SAINT PETERSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY
School of Journalism and Mass Communications
Global Communication and International Journalism
Manuscript
Giovanni Pigni
Nation Branding in the Aftermath of a Military Conflict:
the Case of Chechnya
Master Thesis
Research Supervisor:
Svetlana S. Bodrunova,
Professor, Doct.Sci. in Political Science
St. Petersburg
2017
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Table of Contents
Introduction
4
Chapter 1. An Overview of Nation Branding Theory
9
§ 1. Fundamentals of Nation Branding
9
1. Defining Branding and Place Branding
9
1.2 Nation Branding: Definitions and Origins
12
1.3 Core Elements of the Nation Brand
14
§ 2 Nation Branding: Structures and Practices
19
2.1 The Nation Brand Hexagon Model
19
2.2 Phases of the Nation Branding Process
20
2.3 Nation Branding and Public Diplomacy
22
Chapter 2. The Case of Chechnya
24
§ 3 The Autonomous Republic of Chechnya
24
3.1 Chechnya: Geography, Demography, Culture
24
3.2 Brief History of Russian-Chechen Relations
26
§ 4 Evolution of Chechnya’s Image in Russian Culture
32
4.1 The Chechen Nation in 19th Century Russian Literature
32
4.2 The Chechen Nation in Post-Soviet Russian Media
35
Chapter 3. Nation Branding in Contemporary Chechnya
48
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§ 5 Methods and Limitations
48
5.1 Qualitative Interviews and Content Analysis
48
5.2 Brand Categories and Subcategories
50
§ 6 Deconstructing Chechnya’s Brand Identity
53
6.1 Interviews with Chechen Officials
53
6.2 Ramzan Kadyrov on Vkontakte
53
6.3 ‘Komanda’ TV Show
64
6.4 Interpretation of the Results
70
Conclusion
75
Bibliography of References and Sources
77
Appendices
82
Appendix 1: Graphs
82
Appendix 2: Sampling
87
Appendix 3: Interviews
99
Introduction
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Research Premises. Around the turn of the 20th century, Chechnya was the
theater of two devastating military campaigns, carried out by Russian federal
forces against the Chechen separatist army. By the time pro-Russian Chechen
leader Ramzan Kadyrov was appointed in 2007, the small Caucasian Republic had
already made major steps on the path towards peace and stability: heavy-scale
fighting had stopped and Chechnya was once again part of the Russian Federation.
Under Kadyrov’s leadership the remaining rebellious armed groups on Chechen
soil were defeated and the Republic rebuilt from scratches. However, after peaceful
life was reestablished in Chechnya, the local administration had still to face a deep
image crisis: the reputation of the Republic and its inhabitants was severely
damaged in the course of the conflict, during which Chechnya came to be
associated with crime, separatism and Islamic terrorism. Most of these stereotypes
are deeply rooted in Russian culture, due to centuries of conflictive relations
between Chechens and Russians. In the last few years, the local administration has
been promoting a new image of Chechnya through what can be defined as a
process of nation branding. Theorized in the 90s by Simon Anholt, the concept of
nation branding refers to all communication practices aimed at promoting the
image of a nation among a specific audience. The purpose of our study is to
analyze the current Chechen nation brand, in order to identify the nation branding
techniques that have been adopted to improve the reputation of Chechnya within
Russian society.
Novelty. Unlike most nation branding practices, which are carried
out to influence foreign audiences, the case of Chechnya is an example of how
nation branding can take place within a multinational State like the Russian
Federation. Moreover, our study seeks to provide insights on how nation branding
techniques can be deployed as means of reconciliation, useful to counter negative
perceptions engendered during inter-ethnic and separatist conflicts.
Research Object. The primary objects of our study is the current
Chechnya’s nation brand and the nation branding practices adopted by the Chechen
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administration to influence the Russian public. As a preliminary object of study, we
carried out a diachronic reconstruction of the portrayal of Chechnya and Chechens
in Russian literature and media, on the basis of which the contemporary brand of
Chechnya can be interpreted.
Research Questions. What are the main features of Chechnya’s current
nation brand? What nation branding techniques have been adopted by the current
administration of Chechnya in order to improve the image of the region among the
Russian public?
Goal. The purpose of our research consists in defining the contemporary
brand of Chechnya and pointing out the nation branding techniques adopted by the
Chechen administration in order to improve the image of the Republic in the eyes
of the Russian public.
Tasks. In order to accomplish our goal, we carried out the following tasks:
- Provided an adequate background on nation branding theory
- Reconstructed the diachronic evolution of the portrayal of the Chechen
Nation in Russian culture, focusing mainly on Russian 19th century
literature and Post-Soviet Russian media. Thus we provided the premises
which allow an adequate interpretation of the nation brand currently
promoted by the Chechen administration.
- Identified the main sources through which Chechnya’s nation brand is
communicated to the Russian audience.
- Carried out a content analysis of the selected sources in order to
deconstruct Chechnya’s nation brand and point out its main constitutive
elements.
- Interpreted Chechnya’s nation brand, highlighting the communication
strategies which are being used to improve the image of the Republic in
the eyes of the Russian public.
Chronological framework. The selected time framework embraces the
history of Russian-Chechen relations starting from the Caucasian War
(1817-1864), when most of the modern images and perceptions of Chechnya have
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their roots. For reason of conciseness we did not consider representations of
Chechnya in the Soviet Union, given the less significant impact of this period on
the perception of Chechnya in Russia’s mass consciousness. Therefore, we fasted
forward to the last decade of the 20th century, when the media representation of
Chechnya during two brutal separatist conflicts heavily influenced Russian public
opinion. In order to analyze the contemporary brand of Chechnya we focused on
Ramzan Kadyrov’s government, which was established in 2007 and it is still in
charge nowadays. However, the analyzed material is related to a more limited
timeframe, roughly comprised between October 2016 and April 2017.
Theoretical foundation. The theoretical foundations of our study lie
in the theory of nation branding, a relatively new field of study embracing
elements of Marketing, Branding, Public Diplomacy, and National Identity
Studies. In our overview of nation branding theory we relied upon the literature
authored by experts in the field such as Simon Anholt and Keith Dinnie. To
reconstruct the image of Chechnya in Russian literature and media, we relied on
secondary sources. Academic articles by H. Ram were rather significant for our
analysis of the representation of Chechnya in Russian 19th literature. Works by J.
Russel and V. Tishkov provided us with extensive information on the media
representation of Chechnya and Chechens during the last military conflict and their
impact on the Russian public opinion.
Methods. Our research is founded on a mix of qualitative interviews and
quantitative content analysis. In occasion of a short stay in Grozny in December
2016, we had the chance to interview two members of the Chechen administration:
representative of the Ministry of information Islam Khatullev and Press Officer of
the Chechen Government Committee of Tourism Murat Shakhidov. The interviews
allowed us to identify the sources of nation branding for our content analysis:
Ramzan Kadyrov’s activity on Vkontakte (Russian Facebook) and the ‘Komanda’
TV show featuring Ramzan Kadyrov as the protagonist. The content analysis,
aimed at deconstructing Chechnya’s nation brand, was carried out by applying a
readapted version of the Anholt’s Nation Brand Hexagon Model to the selected
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media content.
Sample. As a sampling method for Kadyrov’s Vkontakte, we selected 200
recent posts, dividing them into two groups related to different timeframes. By
analyzing separately the two groups, we could assess the degree of consistency in
the content throughout time. Regarding ‘Komanda’, we considered the eight
episodes making up the TV series, analyzing meaningful items of different lengths
(from single sentences to longer thematic fragments).
Probation. In February this year, we presented an outline of our research
during the conference: ‘Research on media and communications: theories,
practices research perspectives’ (Исследования медиа и коммуникаций: теории,
практики, исследовательские перспективы) held by the Faculty of
Communications, Media and Design of the High School of Economics in Moscow.
For its novelty and relevance our project was recognized as one of the best among
those presented during the conference.
Structure. Our research consists of three chapters, each one including two
paragraphs. In the first chapter we provided an overview of the theory of nation
branding, focusing on the aspects we thought more relevant for our case study. In
the very first paragraph we provided basic definitions from branding theory and we
introduced the fundamental concepts of branding applied to places and nations.
The second paragraph explores the constitutive elements of the nation brand
according to Simon Anholt, the founder of nation branding theory. We also
outlined the structure of the nation branding process, concluding the chapter with a
comparison between nation branding and the related field of public diplomacy. The
second chapter introduces the case study or object of research: the Autonomous
Republic of Chechnya. In the first section of this chapter we provided a brief
description of Chechnya from a geographic, demographic and cultural point of
view, followed by an overview of the history of Russian-Chechen relations. The
second section of the chapter is dedicated to a reconstruction of the portrayal of the
Chechen nation in Russian culture. Drawing from Russian 19th century literary
tradition we explored some of the first representations of Chechens as hostile and
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fundamentally aliens. Fasting forward to the end of the 20th century, we showed
how Russian media coverage of the Chechen wars contributed in reinforcing
preexisting stereotypes and generated new, more negative ones. The third and last
chapter of our study is dedicated to our empirical analysis of nation branding
practices in contemporary Chechnya. A first paragraph is dedicated to a description
of the methods adopted and the existing limitations. Then we outlined the
categories and sub-categories to be used as a framework in the content analysis.
After providing the main results of the interviews with two members of the
Chechen administration, we presented the results of our content analysis. Finally
we carried out an interpretation of Chechnya’s brand in the light of its preexisting
negative image, in the attempt to highlight elements of a nation branding strategy.
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Chapter 1. An Overview of Nation Branding Theory
§ 1. Fundamentals of Nation Branding
1.1 Defining Branding and Place Branding
According to the American Marketing Association, a brand is ‘a name, term,
sign, symbol, design, or a combination of them, intended to identify the goods and
services of one seller or group of sellers and to differentiate them from those of
competitors’1. Keller argued that a brand, to be defined as such, needs to create a
certain awareness and reputation on the marketplace.2 The brand is more than just
a product since ‘it is provided with dimensions that differentiate it in some way
from other products designed to satisfy the same need’3. These differences are
usually intangible and symbolical, so related to mental representations of what the
brand stands for.4 Even though the brand is rooted in a concrete product and
service, its essence is located in the consumers’ minds and consists in a set of
associations which should be unique (exclusivity), strong (saliency) and positive
(desirable). Besides acting on a cognitive level, strong brands should also generate
emotional bonds.5 Successful brands are bound with their target audience through
a relationship of trust and loyalty. As Erdem and Swait pointed out, brands become
the symbol of a certain level of quality which buyers can always rely on.6
Branding is the process of building a brand, informing the audience about a
product by labeling it and generating determined mental structures about it.
Branding creates meaning for the product, explaining what kind of benefit it can
1 Dictionary
(2017). American Marketing Association. Retrieved from https://www.ama.org/
resources/pages/dictionary.aspx?dLetter=B
2
Keller, K. (2013). Strategic brand management. Boston: Pearson.
3
Ibid. P. 31
4
Ibidem
5
Kapferer, J. (2008). The new strategic brand management. London: Kogan Page.
6
Erdem, T., & Swait, J. (1998). Brand Equity as a Signaling Phenomenon. Journal Of Consumer
Psychology, 7(2), 131-157. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327663jcp0702_02
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provide to the consumer and what distinguishes it from other similar products.7
Branding can apply to all kind of entities: from the most concrete, like physical
goods and services, to organizations and people.8 The additional positive value
generated by branding a product is defined as brand equity. In order to achieve
brand equity, marketers need to generate brand knowledge among the target
audience. Brand knowledge is composed mainly by two elements: brand awareness
and brand image. Brand awareness measures the ability of the consumers to
identify the brand, distinguishing it from other products.9 According to Keller
‘The more a consumer ‘experiences’ the brand by seeing it, hearing it, or thinking
about it, the more likely he or she is to strongly register the brand in memory’ 10.
Brand image indicates the way the consumers perceive the brand. In order to
generate brand equity, a positive brand image needs to be conveyed by linking
strong, favorable, and unique associations to the brand in memory.11
Place Branding. The practice of labeling, identifying, distinguishing certain
products from others can be applied to geographical entities such as countries,
regions and cities. The specialized fields of place marketing and place branding
emerged in the early 1990s. A brochure titled ‘Debate: A Global Brand for
Germany’ authored by the image consulting firm Wolff Olins, noted that even
though brands have been mostly associated with products and corporate entities,
branding techniques can be applied to every area of mass communication.12In the
age of globalization, territories, like products and corporations, compete with each
7
Keller, K. Op. cit. P.36
8
Ibid. P. 37
9
Ibid. P. 69-73
10
Ibid. P. 75
11
Ibid. P. 77
12
O’Shaughnessy, J. & O’Shaughnessy, N. (2000). Treating the Nation as a Brand: Some
Neglected Issues. Journal Of Macromarketing, 20(1), 56-64. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1177/0276146700201006
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other on the global market.13 However, Gold, J. and Ward, S. traced the origin of
place branding in the mid-19th century, when cities, regions and other territories
started being subject of promotion. They also argued that forms of place promotion
were already existing in colonial times, when governments persuaded people to
settle in newly conquered territories.14 In the age of globalization, increasing
competition and the need for product differentiation through branding strategies
started applying to places as well.15 Short claimed that place promotion involves
‘the re-evaluation and re-presentation of places to create and market a new image
for localities, to enhance their competitive position in attracting or retaining
resources’ 16.
According to San Eugenio Vela, place branding emerges from ‘a
manifest need to promote identity in times of globalization’17 . Anholt argued that
branding a place consists in improving its reputation in the eyes of a certain
audience in order to achieve economic gains18. Destination branding is the most
developed specialization of place branding which focuses on the development of
13
Dinnie, K. (2008). Nation branding. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. P.17
14
Gold, J. & Ward, S.. (1994). Place promotion. Chichester: Wiley, pp.19-37, cited in Go, F. &
Govers, R. (2010). International place branding yearbook 2010. Basingstoke: Palgrave
McMillan
15
Go, F. & Govers, R. Op. cit. P.xxii
16
Short, J., Benton, L., Luce, W., & Walton, J. (1993). Reconstructing the Image of an Industrial
City. Annals Of The Association Of American Geographers, 83(2), 207-224. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1111/j.1467-8306.1993.tb01932.x
17
San Eugenio Vela, J. (2013). Place branding: A conceptual and theoretical framework. Boletin
de la Asociacion de Geografos Espanoles, (62), pp. 189-211+467-47. P.469. Retrieved from
http://repositori.uvic.cat/bitstream/handle/10854/2295/
artconlli_a2013_san_eugenio_jordi_place_branding.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
18 Anholt
(2010), Places – Identity, Image and Reputation. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
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the tourism sector.19 However, Avraham and Ketter noted that place marketing
strategies are not aimed exclusively at tourists but also at potential residents,
investors, exporters and importers. The marketing goals to be achieved by
improving a place image are also different: to support the local tourism industry; to
make the place more attractive for living; to attract capital and investments; to
enhance the importance of a place in a municipal, regional , national, and even
international hierarchy.20 Generally, brands provide an additional value for places
and their stakeholders.21
1.2 Nation Branding: Definitions and Origins
Our study focused on a specific type of place branding: nation branding.
