simply did not have enough time for catching
terrorists as after the Dagestani tragedy they could simply hide
in mountains of Ichkeria.
36
One can certainly argue with the thesis I voiced, saying that the
separation of Chechnya from Russia itself was illegal, since the
Russian constitution does not provide for the withdrawal of its
subjects. As a counterargument, I can cite Russia's annexation of
the Crimean Peninsula. Because the Ukrainian constitution also
does not provide for the separation of its administrative units.
While Chechnya's independence was in fact confirmed by the
Russian President himself when he signed the agreement on May
12, 1997.
The most interesting thing is that in the case of the Chechen
conflict, there was no reaction from the international community,
which at the time when the Crimean events took place
overwhelmed Russia with sanctions, although there were no
human rights violations during those events, while during the
second Chechen campaign, Russian aviation bombed Chechen
cities, thus killing not only the so-called separatists, but also
innocent civilians.
Summing up this paragraph, I have found that the Second
Chechen War can be considered a real international conflict.
Moreover,
there
is
no
known
reason
why
international
organizations did not attempt to resolve that conflict.
2. The Probability of the Third Chechen War
After being appointed as the head of the Chechen Republic,
Ramzan
Kadyrov
resumed
the
process
of
Islamization
in
Chechnya. A very conservative form of Islam dominates the
territory of Chechnya. For example, it is impossible to buy
alcohol or tobacco products in Chechnya. As the INOSMI website
writes: "The role of women is also very low, and if you see girls
37
without kerchiefs, then they are a minority, and they are
increasingly
receiving
'advice'
from
men
to
dress
up
in
accordance with Islamic norms, which was not so common in
Chechnya before.
During Ramzan Kadyrov's administration, Sufi Islam, or rather
the ideas of this religious movement, became the basis on which
Chechen society is being built. All Chechen life, including
politics, is based on the canons of Sufism. Thus, the Sufi Islam
became the most important factor and the centre of the creation
of the identity of Chechens. Religion-based value creation gives
the political elite of Chechnya a great amount of space for
manoeuvres and manipulations, allowing them to solve many
tasks, in the political sense. A society brought up only on the
values of Islam has difficulty in integrating into Russia, where
the absolute majority of the population professes a different
religion, and in general is based on cultural values different from
those in Chechnya.
Ramzan Kadyrov realizes that as long as Vladimir Putin, who
according to him treats Kadyrov as his own son, is in power, he
can afford to do whatever he wants. In fact, after the Kadyrov
clan came to power in Chechnya, Chechnya basically remained
an independent state, only formally part of the Russian
Federation. A closer look allows one to notice that the laws of the
Russian Federation do not work well in the territory of the
Chechen
Republic.
This
is
clearly
demonstrated
by
the
confrontation between Kadyrov and the FSB. For example, in
2015, when Dzhambulat Dadayev was killed on Chechen territory
by the FSB agents, along with policemen from a neighbouring
region of Chechnya, Kadyrov ordered to open fire on them. By
38
doing so, Ramzan Kadyrov openly stated that he was ready to use
violence to make his implicit independence from the government
visible.
According to the director of the extremism research center
"SOVA":
"The
interests
of
the
Chechen
police,
which
is
transforming into an organized criminal syndicate, lie far beyond
Chechnya23". This means that Ramzan Kadyrov is so influential
today that if the FSB officers come across bandits under his
personal patronage, they risk being severely harmed.
It is not clear how long the confrontation between Kadyrov and
the FSB can last. Also, it is unclear how long the "Putin's
infantryman" will be able to get away with it, using his intense
loyalty to the Russian president. If Chechnya continues to remain
a "special region", living by its own laws and not in accordance
with the Russian constitution, it will not be difficult to imagine
the worst outcome: the beginning of the third Chechen war.
It is reasonable to assume that the FSB and other law
enforcement agencies do not like the excessive independence of
the head of Chechnya at all. According to Andrei Piontkovsky:
"the special services felt "devoid of fame 24" in Chechnya when
Kadyrov made a deal with Putin that ended the war, and that
now they are " almost openly" provoking him by organizing leaks
of information about his activities".
Verkhovsky also confirms the reality of the confrontation
between Kadyrov and security services. According to him, the
23
Is Putin's elite security service feuding with his own puppet regime in Chechnya?/
available at [https://www.vox.com/2015/5/11/8585661/putin-kadyrov-fsb]
24
Ibid
39
FSB is now trying to prevent the expansion of Kadyrov's criminal
activity outside Chechnya.
The new war in Chechnya can be much worse than the previous
two, because now the military training of Chechens is much
higher than that of those who took part in military conflicts in the
1990s. Most likely, in case of a new war, the losses on both sides
of the conflict will be greater in scale.
Summing up all of the third chapter, I want to say that because
of their short-sightedness, Russian politicians of those years
hung up a gun on the wall, a rifle that could shoot in the future.
It seems to me that even Vladimir Putin, after taking control of
the situation in Chechnya, felt how gradually, instead of
integrating into the Russian state, Chechnya began to turn into a
specific region of it. Time passed; Chechen society did not
become any less religious. The generation of people that in the
1990s were sown a seed of religiosity in their heads by the then
Chechen authorities grew up. And now they are raising their own
children, who are also being taught Islam. A striking example of
such a person is the current head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov,
who in almost all his speeches and posts in various social
networks refers to religion, mentioning the name of Allah. If
we're talking about young North Caucasians, I can say that even
among them there is the cult of personality of Dudayev,
Maskhadov, Basayev and even the Chechen Goebbels - Udugov. I
made sure of this by looking at the interviews with the
personalities I listed, more precisely by looking at the comments
under the video of their interview.