The term nation branding was coined in 1996 by British policy advisor Simon
Anholt. His original intuition was that ‘the reputations of countries (and, by
extension, of cities and regions too) behave rather like the brand images of
companies and products, and they are equally critical to the progress, prosperity,
and good management of those places’22. Dinnie noted that branding tools are now
increasingly used by governments all around the world as instruments for
competing with other nations on the global market. 23 Fan defined the nation brand
as ‘the total sum of all perceptions of a nation in the mind of international
stakeholders which may contain some of the following elements: people, place,
culture/language, history, food, fashion, famous faces (celebrities), global brands
19
Szondi, G. (2007). The role and challenges of country branding in transition countries: The
Central and Eastern European experience. Place Branding And Public Diplomacy, 3(1), 8-20.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.pb.6000044
20
Avraham, E. and Ketter, E. (2008) Op. cit. P.8
21
Go, F. & Govers, R. (2010) Op. cit. P.xxii
22Anholt,
S. (2011). Beyond the nation brand: The role of image and identity in international
relations. A. Pike, Brands and Branding Geographies, 289. Retrieved from http://surface.syr.edu/
exchange/vol2/iss1/1
23
Dinnie, K. Op.cit.
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etc.’ 24 Dinnie described it as ‘the unique, multi-dimensional blend of elements that
provides the nation with culturally grounded differentiation and relevance for all of
its target audiences’25. Nation branding consists in the application of marketing and
communication techniques ‘to alter or change the behavior, attitudes, identity or
image of a nation in a positive way’ 26. The term ‘nation branding’ is often used
interchangeably with the term country or state branding. Van Ham stated that the
ultimate aim of nation branding is securing economic and political attention in an
increasingly globalized world. This view is reinforced by the following rhetorical
question : ‘Why would we invest in or visit a country we do not know, and why
would we pay attention to its political and strategic demands if we have no clue
what the country is all about and why we should care?’27.
Attracting tourism and foreign investments, increasing political influence, boosting
the export are just a few examples of the benefits generated by nation branding.
Szondi argued that nation branding can be also used by governments of transition
countries to distance themselves from previous political and economic orders, like
in the case of Eastern European countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union.28
Dinnie highlighted the high level of complexity of the nation brand, which sets it
apart from simple product brands and makes it more similar to corporate brands.
This higher complexity lies in
24
Fan, Y. (2008). Soft power: Power of attraction or confusion?. Place Branding And Public
Diplomacy, 4(2), 147-158. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/pb.2008.4,17
25
Dinnie, K. Op. cit. P.16
26 Szondi,
G. (2008). Public diplomacy and nation branding: Conceptual similarities and
differences. Netherlands Institute of International Relations" Clingendael". P.5. Retrieved from
http://kamudiplomasisi.org/pdf/nationbranding.pdf
27
Van Ham, P. (2008). Place Branding: The State of the Art. The Annals of The American
Academy Of Political And Social Science, 616(1), 126-149. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1177/0002716207312274
28
Szondi (2007) Op.cit.
!13
1. A wider range of stakeholders
2. The multiplicity of communications channels used to reach the target
audience
3. The difficulty of condensing a multifaceted entity into the distilled essence
of a brand
4. The unlimited number of uncontrollable factors that can affect perceptions
of the brand29
Ollin argued that, despite the relative novelty of nation branding as a field of
studies, nations have been always branding themselves during history. As an
example he pointed out the case of France and its transformation from the
Absolutist State under Louis XIV to revolutionary Republic after 1817:
The tricolor replaced the fleur de lys, the Marseillaise became the new anthem, the
traditional weights and measures were replaced by the metric system, a new calendar was
introduced, God was replaced by the Supreme Being and the whole lot was exported
through military triumphs all over Europe. In other words the entire French package was
changed. (...) if revolutionary France was not a new brand I do not know what is. 30
Due to the multiple changes transforming French national brand through
History, Ollin defined French politicians as ‘the world’s specialists at branding and
rebranding the nation’31. Fan argued that nation brands exist independently from
any conscious action of nation branding: all countries and nations are associated
with specific images by the international audience.32
1.3 Core Elements of the Nation Brand
National Identity and Country-of-Origin. Dinnie located the theory of nation
29
Dinnie, Op.cit. P.193
30
Olins, W. (2002). Branding the nation — the historical context. Journal Of Brand
Management, 9(4), 241-248. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.bm.2540075
31
Ibid.
32
Fan, Y. Op.cit.
!14
branding in the confluence between the fields of national identity and the one of
country-of-origin. The latter is defined as ‘the effect that a product or service’s
origin has on consumer attitudes and behavior towards that product or service’ 33.
Italian food and fashion, German cars, Japanese technology, French perfumes:
these are all cases where the country-of-origin effect provides significant
additional value to the product. Developing a strong COO was proved by
researchers to be a very effective tool for reinforcing the nation brand. In particular
COO is a very important component of every country’s export sector. The COO is
not necessarily static; it can change over time for the better or the worst. South
Korea, Taiwan and Japan are all cases were a rise in the COO value has been
registered in the last couple of decades.34 However, the concept of the nation brand
goes far beyond a country’s products and services, encompassing the political,
social and cultural specificities of national identity. Anholt defined nation branding
as ‘the dominant channel of communication for national identity’35. Therefore,
national culture lies at the core of nation branding practices, elevating them from
the status of superficial PR or marketing operations. Successful nation branding is
only possible if supported by adequate awareness and knowledge of the main
components of national identity: language, food, architecture, sport and music are
just the most visible manifestation of this concept. Landscape is also a very
important element of national identity: iconic locations such as Ayers Rock in
Australia and the fjords in Norway acquired the status of national symbols. The
national tourism sector can highly benefit from the promotion of these ‘poetic
places’ which are identified as the historical home of a particular community.36
Dinnie identified the key elements of national identity in ‘the notions of a historic
homeland, common myths, historical memories and a common, mass public
33
Dinnie. Op.cit. P. 84
34 Ibid.
P.84-86
35 Anholt,
36
S. (2003) Brand new justice. Amsterdam: Butterworth-Heinemann. P.139
Dinnie. Op.cit. P. 113-114
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culture’ 37. The identity of a nation changes across history: different aspects of it
come into focus depending on the political, economic and social circumstances.38
The same concept of nation is, according to Anderson, an imagined construct,
since even in the smallest nation, the majority of its members will never know each
other. 39According to this view, national identity is not a static entity but ‘produced
and fluid’40. Therefore, the national past is often reinterpreted and reframed
accordingly to contingent national interest in order to pursue political or economic
ends. The processes involved in this operation of reframing are the following:
reiteration, where historically positive features of national identity are mobilized;
recapture, which stands for an aspiration to recover certain positive historical
features of national identity that have lost their strength with the passage of time;
reinterpretation, in which negative aspects of the national past are interpreted as
positive or as largely neutral; repudiation, which consist in the omission of certain
features of national identity that are not suitable for reinterpretation.41As Dinnie
pointed out, the flexible nature of national identity is the core aspect of the nationbranding paradigm: the possibility to frame the identity of the nation (or at least
some of its components) allows the implementation of nation branding practices.
Using the above mentioned techniques, governments have the power to highlight
particular aspects of national identity and shape the perception of it. However,
Pittock noted the possible risks of conceiving the nation as an ‘imagined
community’, which would give too much power to certain actors who may shape
national identity in the pursue of their narrow interests.42In the landmark text
37
Ibid. P.113
38
Ibid. P.116
39
Anderson, B. (1982). Imagined communities. London.
40
Dinnie. Op.cit. P. 116
41
Bond, R., McCrone, D., & Brown, A. (2003). National identity and economic development:
reiteration, recapture, reinterpretation and repudiation*. Nations And Nationalism, 9(3), 371-391.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1469-8219.00102
42
Pittock, M.G.H. (1999). Celtic Identity and British Image. Manchester: University Press.
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‘Invented Tradition’, anthropologists pointed out that often in history power groups
used fictitious traditions and interpretations of national identity as instrument of
power in order to create social cohesion.43 ‘The fictitious nature of much invented
tradition inevitably invites criticism on the grounds that such traditions lack
authenticity or legitimacy, and are created in order to benefit the established social
order’44. This view highlights the main ethical dilemma implied in all practices of
nation branding: who has the right to frame the nation brand? Who is supposed to
be the nation brand manager? Democratic society with a free press would not
allow a state-sponsored narrative to be imposed from above. Dinnie argued that all
citizens of the nation are to be considered as stakeholders of the nation brand,
hence they should be included in the process of nation branding.45
Nation Brand Identity and Nation Brand Image. Brand identity and brand
image are core concepts in the theory of branding and, consequently, of nation
branding as well.46 According to the Oxford Dictionary, identity means ‘the
characteristics determining who or what a person or thing is’47. According to the
same dictionary an image is ‘a mental representation or idea’ 48. While identity
refers to what something truly is, an image indicates a mental perception. The
challenge of nation branding mainly consists in filling the gap existing between the
identity of the nation and the image of that same nation in the minds of a
determined target audience. Therefore, no nation branding activity can take place
without first determining the nation-brand identity and image as well as the
43
Hobsbawm, E. & Ranger, T. (1986). The Invention of Tradition. Labour / Le Travail, 18, 313.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/25142744
44
Dinnie, Op.cit. P.117
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid. P. 42
47
Identity - Definition Of Identity In English (2017).Oxford Dictionaries. Retrieved from
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/identity
48
Image - Definition Of Image In English (2017). Oxford Dictionaries. Retrieved from https://
en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/image
!17
distance separating the two.49 National identity is something far too multifaceted
and complex to be encapsulated in a brand. In order to be branded, national
identity needs to be simplified by selecting only some of its constitutive elements
and converting it into nation brand identity.50 Dinnie argued that ‘a key task of
those engaged in constructing a nation-brand identity is to be selective in
identifying which elements of national identity can usefully serve the stated
objectives of the nation-branding campaign’51. Riezebos defined a brand image as
a ‘subjective mental picture shared by a group of consumers’52. This definition can
be easily applied to the concept of nation-brand image, which indicates the mental
representation of a country among a certain audience. Generating a positive nationbrand image is the goal of all nation branding campaigns. However, brand images
usually are applied to places far before any conscious nation branding practice is
undertaken. In fact, As Dinnie points out ‘nations do not have the choice of being
branded or not’53. The factors determining a nation-brand image are multiple.
Firsthand, personal experience of a country by working or travelling is the most
direct way through which nation-brand images are generated. Pre-existing
stereotypes play an important role in shaping the nation brand image. Other factors
include media representations, political events, and the quality of brands
originating from that country or the behavior of people coming from that country.
Nation brand images usually vary depending on the specific audience taken into
account. As a consequence, nation branding campaigns need to be set up
accordingly to the preexisting nation brand image cultivated by a specific
audience.54
49
Dinnie. Op.cit. P.42
50
Ibid. P.46
51 Ibid.
52
Riezebos, H., Kist, B., & Kootstra, G. (2008). Brand management. Harlow: Financial Times
Prentice Hall, cited in Dinnie. Op.cit. P. 47
53
54
Dinnie. Op.cit. P.170
Ibid. P.47
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§ 2. Branding the Nation: Structure and Practices
2.1 The Nation Brand Hexagon Model
In 2006, Simon Ahnolt formulated the Nation Brand Index where he ranked the
reputation of nations, measuring the rise and falls of their image. In 2008 Anholt
created an expanded version of the original index in collaboration with the research
company GfK Roper Public Affairs and Media. Purpose of the new index was
‘providing governments and their agencies with a one-of-a-kind resource for
actionable insights needed to more effectively manage a country’s reputation’ 55.
The index measures the reputation of 50 nations by conducting 20 000 interviews
every year. The ranking takes into account six dimensions, which make up the
people’s perception of a country/nation. These six dimensions are visually
represented through the Nation Brand Hexagon.
● Exports - also known as the ‘country-of-origin’ effect, it determines on what
extent knowing the location where a product was made increases or
decreases people’s likelihood of purchasing it.
● Governance - it measures the reputation of the nation’s government, its
honesty and competency. It evaluates a government’s observation of human
rights, behavior in international relations, and contribution in tackling
environmental and social problems on a global scale.
● Culture - it evaluates the perception of a nation’s cultural heritage taking
into account different fields such as music, art, literature, sport.
● People - this factor evaluates the perception of national behaviors. It
assesses how welcome people would feel in visiting the country. It evaluates
whether people would like to have friends from that country; professional
attitude are also evaluated measuring how willing employers would hire
552008 Anholt-GfK
Roper Nation Brand Index Report Highlights (2008). Retrieved from http://
www.gtai.de/GTAI/Content/CN/Invest/_SharedDocs/Downloads/Studies/diwwochenbericht-9-2010.pdf
!19
professionals from that country.
● Tourism - it measures the appeal of the country’s natural beauties and manmade attractions
● Immigration and Investments - the capacity of a country to attract human
and economic capital. It includes factors such as economic prosperity,
average quality of life; additionally it evaluates the business environment:
whether it is stagnant or dynamic.56
2.2 Phases of the Nation Branding Process
Dinnie outlined a theoretical framework for the process of nation branding,
highlighting its different phases. The first category of the framework is called
anticipations and indicates the condition of the nation brand prior to the branding
campaign. It describes the image of the nation shaped by two main factors:
personal experience and stereotypes. While personal experience can be very
diverse, stereotypes have usually a detrimental effect on the country image, and as
a consequence, on its economy and reputation on the international stage. The
central section of the framework consists in the categories of complexity and
cultural expressiveness. Complexity indicates all the uncontrollable elements that
have an impact on the nation brand, such as political events, calamities, wars.
Cultural expressiveness includes all the cultural elements composing national
identity such as language, architecture, traditions, landscape. Complexity and
cultural expressiveness need to be synthesized through a process of encapsulation,
which is the real essence of the nation branding practice. Encapsulation consists in
managing the different often incoherent elements making up the nation brand,
harmonizing the efforts of the different actors involved in the nation branding
strategy and customize the efforts according to the different target audiences. ‘The
greater the diversity of the nation, the less controllable are its constituent elements
and the more challenging it will be to develop a consistent, widely accepted nation-
56
Ibid.
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brand’ 57 argued Dinnie. The category of complexity also takes into account the
urban and rural dichotomy: two souls of the nation which need to be adequately
represented in a unified nation brand strategy. Cultural expressiveness is broken
down into three components: heritage, landscapes and the arts. Heritage
encompasses the national traditions; landscape is considered as a powerful iconic
and symbolic element of national identity; the arts include music, food, and other
cultural artifacts. The process of encapsulation includes three distinct subcategories: redefinition, branding and zeitgeist. Redefinition is the crucial moment
in the nation branding process, since it defines the new way the nation decides to
present itself to the external audience. The redefinition of the nation brand is then
communicated and made visible through the act of branding. Zeitgeist, the ‘spirit
of the time’ stands for the global social, political and economic circumstances to
which the redefinition of the nation branding should be adapted. The last phase
considered by Dinnie is called engagement. This phase is crucial for making the
nation branding project resonate within society at large by including the maximum
amount of stakeholder. Engagement’s sub-section inclusiveness indicates the effort
that need to be done to include all the relevant stakeholders and their respective
values in the nation-branding campaign. If the campaign fails to include enough
relevant actors, it will generate hostility in those stakeholder groups that are
excluded. Dinnie mentioned the national diaspora as a key stakeholder group that
should be included in the branding strategy. Diaspora networks are an invaluable
resource for reputation-building and they can give a significant contribution in
cultivating the nation brand. Exemplars is another sub-section included in
engagement. It indicates the success stories which can be used to generate support
for the nation-brand activities. For example the involvements of testimonials that
can bolster the credentials of the nation brand. Transparency is also part of the
section engagement. Different approaches can be adopted in regard to the degree of
transparency of the nation branding process. A little transparent process will see
less stakeholders participating while a very transparent and public strategy could
57
Dinnie. Op.cit. P. 146
!21
generate a high degree of dissenting voices to derail the campaign before it gives
its first results.58
2.3 Nation Branding and Public Diplomacy
As a field of study, public diplomacy has a far older tradition than the
relatively new field of nation branding. However, despite the considerable amount
of literature devoted to the field, the definition of public diplomacy has been object
of long controversies. Szondi defined public diplomacy as ‘government
communication aimed at foreign audiences to achieve changes in the ‘hearts or
minds’ of the people’59. Malone described the content of public diplomacy as
‘activities, directed abroad in the fields of information, education, and culture,
whose objective is to influence a foreign government, by influencing its citizens’ 60.
The promotion of the national interest outside the boundaries of the nation is the
ultimate goal of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy, differently from nation
branding, is traditionally linked to situations of tension and conflict between
nations.61Other commentators argued that while the main goal of nation branding
is raising awareness of the nation, public diplomacy aims at creating mutual
understanding. Frederick identified public diplomacy as ‘a mean of low intensity
conflict resolution’62. Both nation branding and public diplomacy can be
considered channels of soft power.
58
Dinnie. Op.cit.
59
Szondi (2008). Op.cit. P. 6
60Malone,
63
While nation branding is usually aimed at
G. (1985). Managing Public Diplomacy. The Washington Quarterly, 8(3), 199-213.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01636608509450301
61
Szondi (2008). Op.cit. P.7
62
Frederick, H. (1993). Global Communication and International Relations. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth Publishing, quoted in Szondi (2008). Op.cit. P. 7
63
Bátora, J. (2005). Public diplomacy in small and medium-sized states: Norway and Canada.
Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'. Retrieved from https://
www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/Clingendael_20050300_cli_paper_dip_issue97.pdf
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highlighting the ‘uniqueness’ and ‘otherness’ of the nation, its culture, landscape
and people, public diplomacy seeks to highlight shared elements in nations’ history
and culture, in order to improve international relations.64 Nation branding derives
from the field of marketing while public diplomacy is located at the intersection of
international relations and international communication. Szondi argued that nation
branding can be alternatively seen as the economic dimension of public diplomacy.
Nation branding strategies usually target mass audiences, unlike public diplomacy,
which is usually oriented to a narrower public, usually the cultural and political
elites.65 The government is by definition the main actor in public diplomacy
operations. In nation branding, even though the government has usually the role of
general supervisor, the private sector and civil society gives a significant
contribution to the campaign. Szondi identified relation building as the common
goal for both public diplomacy and nation branding. The two disciplines are
therefore conceptualized as variations of ‘international public relations’.
***
This first chapter provided the theoretical foundations of our research. The
concepts we outlined will be applied in the course of our analysis of the Chechen
nation brand. However, in order to proceed with an interpretation of the current
nation brand identity of Chechnya, we need first to outline the preexisting brand
image cultivated by the Russian audience.
Chapter 2. The Case of Chechnya
§ 3 The Autonomous Republic of Chechnya
64
Szondi (2008). Op.cit. P.16
65
Ibid. P.13
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3.1 Geography, Demography, Culture
To provide a short description of the Republic of Chechnya and the Chechen
nation we mainly relied on Jaimoukha’s work ‘The Chechens: a Handbook’, the
content of which is summarized in the following paragraphs66. The Autonomous
Republic of Chechnya, also known as Chechnya, is a federal subject of the Russian
Federation. It is situated in the area of the North Caucasus, in the southernmost
corner of Eastern Europe. The region has an area of around 17 000 sq. ml. It
borders with the Stavropol Krai and Dagestan in the north, with Dagestan in the
east, North Ossetia and Ingushetia in the west, Georgia in the southwest and
Dagestan in the southeast. Geographically, Chechnya can be divided in four
regions: the Northern plains, the Terek-Sunzha ridges to the south of the Terek
River, the Chechen plains in the center and the Caucasus in the south. Chechnya’s
climate is characterized by its diversity: it ranges from a continental climate in the
semi-desert plains in the north, to the alpine weather in the mountains of the south.
Chechnya has short cold winters and long warm summers.
Status in the Framework of the Russian Federation. Chechnya is one of the
22 republics of the Russian Federation. In virtue of its status of republic, Chechnya
enjoys a higher degree of autonomy than other federal subjects of the Russian
Federation: it has its own Constitution and official language. Republics are usually
home of a specific ethnic minority. In the case of Chechnya, the Chechen nation
gives the name to the region. The Parliament of Chechnya consists of two
chambers: the Republic council (21 members, one for each district) and the
People’s Assembly (40 deputies 20 elected in party lists and 20 in single mandate
electoral districts). Chechnya is part of the North Caucasian Federal district. The
region includes 15 administrative districts: Achkhoi-Martan, Grozny, Gudermes,
Itum-Kala, Kurchaloi, Nadterechny, Naur, Nozhai-Yurt, Shali, Sharoi, Shatoi,
Shelkovsky, Sunzha, Urus-Martan and Vedeno.
Demographics. Chechens are the largest nationality inhabiting the North
66 Jaimoukha, A.
(2005). The Chechens: a Handbook. London and New York: Routledge
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Caucasus. According to Goskomstat Rossia the population of the Republics is 1
413 446. The 95, 3 % of the population is made up of ethnic Chechens while only
3, 7 % are Russians. Most of Russian residents left the Republic during the
government of Dzhokhar Dudaev due to rising ethnic violence. Chechnya is
mainly rural with just the minority of the population (34, 69%) settled in the urban
areas. The most highly populated city is Grozny, with a population of 250 803
followed by Urus-Martan (52 399), Shali (46 073), Gudermes (43 969) and Argun
(42 797).
Economy. In the last few years the Chechen GRP increased more than three
times: from 23 billion rubles in 2005 to 70 billions in 2010. Given the
predominantly rural nature of the region, farming and cattle breeding play an
important role in Chechen economy. The oil industry is another prominent sector
of Chechen economy. Chechnya is ranked 24th in the list of subjects of the Russian
Federation for extraction of oil and 18th for the extraction of natural gas. Despite
the noticeable improvement compared to the early 2000s, unemployment remains
high in the Republic.
Culture. Chechens refers to themselves as ‘Nokchii’ (singular ‘Nokchuo’).
According to Russian sources, the word ‘Chechens’ came into use after a first
skirmish between Nokchii and a Russian contingent on the shore of the Argun
River in 1732. Chechens are part of the Vainakh people, an ethnic group also
including Ingush and Kist. The Vainakh people, originally coming from the Middle
East, have inhabited the Caucasus for thousands of years. Prior to the Russian
conquest, Chechen people had already formed their national identity: they had their
own language, definite territory and political structures. Chechen society has
always been based on a conglomeration of clans called teips bounded together in
larger confederations called tukhum. In case of external danger, the tribes would
come together as once in defense of their common territory. Chechen society has
been for many centuries a society of equals, where freedom is held as one of the
highest values. Every clan is headed by an elder and decisions used to be taken by
elected councils. Social life is very much regulated by a traditional code of conduct
!25
called ‘nokchallah’, which can be rendered as ‘the way of being a Chechen’. This
set of rules includes obligation towards the clan and the safeguard of the honor of
women. Love for the fatherland, bravery and hospitableness are some of the values
held into highest account.
Language. Chechen and Russian are the official languages of Chechnya.
Chechen, likewise Ingush, Kist and Tsova-Tushian belong to the Nakh branch of
the North East Caucasian languages. The Chechen language has literary status. It is
used in the government, media and education.
Religion. Prior to their conversion to Islam, Vainakh people believed in a
multitude of deities, with elements of paganism, polytheism and animism. The
veneration of trees and the cult of the dead used to play important role in the
ancient Vainakh cult. According to the most accredited theories, Islam started
penetrating into Chechnya from Dagestan starting from the 17th century. By the
first half of the 19th century the overwhelming majority of the Chechen population
had embraced Islam. Chechens adopted Sufism since it was the Islamic current that
best fitted their social and cultural characteristics. Important pillars of Chechen
Sufism are asceticism, submission to the sect leader and the glorification of
gazavat, the holy war of resistance against foreign occupation. Chechen
interpretation of Sufism soon acquired militant traits, becoming a powerful
unifying element in times of aggression.
3.2 Brief History of Russian-Chechen Relations
From first encounters to the annexation of the Caucasus. The first encounter
between Russians and Chechens dates back to the 16th century. After the conquest
of Astrakhan, Russian tsar Ivan the terrible directed Russian expansionist efforts to
the North Caucasus. Russian Cossacks established settlements in the Terek River
Valley in 1577. Since then, the region was contested between the Ottoman Empire,
Persia and Russia. Russian rulers tried several attempts to coopt the Vainakh
people in the struggle with the other hegemonic powers. However, attempts to
expand in the regions gave little results until the reign of Peter the Great
!26
(1682-1725), when Russian took over a significant amount of Caucasian territory
from Persia in one of the several Russian- Persian wars (1722-1723). Under the
rule of Empress Catherine the Great, Russians’ strategy in the Caucasus consisted
in slowly pushing south the tribes of the region, erecting fortresses in defense of
the conquered territory. Russian expansionism in the Caucasus eventually led to a
full-fledged war with the mountain peoples: the Caucasian War (1817-1864).
Russian commander Alexey Yermolov became notorious for his ruthless
determination in subjugating the tribes of the Caucasus. Under his commands,
massacres and rape became widespread practice in the Russian military campaign.
Atrocities committed by Yermolov had the collateral effect to unite the mountain
tribes, who set aside their rivalries in order to resist the Russian aggression. Sufi
Islam, recently embraced by the mountaineer tribes, became a powerful source of
cohesion in the struggle against the Russians. One of the most prominent leaders of
the mountaineers, Avar-born imam Shamil unified the tribes of the Caucasus and
led them in battle from 1834 and 1859. Despite the fierce resistance of the
mountaineers, Russians eventually got the upper hand and annexed Chechnya in
1861. As a result of the war, more than half a million Chechens died, and many
were forced to leave for Ottoman land. Despite the politics of relative cultural and
religious tolerance adopted by the tsars, Chechens were never pacified and violent
uprisings became a common phenomenon in the North Caucasus.
The Soviet period. The chaos engendered by the Russian Revolution in 1917
offered a first chance for the peoples of the North Caucasus to obtain
independence. The North Caucasian Mountain Republic, including Ingushetia,
Chechnya and Dagestan set apart from Russia in 1919. In 1921 The Red Army
retook control of the region and absorbed it in the newly born Soviet State. The
following process of sovietization was met by stubborn resistance in Chechnya and
the regime had often to intervene to crack down on rebellions. In 1934 Chechnya
officially became part of the Chechen-Ingush autonomous Socialist Republic.
During World War II, more than 30000 Chechens and Ingush fought in the ranks of
the red army while a minority sided with the German invaders. In 1944 Stalin
!27
enforced a mass deportation of Chechen to the Steppes of Central Asia, justifying it
as a punishment for their treason. A quarter of the deportees perished during the
journey to exile and, in the following years, tens of thousands Russians resettled
the empty Chechen lands. Only in 1956, as a consequence of the de-Stalinization
process, Nikita Khrushchev allowed the Chechens to return from exile. The
reintegration of the Chechens in soviet society was not an easy process because of
frequent disputes arising
with ethnic Russians on issues of land property.
However, Chechens’ resentment and will for self-determination were kept under
control by Soviet authorities until the late 80s, the years of the perestroika, when
liberalization allowed Chechen nationalistic sentiments to break loose.
Independence and First Chechen War. Perestroika reforms paved the way
for the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Many of the national
enclaves composing the Soviet State asserted demands of sovereignty.
The
Government of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was dissolved in 1991 by Dzhokhar
Dudaev, former commander of Soviet air force who recently had become leader of
the All-National Congress of the Chechen People. While the newly born Republic
of Ingushetia joined the Russian Federation, Chechnya unilaterally declared its full
independence from Russia in 1993. In the period between 1991 and 1994, frequent
episodes of ethnic discrimination against non-Chechens compelled thousands of
Russians to leave the Republic. Tensions between Grozny and Moscow steadily
rose until November 1994, when Yeltsin sent the army to restore constitutional
order in Chechnya.
Despite the estimations of general Grachev, who said the
operation was going to be a ‘bloodless blitzkrieg’, Russian forces quickly ended up
in a quagmire. Despite the disproportionate superiority of Russian forces, Chechen
resistance proved to be much better organized and inflicted heavy losses to the
Russian. Indiscriminate airstrikes on Chechen soil and human right abuses quickly
enraged the local Chechen population, who grew increasingly hostile to the federal
forces and led many to join Dudaev’s army. Russian assault on Grozny on New
Year's’ Eve 1995 ended up in a complete failure. Federal forces lost around 2000
men, most of which were inexperienced conscripts. After prolonged fighting,
!28
eventually Chechen separatists were forced to abandon the capital in March 1995.
In the following months the federal troops gained control of almost the whole
Chechen territory. However, Chechens retreated to the mountains where they
engaged the Russians in guerrilla warfare. In June 1995, Chechen field commander
Shamil Basayev took more than 1000 people hostages in a hospital in Budennovsk.
After negotiations, the Chechen leader managed to obtain a temporary ceasefire
gaining some time for Chechen forces to reorganize. In August 1996 the Chechen
rebels led by Basayev and Maskhadov launched a new offensive in the center of
Grozny where Russian troops were soon rounded up and cut out from the rest of
federal forces. To prevent a further bloodbath, General Aleksandr Lebed brokered a
ceasefire and signed the Khasavyurt accord on 31 August 1996. According to the
agreement federal forces had to leave the Republic by the end of the year and the
relations between Russia and the Chechen Republic were to be defined by 2001.
As a result of the accord Chechnya was de-facto independent.
Inter-war period and Second Chechen War. In the aftermath of the first
campaign, the Republic was in ruin and its economy severely damaged. In 1997
presidential elections were held in Chechnya and former field commander Aslan
Maskhadov was elected president. However, it became clear that the new
government was unable to restore order in the Republic ravaged by war. Guerrilla
groups previously united in the fight with the Russians started fighting each other.