40
Conclusion
In the concluding part, I summed up the results of my research,
formulated the main findings, and identified the peculiarities of
using the religious factor as a political tool to unite and mobilize
Chechen society during the two Chechen wars that took place at
the end of the last century and the beginning of the present one.
The wars that took place in Chechnya in the 1990s showed that
religion is an extremely powerful tool that can both unite people
and divide them. The uniqueness of this case lies in the fact that
the Chechen political elite, perhaps unaware of it, created a
powerful propaganda tool during the first war, which actually
brought them victory, leading to the signing of the Khasavyurt
Accord.
The Khasavyurt Accord signed in 1996 for the Russian side was a
forced step and the actual transfer of power in the Chechen
Republic to the leaders of the then separatist movement.
However, the signing of this document could not stop the
internal political struggle in Chechnya between moderate,
radical and ultra-radical forces, which only intensified after
Dudayev's death.
The 1997 presidential election, recognized as legitimate by all
observers, also failed to consolidate the opposing political forces.
41
Newly elected that year, the president and government of
Ichkeria were supporters of the independence of their republic
from the Russian Federation. The ongoing internal political war
between the representatives of the Chechen authorities resulted
in a very rapid decline of the entire system of state institutions
within
Chechnya.
That
period
was
also
marked
by
an
unprecedented activation of proponents of radical Islamic ideas
such as Wahhabism, who refused to obey anyone and wanted to
wage a new war.
It is worth to mention separately the various political parties that
emerged at that time, which were created by many different
warlords in order to concentrate around their personality, the
people who supported them, as well as to create a type of
political activity.
During the period of calm between the two wars, the Chechen
Republic of Ichkeria was plunged into a state of deep crisis that
affected the public and political spheres of life of the Chechen
people. There was also a state of total anarchy in the country due
to confrontations in Chechen society itself and the struggle of
various political groups aimed at taking the control of the
republic. The conflict with the Russian Federation has also
contributed to this situation to some extent.
It should be noted that the process of modernization of Chechen
society was very fast and took place in an extremely short time.
That was the reason why Chechens retained centuries-old
traditions and customs, since they simply did not have time to
disappear.
42
The level of interest in religion among Chechens increased
greatly at that time. As a consequence, a small part of Chechen
society adopted Sunni Islam. However, Sufism, as well as other
elements of centuries-old Chechen culture, did not allow
Wahhabism to take root in their life.
During
the
second
Chechen
campaign,
Akhmat
Kadyrov
cooperated with Russian authorities. The Russian government,
for its part, supported him in every possible way, which later
helped to bring Chechnya back into Russia. And by early 2006
the entire territory of Chechnya was subordinate to the Russian
political system. The system of power in Chechnya was built on
the Russian constitutional model.
Of course, the role of socio-economic factors should not be
disregarded during the analysis of political processes that took
place in Ichkeria. The decline in the standards of living in
Chechnya has led to the popularity of radical ideas in society.
The success of the Russian Federation in the war against the
separatists, in my opinion, was largely due to Maskhadov's
chaotic policy. It was his failure as a leader, I believe, that
helped Akhmat Kadyrov to come to power in Chechnya.
The important role of religion in the life of Chechen society and
nationalist ideas were decisive factors that influenced the
political processes of the time. Moreover, the factors I have
mentioned are still present in Chechnya, and therefore have not
yet exhausted their potential, and can be used by the current
political elite of Chechnya in the future.
43
The second Chechen war was many times more destructive than
the first one. The Chechen people were on the verge of mass
extinction in both the physical and cultural senses of this word.
Fortunately, the threat of loss of national identity has been
eliminated, and the ideology of Chechen nationalism and the Sufi
Islam which is traditional for the Chechen society has been used
as the basis for modern spiritual life in Chechnya.
The study of this topic was extremely difficult and emotionally
stressful for me. The difficulties arose because of the very few
sources of information that describe the events of those years
from the Chechen point of view. A very small number of
newspapers and magazines, as well as video fragments of the
public speeches of Chechen leaders, remained, which made it
very difficult to study the separatist propaganda methods. The
work was also complicated by the fact that all the interviews I
could find with political leaders of the then Chechen Republic of
Ichkeria were posted on websites and YouTube channels with
questionable content, for example, calling for the separation of
Chechnya from Russia. The solution to this problem would be to
create official websites/sources, with all the documents, news
articles, etc., in order to make it easier for people who decide to
study this topic to have access to such important materials.
In general, the prospects for further study of the use of religion
as a propaganda tool in the Chechen conflict, I see in a more
detailed study of media materials during the period when these
two wars took place, paying particular attention to the words
spoken by Chechen separatist leaders, and finding among them
the key ones. In my opinion, the methods used by Movladi
44
Udugov are worth a separate study.
Moreover, since my
research describes the use of religion as a political tool only by
Chechen militants, I think it is important to write a study that
would, on the contrary, reveal the methods of propaganda used
by the Russian federal troops. By the way, it is also possible to
investigate
the
propaganda
techniques
used
by
Dzhokhar
Dudayev at the very beginning of the Chechen crisis, when he
tried to consolidate the people only on nationalist ideas.
45
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