Law-enforcement was nonexistent and kidnapping became the most profitable
business for many militants, unable to adapt to peaceful life. The Chechen field
commanders became warlords with their own private militias, economic and
political interests. Overspread misery, crime, and violence proved a fertile ground
for religious radicalism to thrive. Maskhadov’s attempts to normalize the
relationships with Moscow were unsuccessful, mainly due to his inability to reign
in the increasingly aggressive Islamic groups, the aim of which was achieving the
independence of the entire North Caucasus from Russia and the constitution of an
Islamic State. In August 1999, Shamil Basayev and the Saudi-born Ibn Al-Khattab
at the head of 2000 militants attacked the neighboring Republic of Dagestan. In
!29
September bombs went off in apartment buildings in Moscow, Volgodonsk and
Buynaksk resulting in the death of over 300 people. The explosions, whose
responsibility was attributed to Chechen terrorists, became the trigger for the
Second Chechen War. While Basayev militants were pushed back from Dagestan
into Chechnya, the federal army began carrying out airstrikes on Chechen soil. In
October 1999, Russia’s new Prime Minister Vladimir Putin declared Maskhadov’s
government illegitimate and proceeded to a full scale land invasion. A considerable
amount of Chechen fighters led by former mufti Akhmad Kadyrov switched side
and joined the Federal forces. By December, federal troops reached Grozny and
targeted it with heavy artillery strikes and bombing.
When Russian troops
captured it in February 2000, the city had turned into a wasteland. After the fall of
Grozny, heavy fighting continued in the mountains and the Chechen conflict turned
into a ‘counter-insurgency operation’, which would continue for almost a decade.
Increasingly aware of the impossibility to end the war in a traditional way, Putin
opted for the strategy of ‘Chechenization’ of the conflict: the direction of the
counter- insurgency operations was passed on to pro-Moscow Chechens. In May
2000, federal forces established a transition pro-Moscow government with
Kadyrov at its head. On 23 of March 2003 a national referendum was held in
Chechnya which led to the signing of a new Constitution declaring Chechnya an
integral part of the Russian Federation.
Reconstruction. In 2004 Akhmad Kadyrov was elected president of the
Autonomous Republic of Chechnya. In exchange of a full amnesty, many former
separatists were convinced by the new president to lay down arms and join the profederal forces.
However, the Chechen separatists were far from defeated and,
under the leadership of President Maskhadov, they continued engaging pro-federal
forces in guerrilla fighting. The unwillingness of Moscow to negotiate with
Maskhadov moderate faction resulted in a general radicalization of the insurgency,
which came to be driven by religious extremist ideology. The most radicalized
factions of the resistance often resorted to terrorist strategies, carrying out suicide
attacks across Russia. In 2002 a commando of Chechen terrorists seized the
!30
Dubrovka Theater in Moscow and took the public as hostages. They demanded
Russian troops to be withdrawn from Chechnya and the end of the Second
Chechen war. The Russian government refused to engage in negotiation and
Special Forces stormed the theater. As a result, all terrorists and 140 hostages were
killed. Two years later, Chechen terrorists sent by warlord Shamil Basayev
occupied a school in Beslan, holding captive around 1100 people, most of which
were children. In the ensuing shootout, all terrorists were killed and more than 300
civilians died in the crossfire. On the 9th of May 2004, President of Chechnya
Akhmad Kadyrov was assassinated during a bombing attack prepared in the
occasion of the Victory Day parade. His son, Ramzan Kadyrov, was appointed
head of the Republic in 2007. Kadyrov’s personal militia, the so called kadyrovtsy
took in their hands the fight against the remains of the Chechen insurgent army. By
the end of the decade the most prominent leaders of the Chechen insurgency died
or have been killed, including Khattab, Basaev and former President of Ichkeria
Maskhadov. Internal disunity also contributed to weaken further the Chechen
insurgence, with many leaders replacing Chechen separatism with pan Islamic
ideology. On 16 April 2009 President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev announced the
counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya was officially over.
§ 4 Evolution of Chechnya’s Image in Russian Culture
4.1 The Chechen Nation in 19th Century Russian Literature
Edward Said defined the phenomenon of orientalism as a tendency, deeply
rooted in Western society, to judge and misrepresent Eastern cultures on the basis
!31
of preconceived archetypes. According to Said, Europe represented the Orient as
its own ‘other’, using it as a mirror to define itself.
This ‘othering’ discourse
establishes the superiority of the rational, enlightened, technologically advanced
West over a backward and irrational East.67 Europeans largely adopted this
representation of the Orient in order to justify their colonial ambitions.68
According to Johnson and Coleman ‘‘othering’ of different places—of places
viewed as ‘modern’ finding their inverse ‘backward’—was established as a
fundamental part of European thought at a time when nation-states and national
identities were being formed and grounded within Europe’69 . Russia, as an eximperial power, has a long tradition of Orientalism mainly related to the
colonization of the North Caucasus. The Russian Empire established its control
over this mountainous region only after a half a century- long war against
Chechens and other belligerent tribes. The Russian official discourse justified the
annexation of the Caucasus as part of a civilizing mission aimed at taming the
barbaric inhabitants of the mountains. 70 The phenomenon of Russian Orientalism
is well reflected in the literature of that time. According to Dziolkowski, literature
is ‘the main locus where national stereotypes are not only reflected, but also
reinforced and even engendered’71. Ram and Wertz argued that ‘Russia’s literary
tradition was the primary locus of Russian debate on the Caucasus until the media
67
Said E. (1979). Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, cited in Shafee, F. (2016).
Misperceptions about the conflict in Chechnya: The influence of
Orientalism. Securitologia, 22(2), 27-42. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/18984509.1203724
68
Johnson, C., & Coleman, A. (2012). The Internal Other: Exploring the Dialectical
Relationship Between Regional Exclusion and the Construction of National Identity. Annals Of
The Association Of American Geographers, 102(4), 863-880. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/00045608.2011.602934
69
Ibid. P.13
70
Shafee, F. Op.cit. P. 39
71
Ziolkowski, M. (2005). Alien visions. Newark: University of Delaware Press. P.10.
!32
revolution of the post-Soviet nineties’72. The two authors observed that, in absence
of war reportages, a major source of information on the Caucasian War was the
literary production of Russian writers such as A. Pushkin, M. Lermontov and L.
Tolstoy.73 Witnessing the Caucasian War at first hands, Mikhail Lermontov
portrayed the people of the Caucasus as fundamentally barbaric, acknowledging no
law except the one of violence. His famous poem ‘Cossack Lullaby’ (1840) reads:
‘The wicked Chechen crawls onto the shore/ and sharpens his dagger’74. Among
the traditions of the highlanders, Lermontov was particularly impressed by the
blood feud, which obliged family members to take revenge on the killer of a
kinsman and even on his relatives: ‘Over there to strike an enemy is not a crime; /
Friendship can be trusted, but vengeance is more reliable’ 75. Lermontov perceived
the mountaineers’resistance to the Russians as ‘an inchoate, predatory violence,
based on an elemental sense of vengeance rather than on any evolved sense of
justice’76. Lev Tolstoy defined Chechens’ resentment towards the Russian invaders
as ‘stronger than hate’77. The resistance of the Caucasus tribes to Russian
domination was embodied by the figure of the abrek, (in Chechen the word means
‘avenger’ while in Russian is a synonym for ‘bandit’), the prototype of the
indomitable and brave mountaineer fighter.78In the iconography of the time, he was
72
Ram, H. (1999). Prisoners of the Caucasus: Literary myths and media representations of the
Chechen conflict. Berkeley Program in Eurasian and East European Studies. Retrieved from
http://iseees.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/u4/bps_/publications_/1999_01-ram.pdf P.3
73
Ibid. P. 1
74
Lermontov, M. (1840). Otechestvennie Zapiski, quoted in Ram, H. Op.cit. P. 3
75
Lermontov,M. (1832) Sobranie sochinenii quoted in Ram,H. (1999) Op.cit. P.5
76
Ram, H. (2003). Imperial sublime. Madison: Univ Of Wisconsin Press. Op.cit.P.4
77 Tolstoy
L. (1912), Hadji-Murat. Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya Literatura, 1965, p 110, quoted
in Russell, J. (2005). Terrorists, bandits, spooks and thieves: Russian demonisation of the
Chechens before and since 9/11. Third World Quarterly, 26(1), 101-116. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/0143659042000322937
78
Russell, J. (2005). Op.cit. P.103
!33
portrayed as ‘rifle in hand, on a hilltop silhouetted like a wolf against the moon’ 79.
As Ram and Wertz noticed, even though Russian poets depicted the Caucasus as
Russia’s ‘other’, their representations were by no means a mere expression of
colonialism: Russian poets were both attracted and unsettled by the primordial
beauty of the Northern Caucasus and by its hot blooded inhabitants. The
dichotomy freedom-violence inspired contrasting feelings in Russian Romantic
poets, who alternated demonization and glorification of the Chechens. 80 The
following verses from the poem Izmail-Bei (1832) well express this double-sided
perception: ‘And the tribes living in those gorges are savage/ Their god is freedom,
their law is war’81. As the mountains they inhabited, highlanders were the
embodiment of the romantic sublime, conveying simultaneously a sense of
pleasure and fear. While visiting the Caucasus, Tolstoy wrote in one of his diaries:
‘This savage land is indeed splendid: in it two entirely opposed things - war and
freedom - are so strangely and poetically united’82. The inhabitant of the Caucasus
came to be associated with the archetype of the Noble Savage, a popular figure in
19th century Romantic primitivism. According to this tradition, from being the
uncultured barbarian of the orientalizing- colonial discourse, the savage becomes a
positive symbol of resistance against the corrupted Western civilization.83 Thus,
sympathy expressed by Russian poets towards the freedom loving highlanders was
indissolubly bound to the criticism of Russian imperial authoritarianism. The
Caucasus became the symbol of the uncontaminated nature and boundless liberty,
contrasting with the coercive nature of the Russian State.84 A. Griboedov was also
deeply critical of the bloody campaign launched by General Yermolov against the
tribes of the Caucasus. In the poem ‘Predators on the Chegem’ (1825), written in
79
Ibid.
80
Ram, H. & Wertz, A. Op.cit. P.3
81
Lermontov, M. (1832). Sobranie sochinenii quoted in Ram,H, (1999). Op.cit. P.4
82 Tolstoy
L., (1854). Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, quoted in Ram,H.(1999). Op.cit. P.4
83
Ram, H. (1999). Op.cit. P.6
84
Ibid. P.8
!34
the form of a war song, the topography of the Caucasus becomes allegory of
resistance against the Russian aggression.
The rites of our father live on within us, Their impetuous blood lives on. The same blue is in the
sky, The same colossi of ice, The same thundering waterfalls, The same wildness, beauty Is
spread throughout the ravines! The rocks are ours, the plunging slopes are ours! Russia! Why do
you wage war against The age-old heights?—There above the cloud— The double-peaked and
powerful [Mount Elbrus] Cuts through the clouds Above the heads of your regiments 85
To sum up, the portrayal of the Caucasian War by Russian writers generated a long
lasting image of Chechnya as Russia’s oriental ‘other’. As Ram argued, these
representations ‘were nominally superseded by the construction of the poliethnic
Soviet nation (...) and then powerfully revived in the nineties, providing a ready
precedent for the political anxiety of the Post-Soviet present.’86
4.2 The Chechen Nation in Post-Soviet Russian Media
Lieven argued that the romantic perception of Chechens as ‘primordial and
essentially unchanging’ was still very strong in post-Soviet Russia.87 With the rise
of Chechen nationalism, the image of the proud, untamable savage was adopted by
Chechen themselves in building a renovated sense of unity and independence from
Russian rule. 88Framing the events of the First Chechen War, both Chechen and
Russian media drew on what Aurélie Campana defined the ‘separatist narrative’,
based on the recurrent themes of Russian oppression and Chechen resistance.
Trying to explain the origin of the conflict, many journalists and opinion leaders
stressed the historical hostility that have always characterized Russian-Chechen
relations since the times of the Caucasian War. According to this narrative,
Chechens always lived in a society of equals, intrinsically hostile to all kind of
centralized authority. Precisely because of their rebellious, freedom loving nature,
85
Griboedov, A. (1825). Sochineniia, quoted in Ram, H. (2003). Op.cit. P.139
86
Ram, H. (1999). Op.cit. P.2
87
Lieven, A. (1998). Chechnya. New Haven: Yale University Press. P.335.
88
Ram, H. (1999). Op.cit.
!35
Chechens have been continuously persecuted by Russians. The separatist narrative
portrays Chechens as irreconcilably opposing Russian rule, thus presenting
Chechnya independence as an historical necessity. This interpretation of history
generated the image of Chechens as ‘eternal victims’ and ‘eternal rebels’,
conveying a sense of their unity against the Russians. A sense of continuity with
the past was created and the new incursion of Russian troops into Chechen land
was described as the last of a long series of attempts made by Russian despots to
subjugate the Chechens. After declaring independence in 1991, Dudayev adopted
the term ‘Ichkeria’ to rename the Chechen Republic, thus reinforcing the idea of a
new Chechnya, independent from Russian rule. The term ‘Ichkeria’ indicates the
southernmost mountainous region of Chechnya which, in the collective imaginary,
is perceived as a place of resistance, where traditions and customs are kept alive.
The national symbol of Ichkeria was the wolf, which featured in the Chechen coat
of arms and figured in the first line of the national anthem.89 Tishkov argued that
the wolf ‘underlines a collective attachment to a mythical ideal of liberty and
equity’90, thus embodying the Chechen fight for independence. Separatist fighters
were proudly calling themselves ‘borz’ (wolves) to stress their spiritual affinity
with the animal. Also Russians came to identify Chechens with wolves, because of
their wild, untamable and fierce nature. Russian adopted the image of the wolf to
represent Chechen leaders: Aslan Maskhadov was ‘the wolf with a human face' 91,
Shamil Basayev 'the lone wolf’92 and Salman Raduyev 'the loony wolf93. The
image of the wolf was picked frequently by Russian media during the Second
Chechen War. By that time the epithet had lost all kind of positive connotations,
preserving just its meaning of an animal ‘dangerous enough to warrant only death
89
Campana, A. (2006). The Effects of War on the Chechen National Identity
Construction. National Identities, 8(2), 129-148. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14608940600703759
90
Quote by Tishkov, V. (1997) cited in Campana, A. Op.cit. P.19
91
Moskovskie novosti. (1995), quoted in Russell, J. (2005). Op.cit. P.86
92
Moskovskie novosti. (1997), quoted in Russell, J. (2005). Op.cit. P.86
93
Izvestiya (1999), quoted in Russell, J. (2005). Op.cit. P.86
!36
and destruction’94. In the aftermath of the apartment bombings in Budennovsk and
Moscow in 1999, Izvestiya headlines hinted at the alleged Chechen responsibility
through the metaphor ‘Wolf track’95. Later on during the conflict, the front page of
the weekly newspaper Argumenty i Fakty read 'The Chechen wolves have been
driven back to their lair, but for how long?'96 .
The First Chechen War (1994-1996). With the fall of the Soviet Union, the
disappearance of an inclusive, unifying ideology and the sharp fall of living
standards were major factors leading to the rise of racism and ethnic strife within
Russian society. Human Right Watch activists noted that, instead of representing
the true causes of ethnic conflicts, Russian media described them as stemming
from the intrinsic violent nature of these non-Russian people.97 Chechens, as well
as other people from the Caucasus and Central Asia, came to be colloquially
addressed with the derogatory term chernye (‘blacks’).98Thus, even before the
conflict erupted, Russian public opinion was far from sympathetic to Chechnya
and its population. Since Dudaev took power in 1991 the breakaway republic was
notorious for having turned into a lawless and corrupt enclave. The rising influence
of Chechen criminal gangs in major Russian cities led the stereotype of the 19th
century abrek to evolve into the figure of the modern bandit. 99 During his public
speeches, President Yeltsin characterized Chechnya as a place of corruption and
94
Russell, J. (2005). Op.cit. P.86
95
Izvestiya. (1999), quoted in Russell, J. (2005). Op.cit. P.106
96Argumenty
97
i fakty. (1999), quoted in Russell, J. (2005). Op.cit. P.106
Roman, M. (2002). Making Caucasians Black: Moscow Since the Fall of Communism and the
Racialization of Non-Russians. Journal Of Communist Studies And Transition Politics, 18(2),
1-27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714003604
98
Eichler, M. (2006). Russia's Post-Communist Transformation. International Feminist Journal
Of Politics, 8(4), 486-511. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14616740600945065
99
Russell, J. (2002). Mujahedeen, Mafia, Madmen: Russian Perceptions of Chechens During the
Wars in Chechnya, 1994-96 and 1999-2001. Journal Of Communist Studies And Transition
Politics, 18(1), 73-96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/725289009
!37
lawlessness while Dudaev and his supporters were often referred to as ‘bandits’100.
Especially Chechen men were increasingly perceived as intrinsically aggressive
and prone to crime.101 This image of Chechnya and Chechens was greatly shaped
by the media coverage of the two Chechen campaigns. In the 90s television
became the most popular source of information in Russia and the first Chechen
campaign is considered the first ‘televised war’102 and a ‘war of representation’103,
where identity was largely used as ‘a means of legitimizing power’104. As Dinnie
pointed out, in a time of globalization and free flow of information, media
narratives have a major impact on the outcome of political and military
conflicts.105Petersson argued that during wars, each side of the conflict tends to
dehumanize and demonize the opponent in order to justify extreme measures taken
against it. 106 He identified two major discourses in the pro-government Rossiiskaya
gazeta at the eve of the first conflict: 1.Chechnya had become a source of political
instability and national extremism which threatened to spread to the rest of the
Federation. 2. The Chechen regime actively supported criminal activity such as
weapon and drug trafficking inside and outside the region.107 Moreover, Petersson
highlighted the racial components characterizing Russian official narrative during
100
Petersson, B. (2008). The Power of Stereotypes and Enemy Images: The Case of the Chechen
Wars. In Petersson, B., & Tyler, K. (2008). Majority cultures and the everyday politics of ethnic
difference. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
101
Eichler, M. Op.cit. P. 489
102
Russell, J. (2005). Op.cit., P.82
103
Ram, H. and Wertz, A. (1999). Op.cit. P.2
104
Eichler, M. Op.cit.
105
Dinnie. Op. cit.
106
Petersson, B. Op.cit.
107
Petersson, B. & Wagnsson, C. (1998). A State of War: Russian Leaders and Citizens Interpret
the Chechen Conflict. Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift 101(2). P.167-181. Retrieved from http://
www.statsvetenskapligtidskrift.se/cms/documents/
3B2C2862-3968-4AA9-8A32-32A04220411E.pdf
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those years. The mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov repeatedly mentioned the
possibility to expel all the ethnic Chechens from the capital. Eicher argued that,
even though Russian authorities never officially framed the war in racial terms,
they often linked Chechen leaders, and occasionally Chechen people in general,
with criminality. Thus, Chechens became increasingly seen as the embodiment of
the degradation and anarchy engulfing Post-Soviet Russian society.108 On January
1996, during the hostage crisis in the Dagestani village of Pervomayskoye, director
of the Federal Security Service Mikhail Barsukov uttered: ‘One respected Chechen
says of his people that a Chechen can only kill. If he cannot kill, he robs. If he
cannot do that, he steals. There is no other kind of Chechen’109. In the spring of
1992 VTSIOM (Russian Center for Political Opinion and Market Research)
surveyed 1566 respondents from 11 regions of the Russian Federation
investigating the reputation of other nationalities. Chechens featured among the
most disliked ethnic groups, although on a less extent than Armenian or
Azerbaijanis.110 In the aftermath of the First Chechen War, Russians’ perception of
Chechens had become much more negative. According to a similar survey
conducted in 1996 by VTSIOM, Chechens, Chechnya and Dudayev were
considered the major enemies of the country together with ‘organized crime’ and
‘corrupted officials and bureaucrats’111. However, Chechnya’s bad reputation was
somehow counterbalanced by the equally low degree of sympathy enjoyed by
Yeltsin and his government. The sudden decision to send troop to reestablish
‘constitutional order’ in Chechnya was seen from the majority of citizens as the
wrong way to solve the crisis. The public opinion was totally unprepared for the
conflict and the military started a public relation campaign only some months after
the initial invasion. Russians' harsh criticism towards Yeltsin and its government
exponentially increased because of authorities’ inability to win the information war
108
Eichler, M. Op.cit.
109
Moskovskie novosti. (1996), quoted in Petersson, B. & Wagnsson, C. Op.cit. P.172.
110
Omnibus. (1992), cited in Petersson, B. & Wagnsson, C. (1998) Op.cit. P. 174
111
Express. (1996), cited in Petersson, B. & Wagnsson, C. (1998). Op.cit. P. 175
!39
against the Chechens. The fall of the Soviet regime had deprived the government
of the powerful propaganda machine able to justify war, demonize the enemy and
motivate soldiers. Citizens had the possibility to follow the events free of all the
filters of soviet censorship and journalists could enjoy an unprecedented degree of
freedom.112 Due to the government inability to create effective media relations the
First Chechen war was for Russia a ‘public relation disaster’. Journalists were
treated with little respect and they were often denied access to basic information on
the military campaign. No guided press tours were organized other than those
reserved to military and government journals like Krasnaya Zvezda
or
Rossiyskaya Gazeta.113 The media-unfriendly attitude of the authorities led
representatives of independent media to turn to the Chechen separatists as a source
of information. The Chechen
Ministry of Information and press headed by
Movladi Ugudov set up an effective public relation strategy to support the
separatist cause and discredit the Russian army. In the center of Moscow, the press
agency ‘Chechen press’ was advocating the Chechen cause via radio and also
facilitating the access to Chechnya to Russian and foreign correspondents. As a
consequence, until February 1995, Russian correspondents received 90 % of the
information about events in Chechnya from the separatist side.114 The media
portrayal of the Chechen leaders was deeply divided: Chechen field commander
Shamil Basayev was labeled as ‘ideological terrorist’ and ‘butcher’ but also as
‘Chechnya’s greatest war hero’, ‘cybernetic superstar’ and ‘a rebel with a cause’115.
Moreover, the coverage of independent media like influential NTV television drew
attention to the destruction, abuses and disproportionate violence carried out by the
Russian military. The war soon came to be perceived as a pointless massacre. Thus
112
Ram, H. (1999). Op.cit. P.2
113
Lieven, A. (1998). Chechnya. New Haven: Yale University Press
114
Ginos, N. (2010). The Securitization of Russian Strategic Communication. Fort Leavenworth:
School of Advanced Military Studies, p.26. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/
u2/a536578.pdf
115
Ibid. P.76
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feelings of compassion towards the Chechens grew among the Russian public
together with an understanding of their struggle as one of national liberation.116The
fierce Chechen resistance against an overwhelming Russian military might was
increasingly perceived as the David’s courageous fight against a brutal Goliath.
The unpopularity of the First Chechen War reflected heavily on Yeltsin’s
reputation. In order to avoid defeat in the 1996 election, the president had to
withdraw Russian troops and sign the treaty of Khasavyurt, which granted
Chechnya de-facto independence.117
Interwar Period and Second Chechen war: from Freedom Fighters to
Islamic Terrorists. As Ram pointed out, the interwar period was characterized by a
de-romanticization of Chechens in the Russian media discourse.118 This change of
framing was due to the incapability of the new Chechen government to enforce
order in the republic and impose its authority on radical armed groups. The
infiltration of Wahhabism in Chechen high command ranks was a major factor in
worsening the image of the breakaway republic in the eyes of the Russian public.
President Maskhadov soon lost control over a significant part of the military and,
under pressure of radicalized warlords, he enforced Sharia law in 1999. Doing so
he
highlighted the weakness of the moderate position within the Chechen political arena, which
tends more and more to overlap the radical Islamist one. Essentially, it gave a strong political
visibility to an ideology few Chechens are following119
As a result, all sympathy for the separatist cause quickly waned and
mainstream discourse on Chechnya focused on the uncivilized and savage nature
of its inhabitants. The romanticized struggle for freedom was over. De facto
independence was achieved and it brought nothing but misery, crime and violence.
116
Russell, J. (2002). Op. cit.
117
Dannreuther, R., & March, L. (2008). Chechnya: Has Moscow Won? Survival, 50(4), 97-112.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330802329030
118
119
Ram, H. (1999). Op.cit.
Ibid. P.2
!41
Russell noted: ‘Chechnya lost its image internationally as a brave 'David' fighting
'Goliath' and became perceived as yet another failed state like Afghanistan or
Lebanon when these were ruled by warlords’120.The responsibility for barbaric
actions of certain groups within Chechen society was extended to the entire
Chechen nation. As pointed out by Belin, ‘Journalist Sergey Dorenko from ORT
TV channel blamed the whole Chechen civilian population for allowing crime
flourishing in the Republic’ 121.
As Shafee
stated ‘The chaos, brutality and
banditry which characterized the interwar period (1996-1999) are brought to
explain the need for Chechnya to be subjugated to a ‘better’ power – in this case,
Moscow seems to be the only choice.’122
A new war with Russia seemed
increasingly unavoidable when, in August 1999, Shamil Basayev launched an
attack to the neighboring Dagestan, aimed at extending the rebellion against Russia
to the entire Caucasus. In September 1999, later on called ‘Black September’, a
series of explosions in Moscow, Buynaksk and Volgodonsk killed almost 300
people and injured more than 1000. Despite the lack of evidence, Russian
authorities did not hesitate to hold the Chechens responsible for the massacre. The
mayor of Moscow Yury Luzhkov publicly declared that ‘Chechen terrorism’ was
behind the explosions. The media immediately aligned with the authorities
supporting the allegations, and only a few newspapers like Novaya Gazeta and
Obshaya Gazeta questioned the rush to judgment.123 As reported by Russell ‘A poll
taken shortly after the bombings found that 64% of Russians wanted all Chechens
expelled from the country and a similar percentage wanted Chechen towns and
settlements to be bombed’124. By that time, as Tishkov argued, Russian public
considered Chechens as the only responsible of the civil war, while Russian
120
Russell, J. (2005). Op.cit. P. 107
121
Belin, L. (2002). Russian Media Policy in the First and Second Chechen Campaign. Paper
prepared for presentation at the Political Studies Association, Aberdeen, Scotland
122
Shafee, F. Op.cit. P. 38
123
Belin, L. Op.cit.
124
Russell, J. (2005). Op.cit. P.108.
!42
responsibility was largely overlooked.125 Because of the anti-Chechen hysteria
fostered by the media, Chechnya was not perceived any longer as a peripheral
problem, rather, as stated Tishkov: ‘The Chechen war was everywhere’126. As a
consequence, Russian public opinion unanimously supported the second military
intervention in Chechnya. After the information disaster of the first Chechen war,
Russian authorities had learned that media were an invaluable tool for shaping
public opinion.Therefore, In order to rally the Russian people against the Chechen
rebels, the Kremlin strengthened its grip on the press. A Media Ministry which did
not exist during the first war, actively prevented journalists to access separatist
sources. 127 Independent reporting was heavily curtailed and journalists’ access to
the war zone was strictly regulated. New strict rules were enforced on the media to
guarantee a favorable coverage and demonize the enemy. Redactions received a list
of parameters that had to follow in the coverage of the conflict. For instance,
journalists were not allowed to use the words ‘rebel’ and ‘insurgents’ when
addressing Chechen fighters, who had to be labeled exclusively as ‘terrorists’.128
In 2001, The Russian State Duma issued a law prohibiting journalists to publish
interviews with Chechen separatists.129 Being excluded from access to the media,
the Chechen separatists often recurred to terrorisms as an alternative way to draw
public attention to their cause. As it usually happens when media visibility is
pursued by means of violent actions, the image of Chechen fighters further
deteriorated.130 As a result of Russian media campaign, the whole Chechen
125 Tishkov, V.
(2001). Slova i Obraztsy v Postkonfliktnoi Reconstrukzii. In Chechnya: ot
Konflikta k Stabilnosti (2001). Moscow: Institut Etnologii i Antropologii RAN
126 Tishkov, V.
(2001). Op.cit. P. 252
127
Belin, L. Op. cit.
128
Souleimanov, E., & Ditrych, O. (2008). The Internationalisation of the Russian–Chechen
Conflict: Myths and Reality. Europe-Asia Studies, 60(7), 1199-1222. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/09668130802230739 P.1202
129
Ginos, N. Op.cit.
130 Avraham,
E. & Ketter, E. Op.cit.
!43
separatist movement came to be identified with Islamic fundamentalism: ‘the
words ‘terrorist’, ‘Caucasian’ and ‘Muslim’ had merged into one demonic
figure’131argued Russell. Campana argued that the degree of religious
radicalization in Chechen society was highly exaggerated by Russian propaganda
and only a few radicalized leaders advocated a global jihaad.132 Nevertheless,
Aslan Maskhadov, representative of the moderate separatist faction, was presented
by the media as indistinguishable from the radical warlords. After the terrorist
attack on September 9/11 in New York, Putin was the first world leader calling the
American President Bush to manifest Russia’s solidarity in the ‘Global War on
Terrorism’. Thus, the Russian president implicitly linked the Chechen resistance
with Al Qaeda Islamic radicalism. Federal media strengthened this perception,
reporting that after the Afghan war, Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar found
refuge in the mountains of the Caucasus.133 By exaggerating the presence of
foreign Islamic fundamentalists in the ranks of the separatists, Putin deprived
Chechen leaders of legitimacy and excluded all kind of negotiations with them.
Sergey Ivanov, Russia’s defense minister stated it clearly: ‘to those who
recommend that we launch talks with Maskhadov, I always invite them to start
talks with Mullah Omar. It’s the same thing’134.
The worsening of Chechens
’reputation in the second campaign was detected by opinion polls conducted in
September 2000 according to which ‘only 15 per cent of Russians thought that the
Chechens were fighting for independence, against 38 per cent for money, 22 per
cent for revenge, and 16 per cent because of their aggressive nature’135. In May
2000, the Committee on Conscience of the United States Holocaust Memorial
Museum has placed Chechnya on its ‘watch’ list for ‘past persecution of Chechens
131
Russell, J (2002). Op.cit. P. 79
132
Campana, A. (2006). Op.cit. P. 136.
133
Souleimanov, E., & Ditrych, O. (2008). Op.cit.
134Interview
with Sergei Ivanov, Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. (2003), quoted
in Dannreuther, R., & March, L. Op.cit. 101
135
Russell, J. (2002). Op.cit. P.88
!44
as a people, the demonization of Chechens as a group within Russian society, [and]
the level of violence directed against Chechen civilians by Russian forces’136. As
Russel argued, the demonization of the Chechens during the second Chechen
campaign exacerbated the phenomenon of ‘Caucasophobia’ within Russian society.
In October 2002, Lyudmilla Alekseyeva, Chair of the Moscow Helsinki Group,
defined ‘Caucasophobia’ as ‘definitely the most serious problem that Russia is
faced with today. It is very widespread among the population in general, at all
levels’137. In the aftermath of the Second Chechen War, Tishkov underlined the
heavy and long lasting impact of the war propaganda on Chechen-Russian
relations: ‘The Chechen war continues where it started: in the minds of people’138.
Indeed, as Shields pointed out, media-generated reputation ,especially if associated
with a crisis or a catastrophe, can last for years after the events that contributed to
create it are not happening any longer.139‘When a place is labeled by the media as
one in which only a certain type of activities and events occurs, it becomes a
symbol of such events’ 140 he added.
Towards a New Brand for Chechnya: The Pro-Russian Narrative. With the
establishment of a pro-Russian administration in Grozny in 2000, Chechnya
undertook the slow and laborious path of reintegration in the Russian Federation.
The election of pro-Moscow leader Ahmad Hadji Kadyrov and the introduction of
a new Chechen Constitution marked the beginning of a new chapter in Chechen
history, characterized by the renovated sense of belonging to the Russian State. At
this point, Russian authorities realized it was time to mitigate the anti-Chechen
sentiments in Russian society, drawing a distinction between the Chechen people
136
Jaimoukha, A. Op.cit., p.78
137
Sikevich, Z. (2002). The Caucasus and ‘Caucasus phobia’, quoted in Russel, J. (2005),
Op.cit. P.112
138 Tishkov, V.
139
(2001) Op.cit. P. 252
Shields, R. (1992). Places on the margin, London: Routledge, cited in Avraham, E. & Ketter,
E. (2012). Media Strategies for Marketing Places in Crisis. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, P.35
140
Ibid. P.31
!45
and the Islamic terrorists: ‘As far as the negative image of Chechens is concerned,
the Chechen people are not to be blame for anything. (…) Our task is to destroy
this image [of Chechens] as terrorists 141said Putin in 2002. Campana defined ‘the
pro-Russian narrative’ a new official discourse ‘masterminded by Moscow’ and
adopted by the new Chechen government headed by Kadyrov.142 This new
narrative supports the vision of Chechnya as an inseparable part of the Russian
Federation and Chechens as full Russian citizens. The separatist government led by
Maskhadov was declared illegitimate and its supporters were demonized and
discredited as ‘terrorists’ and ‘criminals’.
The history of Russian-Chechen
relations was revisited: elements of historical antagonism between Russians and
Chechens were significantly downsized and more space was given to the positive
aspects of the two people’s coexistence. According to the new official discourse,
the responsibility for the tragedy of the war was ascribed exclusively to the
Chechen and Russian political elites in charge in 1994. The image of the wolf,
elevated by the Chechen separatists to symbol of freedom and independence of the
Chechen nation, was eradicated from the national symbology. Kadyrov motivated
this choice arguing that the wolf ‘has always been regarded as an animal which is
hard to tame’. Consequently, in mid-2004 the pro-Russian Chechen State Council
excluded the wolf from the new coat of arm adopted in mid-2004, which features
less ‘problematic’ images like the mountains, a Vainakh tower and an oil derrick.
The current leader of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov became the embodiment of the
pro-Russian narrative. In public statements he often describes Chechens as patriots
of Russia and he never fails to assert his personal loyalty to Russian President
Vladimir Putin.
***
This chapter provided a diachronic reconstruction of the portrayal of the Chechen
141
Russell, J. (2005). Op.cit. P.111.
142
Campana, A. (2006). Op.cit.
!46
nations in Russian culture. In particular, we defined the highly negative image of
Chechnya generated in the course of the two Chechen Wars. As we pointed out in
the first chapter, every nation branding effort aims at reducing the difference
between a preexisting nation brand image and the nation brand identity. Now that
we have identified Chechnya’s preexisting brand image, we can proceed to
deconstruct its current nation brand identity.
Chapter 3. Nation Branding in Contemporary Chechnya
§ 5 Methods and Limitations
5.1 Qualitative Interviews and Content Analysis
In the preliminary phase of our nation branding case study, we provided
an overview of nation branding theory as theoretical backgroung. In order to
interpret the contemporary brand of Chechnya, knowledge of the its preexisting
brand image was required. Thus, we carried out a historical reconstruction of the
portrayal of the Chechen nation in Russian culture. In particular, we addressed the
!47
literary production of 19th century Russian writers, focusing mainly on poems by
M. Lermontov, A. Pushkin and L. Tolstoy. For the sake of conciseness we limited
our approach to an analysis of secondary sources, such as academic articles
devoted to the representation of Chechens in romantic Russian literature.
Regarding the reconstruction of the modern representation of Chechnya, we relied
on secondary sources describing the portrayal of Chechens in Russian media
during the last Russian-Chechen military conflicts. The empirical part of our
research consists in a combination of qualitative interviews with the content
analysis of media sources. Our choice of the sources to be analyzed is largely
based on the results of interviews we took with the representative of the Chechen
Ministry of Information, Islam Khatulev and the Press Officer of the Chechen
Republic Government Committee of Tourism Murat Shakhidov, both met in
Grozny in December 2016 (Appendix 3). The conversation with the two officials
grounded our decision to identify Ramzan Kadyrov as the main manager and
promoter of Chechnya’s nation brand. Consequently, we focused on Ramzan
Kadyrov’s account on Russian Facebook Vkontakte and the TV show ‘Komanda’
as the object of our content analysis. Among the different social media platforms
Kadyrov is using, we decided to focus specifically on Vkontakte considering our
focus on Russian audience as the target of Chechnya’s nation branding. We
sampled a total of two hundred posts and divided them in two equal blocks
counting a hundred each. The first block contains all the content posted from
28-01-2017 to 06-03-2017 (Appendix 2, Pic. 1), while the second relates to the
period from 06-03-2017 to 12-04-2017 (Appendix 2, Pic. 2). We analyzed the two
groups separately so that afterwards we could compare the results assessing the
degree of consistency in the content. In our classification, we decided to take into
account the text of each post, highlighting the leitmotifs which can be associated
with a coherent branding narrative. As a primary tool of categorization we adopted
Anholt's Nation Brand Hexagon, which represents the six dimensions composing
the reputation of a nation: Export, Governance, Culture & Heritage, People,
Tourism and Immigration & Investments. Given the broadness of the framework
!48
provided by Anholt, we created a number of subcategories which are relevant to
the specific case of Chechnya. For instance, within the dimension Governance we
created the subcategories Enlightened Leadership, which relates to Kadyrov’s
personal leadership skills, and Effective Administration, which focuses on concrete
examples of good administration carried out by Chechen officials. Taking into
account the historical focus of our research, we added Framing of the National
Past as an additional category adding up to the other six theorized by Ahnolt. A
complete description of the additional category and subcategories is provided in
the next paragraph. Each analyzed post was assigned to one (or more) of the brand
categories, depending on the particular aspect of Chechen brand identity promoted
in the post. After completing the categorization of the posts, we calculated the
amount of posts dedicated to every single category and subcategory in order to
evaluate their relative significance within the brand. In the analysis of ‘Komanda’,
the same method of analysis was adapted to the different characteristics of the
medium. In this case fragments of the TV were considered as items of analysis.
Different values were assigned to every fragment according to the modality of
representation: fragments conveying the message exclusively in a visual way (for
instance, the frequent sequences showing the Chechen landscape) were given half
a point; sentences and longer phrases uttered by the protagonists of the show
received a full point; two points were assigned to entire thematic parts dedicated to
a specific category (for instance, the episode 01-11 is largely dedicated to Chechen
food). After that, we calculated the amount of points assigned to each category and
subcategory. As a result of our analysis we outlined the nation brand identities
conveyed by the two selected media (Appendix 1, Pic.1/6). Finally we compared
the results from ‘Komanda’ and Vkontakte pointing out the common patterns
conveying an overarching brand identity. The major limitation of our content
analysis consists in its relatively high level of subjectivity. In particular, the
changes we applied to Anholt’s theoretical framework stemmed from our
subjective interpretation of Chechnya’s brand identity. Another limitation consists
in the very narrow time framework selected for the content analysis, which
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prevents us from verifying on what degree the brand of Chechnya has been
changing during the 10 years-long Kadyrov’s presidency.
5.2 Brand Categories and Subcategories
Governance
Effective Administration: examples of the successful administration of
Chechnya, the competency of Chechen officials in administering the region.
Patriotism: the loyalty of the Chechen government towards the Russian
State and Kadyrov’s personal devotion towards Vladimir Putin.
Care for the Environment: Kadyrov’s commitment to environmental issues and the
safeguard of Chechen natural landscape.
Enlightened Leadership: portrayal of Kadyrov as a gifted and wise leader, fully
committed to his duty as a civil servant.
War on Terror: content dedicated to Chechnya’s involvement in the fight against
international terrorism. Descriptions of the successes achieved in countering
terrorism and radicalization in Chechnya and abroad.
Charity: Commitment of Kadyrov’s administration to humanitarian issues at home
and abroad.
International Relations: Content dedicated to the involvement of Kadyrov’s
administration in foreign affairs as well as the promotion of relations with foreign
powers.
Culture & Heritage
Islam: promotion of a positive image of Islam and Chechen Muslims.
Sport: celebration of Chechen sportsmen’s achievements and talents. Promotion of
fitness and healthy lifestyle.
Family and gender roles: the importance of the family institution and traditional
gender roles within Chechen society.
Architecture: examples of traditional Chechen architecture such asVainakh towers
and mosques.
Folklore: traditional dance, clothes and rituals
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Landscape: the mountainous territory of Chechnya as an iconic landscape closely
linked to Chechens history and identity.
People
References to the Chechens’ positive qualities; references to individual Chechens,
their talents and achievements.
Tourism
Natural beauty: promotion of rural Chechnya and its natural landscape for the
explicit purpose to attract tourists.
Infrastructures: promotion of Chechnya’s tourism infrastructures and facilities
such as hotels and resorts.
Investment & Immigration
Investment: descriptions of Chechnya as a fast developing region, a suitable
location for investments.
Immigration: references to Chechnya as an attractive place for immigrants coming
from other Russian regions as well as from abroad.
Export
Promotions of made-in-Chechnya products and services, strengthening of the
Country-of-Origin effect.
Framing of the National Past
As we pointed out in the first chapter, myths and historical memories are
fundamental aspects of national identity that needs to be taken into account during
nation branding practices. The national past plays a crucial role in our case study,
given the impact of the conflicted history of Russian-Chechen relations on the
Chechen brand image cultivated by the Russian audience. Hence our choice to add
this category to Anholt’s theoretical framework.
Pre-Soviet Past: all events related to the Chechen national history before the
establishment of the Chechen-Ingush Soviet Republic.
Soviet Past: events related to the Chechen Nation as part of the Soviet uUnion
Wars and Reconstruction: all events related to the Chechen wars in Post-Soviet
Russia and Chechnya’s difficult path towards peace and stability.
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§ 6 Deconstructing Chechnya’s Brand Identity
6.1 Interviews with Chechen Officials
In December 2016 we travelled to Grozny in order to collect information on
the nation branding practices carried out by the Chechen administration
influence
to
the Russian audience. In that occasion, we had the opportunity to
interview Islam Khatulev, a representative of the Chechen Ministry of Information
and Murat Shakhidov, the Press Officer of the Chechen Government Committee of
Tourism (Appendix 3). Khatulev argued that anti-Chechen sentiments in Russian
society significantly decreased over the last decade. He identified the
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establishment of law and order as the fundamental precondition for the
improvement of Chechnya’s image. Among the main sectors contributing in the
promotion of the Republic he mentioned tourism, agriculture and the energy sector.
He also highlighted the importance of Chechen sport in attracting a positive
attention to the region, mentioning the excellent results achieved by Chechen
athletes. Khatullev denied the existence of PR agencies actively promoting the
image of the Republic on a federal level. However, he pointed out the positive role
played by social networks in spreading a positive image of Chechnya. He also
noted that the Head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov played a major role in the
reconstruction of Chechnya and its image: ‘His energy, will and determination are
changing everything for the better. His leadership talent, patriotism...all played a
role (...) He transmits his energy to other people and every day there is a positive
change’ said Khatulev. Murat Shakhidov, told us that the Committee of Tourism is
actively involved in the promotion of tourism in the region. ‘We participated in all
possible forums, exhibitions and fairs’ said Shakhidov. The Committee regularly
organizes events aimed at attracting the attention of the media. However,
Shakhidov highlighted the limited resources of the Committee which do not allow
the creation of large projects on a federal level. ‘We cannot afford PR specialists
on a federal level, he said, confirming Khatullev’s statement. According to the
press officer, the main challenge for the development of tourism in the Republic
was convincing the Russian public of Chechnya’s safety, removing the stereotypes
of the region as a ‘dangerous placed inhabited by wild people’. A starting point for
promoting the region as a tourism destination was getting rid of all traces of war,
countering the stereotype of Chechnya as a militarized place ‘where people go
around with guns’.
Shakhidov noted the major role played by the Head of
Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov in improving the image of the Republic. ‘Our major
source of advertisement is Ramzan Kadyrov. He is the engine informing people
about the Chechen Republic. He is moving towards a specific direction. (...) He is
a high ranking official, so he is more popular and ‘accessible’ than whatever
ministry or committee’ said Shakhidov. He also referred to the ‘PR technologies’
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used by Kadyrov to promote the image of the Republic. ‘He contributes to our
work organizing special events: opening fountains, inviting celebrities, all this
attracts the media attention and conveys a feeling of safety’ commented the press
officer. Shakhidov mentioned the TV show ‘Komanda’ as a successful example of
advertising project, which was realized mainly thanks to Kadyrov’s influence on
federal media. Shakhidov commented: ‘I can’t think about a better advertisement
for Chechnya than the reality show ‘Komanda’. The project was created by
VGTRK (All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company) and
Ramzan Kadyrov. If looking at the general effect, the show described Chechnya as
a beautiful, nice, and quiet place from a touristic perspective. It was great
advertisement’.
6.2 Ramzan Kadyrov on Vkontakte
Khatullev’s remark about the positive influence of social networks on the
image of Chechnya convinced us to look at Ramzan Kadyrov’s activity on social
network as an example of nation branding practice. Ramzan Kadyrov enjoys a high
degree of popularity on social networks: he has accounts on Instagram (2,5
millions followers), Facebook (784.947 followers) ,Vkontakte (513.000 followers)
and also a blog on Livejournal. According to the media monitoring and analysis
system Medialogia143, Kadyrov has been consistently ranked as the most quoted
blogger of the year in Russian media since 2014. His degree of popularity is
ranked higher than those of other frequently quoted politicians like Maria
Zakharova and Aleksey Navalny. Kadyrov posts several times per day, distributing
similar content across different platforms. Usually his posts consist in a short text
accompanied by a video or photo material. In the following paragraphs we
described the structure of Chechnya’s nation brand resulting from a content
analysis of Kadyrov’s Vkontakte page. The two Vkontakte sampled blocks taken
into account gave fairly similar results, proving the consistency of the content
(Appendix 2/Figure.1, 2).
143
Reiting gubernatorov –blogerov (2016). Retrieved from http://old.mlg.ru/company/pr/4600/
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Culture
Sport. Kadyrov promotes the excellence of Chechen sport, as well as fitness
and healthy lifestyle. In particular, box, kickboxing and mixed martial arts are the
most frequently promoted kinds of sport. Kadyrov often praises the talents and
achievements of Chechen fighters, the majority of which are members of the
‘Akhmad’ fight club. A significant amount of posts are dedicated to the
achievements of Chechen athletes in national as well as international tournaments.
Sport plays an important role in the life of the Chechen leader, who often shares
videos of his working out sessions. Kadyrov actively promotes the development of
Chechen and Russian sport. ‘Sport, physical culture, healthy lifestyle are extremely
important, not just for single individuals but for the whole State’ he argues (31-03).
He highlights the excellence of Chechen sport: ‘Thousands of youngsters are
worthily taking part in international championships and tournaments on a regional
and global level, achieving the highest awards’ (31-03). Martial arts are an
important part in the education of young Chechens. Kadyrov often brings the
example of his sons, who intensively practice boxing despite the very young age: ‘I
always knew that children have to be educated to sport from an early age. It
encourages the physical, psychological and spiritual growth. It cultivates fighting
qualities’ (11-03). In order to foster the development of Chechen sport, Kadyrov
invests in modern infrastructures, such as the Grozny stadium, ‘Akhmad Arena’,
hosting the Terek football team, or the sport palace ‘Colosseum’, which he defines
‘one of the best in the country’ (31-01).
Islam. Religion plays a prime role in Chechen society and in Kadyrov’s life.
Posts containing the preaching of the prophet Mohammed often embed videos
featuring Kadyrov praying in the Mosque together with his fellow believers.
Kadyrov displays Islam as a positive force perfectly compatible with Russia’s
secular institutions: ‘Muslims are citizens of Russia; they area a worthy part of
Russian society’. Mentioning the Russian Constitution, he points out that Muslims
‘have the right to act according to their religious believes’ (05-03). Kadyrov’s
references to Islam often aim at countering its overspread perception as a radical
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religion. He often stresses the difference between his brand of Islam, which ‘calls
people to peace, kindness, mutual respect and support on this earth’ (05-03) and
the perverted ideology preached by ISIS militants who ‘kill students and Islamic
university teachers, destroy mosques, tombs of saints and other Islamic
values’ (11-03). The only sampled post lacking Kadyrov’s comment is a repost of a
video titled ‘ISIS is not Islam, ISIS is not a Califat’ (20-02). Kadyrov supports a
traditional, peaceful Islam uniting Chechens and the ‘brotherly’ Syrian people in
the fight against terrorism (26-02). One of the posts cites: ‘One of the main duties
of every Muslim is to help the needy and take care of the sick’ (24-02). The
philanthropic nature of Islam is promoted in the posts describing how the Akhmad
Kadyrov Foundation provides humanitarian aid both in Chechnya and in Syria.
Kadyrov conveys a modern and even glamorous image of Islam through the
promotion of his daughter’s fashion house Firdaws, specialized in luxury clothes
for Muslim women.
Family and Gender Roles. The family institution and traditional gender roles
are among the pillars of Chechen culture. Kadyrov often devotes posts to relatives
or his friend's family members. In one post, he talks about his visit to the family
cemetery in Tsentaroy, where he pays respect to his ancestors (23-02). Kadyrov
projects a very traditional conception of gender roles. In occasion of the
International Woman Day, he describes Chechen women as ‘wise
homemakers’ (07-03). Humbleness, intelligence, and respect for the family are
some of the quality which Kadyrov appreciate in his niece (05-03). On the other
hand, the defense of the Motherland is the most important duty of every Chechen
man (23-02).
Architecture.Tsoy Pede, ‘City of the Dead’ is a necropolis dating back to the
Middle Age and an example of Vainakh architecture. The Mosques of Grozny,
Argun and Gudermes became icons of the Chechen urban landscape.
Folklore. In one post Kadyrov celebrates the day of workers of the cultural
field (25-03). He mentions Chechens dancers, actors and other creative people,
praising their successful performances. Another post mentions the folklore dance
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ensеmbles Vainakh, Nokhcho and Daimohk, which according to him ‘are well
known not only in Russia but also abroad’ (07-02).
Landscape. The Chechen mountainous landscape is an integral part of
Chechen culture and history. Describing the beauty of his father’s home region
Benoy, Kadyrov says: ‘Our history is preserved among these cliffs (...) This is one
of those sacred places for us, where the Chechen land generated our national
heroes’ (29-01). He underlines the strong relation bounding the Chechens to their
own land and their past: ‘Here it is, the land of my fathers, the land of the Chechen
people’ (20-02). In a few posts, embedded videos display the views of the Chechen
mountains and the iconic Vainakh towers on their top.
Governance
Effective Administration. Kadyrov often congratulates Chechen State
officials in occasion of their birthdays, highlighting their best achievements.
Examples of good administration range from the field of healthcare (13-02) to the
development of the fuel-energetic sector (13-02), ending with the efficiency of the
Chechen transport police (18-02). Kadyrov also talks about the initiatives aimed at
guaranteeing cleanness of the street in Grozny and in other urban areas (22-02).
Members of Kadyrov’s team are presented as high level specialists in their
respective fields, reliable and capable to fulfill the most difficult tasks. Kadyrov
shares information about the region economic growth and the several construction
projects that are being developed (03-03).
He highlights the efficiency of the
administration in specific areas such as the Sunzha district (16-03). A significant
amount of posts related to governance mentions the outstanding speed with which
the Republic was rebuilt from scratches after the devastation of the war.
In
occasion of the 10th anniversary of his presidency, Kadyrov points out: ‘Wellknown economists and politicians argued that it would take us 50 years to cope
with the devastation. We did it ten times faster’. Kadyrov reports that Chechnya is
ranked among the top five best administered regions. Referring to data collected by
the Levada Center, he ranks himself as consistently in ‘the top ten list of the most
trusted politicians by Russian people’ (03-03).
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War on Terror. Kadyrov is eager to underline the commitment of his
administration to the fight with international terrorism. International terrorists are
identified as ‘the worst enemies of Russia’ (31-01) and a major threat to the
country’s peace and stability. Kadyrov describes the security measures that have
been employed to solve the problem of terrorism and radicalization in Chechnya.
He describes the high level of professionalism and effectiveness of Chechnya’s
Special Forces in countering terrorism threats (19-03). Kadyrov often presents
Chechnya as one of the safest region of Russia. He defines the republic as ‘the only
region in the world that defeated terrorism’ (14-03) and ‘one of the most stable
regions, not only in Russia, but in the entire world’ (16-02). Another post quotes:
‘The Chechen Republic has successfully solved the problems of combating
international terrorism, organized crime and extremism. This fact is acknowledged
by everybody’ (06-03). The war against terrorism has a central role the posts on
Russia’s intervention in Syria. Kadyrov points out the important role played by
Russia and in particular, by the Chechen Special Forces in fighting ISIS. Chechens
have considerable experience in dealing with terrorist threats. The example of
Chechnya is presented as a model that should inspire other governments in the
fight with international terrorism (07-03). In more than one occasion, Kadyrov
argues that the only way to defeat terrorism is by creating unity among the people.
(06-04), (08-04).
Charity. Kadyrov underlines the commitment of his administration to
humanitarian issues in Chechnya and abroad. Charity initiatives are carried out by
the Ahmad Kadyrov Foundation which is directly administered by Kadyrov’s
family. The Foundation provides humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees and finances
the reconstructions of Syrian mosques (06-03). ‘The extent of its activity in Syria
and in the refugee camps is well known’ says Kadyrov (06-03).Occasionally, the
fund provides economic support to disadvantaged Chechen families (22-03).
Care of the Environment. Kadyrov shows his commitment to environmental
problems such as the climate change: ‘Our planet is incredibly small and fragile
(...). Our duty is to treat it with care’ (25-03) .In particular he describes how his
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administration is involved in the preservation of the region’s flora and fauna
(27-02).
Patriotism. Through his frequent patriotic statements, Kadyrov combats the
old perception of Chechnya as Russia’s main source of instability. In occasion of
the anniversary of the Chechen Constitution, Kadyrov remembers the Chechen
people’s free choice to preserve the unity of the State and keep Chechnya as an
integral part of the Russian Federation (23-03). Chechen and Russian nationalism
are perfectly compatible for Kadyrov as can be noted by the constant presence of
the hashtags ‘Russia’ and ‘Chechnya’ in his posts. Kadyrov often refers to Russia
as ‘Fatherland’(Otechestvo) or
conveying a strong sense of
‘our great Motherland’ (14-03) (Rodina) , thus
patriotism.
He often praises Chechen officials,
highlighting their patriotism and their merits in ‘serving the Fatherland’ (12-03). In
occasion of the 10th anniversary of his presidency, Kadyrov defines Chechnya as
‘Russia’s reliable stronghold on its southern borders’ (03-03).
By displaying a
military parade on the streets of Grozny, he conveys the message that Chechen
forces are able to repel any enemy of Russia (23-03). He expresses his full support
to Russian foreign policies, for instance, in regards to the annexation of Crimea
(16-03) or the intervention in Syria (08-04). In occasion of the International
Woman Day, he congratulates the mothers of fallen Interior Ministry soldiers for
‘raising true patriots of our Fatherland’ (07-03). Kadyrov promotes patriotism as a
unifying value for the multicultural Russian State, superseding differences in faith
and customs. While defending
the right of Muslim women to wear hijab he
argues: ‘We need to observe the Constitution and love our Motherland, then we
will not need to talk about hijabs, and the attributes of other religions’ (05-03).
International Relations. Kadyrov makes clear his own position regarding
global political issues. In general, he fully supports the current Russian foreign
policy especially regarding the war in Syria. He rejoices the inauguration of
Donald Trump (29-02) believing it will improve the relationship between Russia
and USA. A few weeks later he condemns the US missile strikes against Syrian
government forces (09-04). Kadyrov is particularly concerns with the war in Syria
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and he is often involved in meetings with Syrian religious leaders. He also show
his ties with leaders of Muslim countries, and does business with them. An
example is a series of post dedicated to his travel to the Arab Emirates, where he
strengthens relationships with the local leaders (12-04).
People
Sportsmen.The majority of the posts about people are dedicated to Chechen
sportsmen, mostly boxers or martial arts champions. Kadyrov praises them for
their fighting skills and achievements in international competitions as well as for
their strength, bravery and strong will.
Officials. Kadyrov praises Chechen officials for their high level of
professionalism, expertise and efficiency in accomplishing tasks.
Patriots. Patriotism and the loyalty to the Motherland are among the most
frequently mentioned qualities of Chechen men. Especially Chechen officials stand
out for their patriotism and commitment in serving the Motherland. Kadyrov points
out that Chechen young people are always ready to defend the Motherland (31-03).
In occasion of the 74th anniversary of the battle of Stalingrad, Kadyrov highlights
the Chechen soldiers’ contribution to the defence of the city and he points out that
still today Chechens ‘continue to protect the southern borders of our Fatherland,
valiantly carrying service in the Armed Forces of Russia’ (02-02).
Warriors. Kadyrov underlines Chechens’ military capabilities. He defines
Chechen special forces as ‘demonstrating excellent physical and fighting qualities
and capabilities. They showed they are able to accomplish the most complicated
tasks securing safety and order’ (22-03). Remembering the Battle of Stalingrad,
Kadyrov points out the merits of ‘valiant Chechen warriors’ who proved ‘the
highest degree of courage and heroism’. The military is among the institutions
valued the most by Kadyrov. In a meeting with the royal guard of Bahrain he says:
‘Great respect is deserved by those who have achieved excellence in the study of
military affairs’(06-04) In one post , Kadyrov points out the combat bibliography
of his friends as among their greatest merits (03-04).
Investments and Immigration
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Investments. Kadyrov presents Chechen economy as rapidly growing, thus
encouraging investments in the region. 30 billion rubles have been invested in the
construction of a thermal power station in Grozny. European investments allowed
the opening of a medical center and a new university is being built in Grozny
thanks to investments from the Arab Emirates (04-04). Ongoing projects like the
Ahmad Tower and the Grozny Mall are also presented as symbols of Chechnya’s
growing economy. Kadyrov argues that German specialists as well as engineers
from other regions of Russia are working on these project which, according to his
esteem, generated a thousand new jobs. Another post is devoted to the economic
growth of the Sunzha district, where investments ‘have blown new life into the
district’. Kadyrov mentions that Moldovan investors began the construction of a
garment factory, which will provide 200 new jobs (09-03).
Immigration. Chechnya’s brand image is designed to attract professionals to
come working in the republic. Kadyrov presents the region as capable to attract
talents from other regions of Russia as well as from abroad. One example is the
announcement of the opening of a new medical center in Grozny which attracted
private investments from Europe. Kadyrov announces that ‘not only local doctors
will be working in the clinic but also we plan to invite leading specialists from
Moscow and St Petersburg. Also experienced foreign doctors will be invited to
work in some of the departments’(15-02).
Export
One of the posts devoted to export announces the launch of the war buggy
‘Chaborz M-3’ produced by the ‘Chechenavto’ factory based in Argun. A ‘sporttourist’ version will be launched soon (04-03). The most frequently mentioned
Chechen product is the fashion brand ‘Firdaws’, managed by Kadyrov’s daughter
Ayshat. ‘Firdaws’ produces luxury clothes for Muslim women, hence it is very
much representative of Chechen traditions. In occasion of the presentation of the
‘Firdaws’ new collection Kadyrov that ‘orders come from many countries in
Europe, Asia, America and even from Australia’ (02-03). Kadyrov show his
appreciation for ‘Firdaws’ collections which embody both Muslim traditions and
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contemporary glamour.
Tourism
Infasstructures. Kadyrov points out the fast growth of Chechnya’s tourism
sector, mentioning the growing amount of tourists visiting the region in recent
years. ‘Today on the streets of Grozny and on mountain sports and healthimproving complexes, there are thousands of guests from other regions of Russia
and other countries. There is not enough space already’. According to his data, 90
thousands tourists visited Chechnya in 2016 which he defined ‘a record’(10-03). In
another post he points out that by that time already 100 000 tourists visited
Chechnya in 2017. Among the most frequently mentioned touristic facilities are the
hotel ‘Grozny City’ and the resort ‘Sernovodsk-Caucasus’. Other mentioned
touristic spots include Grozny, the lake Kezenoyam and the Benoy district.
Kadyrov mentions the participation of the Chechen tourism committee in the
International event ‘Inturmarket 2017’
where Russian high-ranking officials
‘acknowledged the high attractiveness of the region on the international tourism
market’.
Natural Beauty. Kadyrov shows the optimal conditions for extreme tourism
in Benoy, where there is ‘a lot of snow and amazing air’ (30-01).
Framing the National Past
Wars and Reconstruction. As pointed out earlier, the framing of the national
past is a major component of national identity building. Therefore, past events and
the way they are interpreted play an important role in nation branding strategies.
The interpretation of the past is often a politicized process since it serves the
purpose of legitimizing the establishment in charge. Ramzan Kadyrov often evokes
the national past and in particular the events of the two Chechen wars, framing it
according to the pro-Russian narrative. A recurrent figure in this category is
Ramzan Kadyrov’s father, Hero of Russia Akhmad Hadji Kadyrov. Immediately
after his death, Akhmad Kadyrov became the central figure of the pro-Russian
narrative. He entered the collective memory as the saviour of the Chechen people,
who brought the war to an end, bringing back Chechnya in the framework of the
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Russian Federation. When praising Chechen officials, Kadyrov never forgets to
point out the loyalty they demonstrated to his father. In occasion of the Woman
Day, Kadyrov congratulates Chechen women for having raised ‘brave and
courageous sons who rose in defense of their native land when called by our First
President, Hero of Russia Akhmad Hadji Kadyrov. They gave their lives for the
sake of good and peace in the Chechen Republic’ (07-03) Akhmad and his
comrades ‘forever eradicated the causes of war and tragedies, guiding the people
along the path of peace and creation’ (14-03) Celebrating the birthday of his
comrade in arms Magomed Daudov, he remembers the times of the war which he
defines ‘the struggle under the leadership of the First President of the Chechen
Republic, Hero of Russia Akhmad-Hadji Kadyrov with the worst enemies of
Russia, Islam and the Chechen people’ (26-02). Elements of the pro-Russian
narrative are evident here: the militants fighting against Russian troops during the
Second Chechen War are equated to enemies of the Chechen People and Islam.
The same narrative can be noticed in the post announcing the opening of a
memorial dedicated to the paratroopers of 76th Pskov Airborne Assault Division,
fallen during the second Chechen war. The post quotes ‘They have fulfilled their
military duty to the end, protecting Russia from the gangs of international
terrorists’ (02-03). Kadyrov reinforces the pro-Russian narrative in his posts about
Syria, where he equals the suffering of the Syrian people oppressed by the Islamic
State with the past suffering of the Chechen people. Quoting the words of a Syrian
cleric he points out that ‘those people spilling the blood of the Syrian people and
the Muslims of Syria are the same who killed thousands of Chechens, including
our First President, Hero of Russia Akhmad-Hadji Kadyrov’ (06-03). In occasion
of the Defender of the Fatherland Day, Kadyrov remembers his father as ‘an
example of selfless service of the Fatherland’ who ‘gave his life protecting the
integrity of Russia, achieving peace and prosperity in our Republic’ (23-02). While
he condemns Stalin for his crimes towards the Chechen nation he highlights, by
contrast, the leadership qualities and selflessness demonstrated by his father, who
‘at the cost of his own life, saved the Chechen people from complete destruction,
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took responsibility for the fate of the nation’(23-02). Once Akhmad had saved the
Chechen people, Ramzan continued what his father began rebuilding the region,
securing peace, stability and wealth. In two posts dedicated
anniversary of Kadyrov’s
to the 10th
Presidency he enumerates the achievements of his
administration, highlighting ‘the consolidation of society’ as the most important
one . The post quotes: ‘Such thing never happened anywhere else in the world. In a
short time, people torn apart by deep contradictions, rallied together, became one
fist, capable of solving difficult problems’ (03-03). Through the remembrance of
the past,
Kadyrov conveys
the image of a unified Chechen nation that, after
abandoning all kind of anti-Russian sentiments, unanimously followed Akhmat
Kadyrov along the path of peace and prosperity. Thus, he legitimize his own
leadership, presenting himself as the natural prosecutor of his father’s mission.
Soviet Past. Kadyrov devoted one post to the anniversary of the 1944 mass
deportation ordered by Stalin. Here Kadyrov rejects the allegations according to
which the Chechens collaborated with Hitler and harshly condemns Stalin for the
genocide of the Chechens (‘may he be cursed a thousand times’) (23-02).
6.3 ‘Komanda’ TV Show
‘Komanda’ is a TV show featuring Ramzan Kadyrov as the protagonist,
which was aired in October and November 2016 on the federal Russian channel
‘Russia 1’.
The show consists in a competition during which 16 participants
coming from all over Russia are called to show their personal skills and talents to
Kadyrov. The winner will be assigned a position as personal assistant of the Head
of Chechnya. The show is almost entirely staged in Chechnya. The participants
have to undergo a variety of tests, proving their leadership skills, but also learning
about Chechen culture and traditions. In fact, the TV serves largely as a
promotional tool reshaping the image of Chechnya in a positive way. At the very
beginning of the first episode Kadyrov states it clearly: ‘Here there is place for
everybody. Stereotypes need to be changed. They used to call us in many ways:
extremists, terrorists, separatists. People would say all sorts of things about us. We
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say we are citizens of Russia’ (05-10). In the following paragraphs we
deconstructed the nation brand identity of Chechnya as it is portrayed in the TV
show (Appendix 2, Pic. 3).
Governance
Enlightened Leadership. Apart from being ‘great advertisement’ for
Chechnya , ‘Komanda’ is mainly Kadyrov’s opportunity to show his leadership
talents. Kadyrov is represented as a wise and idealistic leader whose task is not just
governing but rather serving the Chechen people. Since the very beginning he
distances himself from traditional politicians. ‘I take care of the problems of the
Republic and its people; I don’t do politics’ (05-10) he states. Kadyrov underlines
the exclusive relation bounding him to the Chechen people: ‘Successful leadership
means understanding the community. Allah the Almighty gave us the highest level
of understanding of the community’ (05-10). Thus, Kadyrov shows himself as a
down-to-earth leader, who is able to talk the same language as his people. Kadyrov
often mentions the high responsibility he is entrusted with and his full commitment
to it. ‘It has been 15-16 years that I haven’t a single day for myself’ he says
(26-10).
Effective Administration. In several occasions, Kadyrov highlights the
outstanding results achieved by his administration in the process of rebuilding the
region. Celebrities and politicians invited to the show confirm the effectiveness of
Kadyrov’s administration. Talking about his arrival to Grozny, Filipp Kirkorov
says: ‘Honestly, I did not realize where I was. So many changes in just five years,
that is impressive!’ (26-10). deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov points out the
‘outstanding results’ which transformed the Republic (08-11).
Care of the environment: Items belonging to this category are related to the
initiatives taken by Kadyrov to preserve the environment, for instance repopulating
the territory with wild animals or planting new trees.
Patriotism. ‘Komanda’ is replete of patriotic rhetoric. The participants are
competing to become Kadyrov’s assistants and serve Russia under his guidance.
‘Being in the team means to be in the team of our President Vladimir
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Vladimirovich’ (05-10), says Kadyrov. Statements expressing patriotism are quite
frequent in Kadyrov’s speech as well as manifestations of loyalty to Putin:
‘Nobody owns to president Putin as much as I do. He helped me, he helped my
people, and he supported my father’. Kadyrov is eager to underline that Chechnya
is an integral part of the Russian Federation: ‘We have to underline that Russia is
our common home’ (08-11). Praising the competitors at the end of the show he
says: ‘They showed they are ready to serve in behalf of our motherland; we have
one motherland: Russia’ (22-11).
Culture & Heritage
Sport. In the second episode Kadyrov states: ‘Every Chechen is a sportsman
in his soul’ (12-10). Kadyrov often highlight the importance of sport and healthy
lifestyle: ‘A man has to know how to ride a horse, to swim, to shoot’ (08-11). The
show’s participants are often called to try themselves in sport competitions like
football, box and archery. Healthy lifestyle and sport are mentioned among the
elements representing the essence of contemporary Chechnya (08-11).
Islam: Religion plays an important role in Kadyrov’s Chechnya. Kadyrov
often shows the importance of Islam in his family: his father used to study and
teach the Quran; his sons are also learning it. Short references to Allah are quite
frequent in Kadyrov’s speeches. The importance of Islam is represented visually
through beautiful framing of the Chechen mosques. Kadyrov presents a tolerant
image of Islam stating that visitors coming to the Republic are free to dress as they
please (26-10).
Landscape. The Chechen mountains are an important landmark of the
region: they are integral part of the Chechen national identity. ‘If we leave our
mountains, we will lose more than a half of our history’ (26-10) says Kadyrov.
‘The mountains are the strength of the soul’ he says, expressing the particular
connection between the Chechen people and their historical territory (15-11).
Views of the Chechen landscape, especially the picturesque districts of Shatoi and
Benoi, are a recurrent leitmotiv of the show.
Family and Gender Roles. The family institution is one of the pillars of
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Chechen society. Kadyrov identifies the family institution as one of the elements
representing better the essence of Chechnya (08-11). Kadyrov himself is presented
as a good family guy, a caring son, father and husband. He points out that in
Chechnya, men who abandon their families inevitably lose their honor and respect
in society. Family values are held in high account by Kadyrov. Responding to the
critics who attacked him after his father’s death he states: ‘those people have no
values (...) they don’t understand what a father is, what a brother is’ (08-05).
Gender roles in Chechen family and society are very conservative. A man’s duty
consists in defending the woman’s honor. ‘The woman is considered holy and
respectable in the highest degree’ says Kadyrov (05-10). He argues that a man
should be a leader and practice sport, while a woman ‘does better as a housewife’.
‘In Chechnya it would be hard for a woman to be a leader’ (05-10) he says.
Folklore. A significant part of ‘Komanda’ is dedicated to Chechen folklore:
clothes, dance and other traditions. Especially lezginka, the traditional Vainakh
dance often appears in the show. ‘Without lezginka we won’t be Chechens any
longer. It is the soul of the people’. The world record for the longest lezginka
dancing performance is achieved in the streets of Grozny (26-10). In the same
episode knowledge of traditional Chechen costumes is the subject of one of the
competitions (26-10).
Architecture. The medieval Vainakh towers and the Mosques are examples
of Chechen architecture. In one episode, competitors explain the characteristics of
the Grozny mosque ‘The Heart of Chechnya’ and the high-tech style mosque of
Argun to visitors. The Vainakh towers are historical landmarks of ancient Chechen
culture. Kadyrov says that modern skyscrapers like the ones of Grozny city
represent a continuation of the long Chechen tradition in tower-building (19-10).
Investments & Immigration
Investments. Investment-related fragments mostly refers to the city of
Grozny as the major center for investments. Kadyrov defines the capital of
Chechnya as ‘young, fast developing city, with interesting projects going
on’ (12-10). In one of the tasks, participants have to find investors interested in
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renting offices in the Grozny City business center. One of them intends to attract
investments to Grozny,
promoting Grozny City as a setting for weddings and
romantic proposals (08-11).
Immigration. The only potential immigrants mentioned in the series are the
protagonists and their families who are ready to move to Chechnya working for
Ramzan Kadyrov. The last chapter features interviews with the family members of
the participants, who show their willingness to move to Chechnya. ‘Grozny is a
very beautiful city and from what my husband told me people are very nice,
responsive, and always ready to help. I feel ready to move there’ says one
participant’s wife (22-11).
Tourism
Natural beauty. The beauty of the Chechen landscape is often highlighted in
the series. Alexander, one of the first competitors to be excluded from the
competition, encourages people to visit Chechnya: ‘bring your family with you,
come to the mountains. Here is beautiful, safe and interesting (...) Similar places
cannot be found even on the Alps’ (12-10).
Facilities. ‘Grozny City’, the most exclusive hotel in Grozny, is described
by Kadyrov: ‘People are happy there, all comforts are provided…’ (08-11).
Besides the capital, other locations equipped with tourism infrastructure are the
Sernovodsk mineral water resort and the city of Gudermes. Talking about the latter,
one of the participants states: ‘When compared to the many hotels I visited all
around Russia, I would definetly include those in Gudermes in the top ten’(15-11).
People
The show is very much focused on the character of Ramzan Kadyrov.
Hence, there are no other Chechen characters with a relevant role. However, the
Chechen people are often praised to be very hospitable. Also, Chechens are
described as people who know how to fight. ‘They always win in fights, they will
never give up their own territory, and they do not need territory of others...it is a
national tradition…’ (08-11) says one of the show guests.
Exports
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The promotion of products ‘Made in Chechnya’ is almost absent in the TV
series, with the exception of one episode,
almost entirely dedicated to local
Chechen food (01-11).
Framing of the National Past
Wars and Reconstruction. At the beginning of the show Kadyrov remembers
the difficult path he followed in order to secure stability and peace to the Chechen
people: ‘I hoped, I prayed. I didn’t sleep. I prayed and fought. I prayed and built. I
asked the Almighty for help to obtain people’s understanding and support’. (05-10)
The military conflict that tore apart Chechnya is evoked to underline the sharp
contrast with new peaceful Chechnya:
‘We are post-war people (...) The infrastructure was totally destroyed, there was nothing
in the Republic. We still managed to find a common language, we changed our positions,
we look at life from a totally new perspective, we build a new Republic, we write a new
book’(05-10).
Evoking the Chechen wars, one of the darkest periods in the history of
Chechnya, Kadyrov underlines the endurance and the valor of the Chechen people
that managed to move on and build a better future:‘There was a war going on here.
It is worth to know who these people are; people who went through two military
campaigns without breaking, they recovered, got up again and now they live with
dignity’ (19-10). Kadyrov often underlines the important contribution given by his
militiamen in restoring constitutional order in Chechnya: ‘They showed they are
true patriots, they are ready for everything (...) They protected the integrity of our
State’ (12-10). During the show, Kadyrov often remembers his father, Ahmad, as
the wise leader who united the Chechen people and brought them peace.
Remembering his father, Kadyrov presents himself as the natural continuator of
Ahmad’s mission: ‘We will finish what our fathers started’ he proclaims.
Soviet Past. Kadyrov evokes the deportation of the Chechens (19-10) and
their return to the homeland.
Pre-Soviet Past. One of the protagonists describes the original function of
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the Vainakh towers saying: ‘Chechens never had a tradition of wars of aggression.
They defended their own land (...) the tower is not for attacking , rather it is a
defensive tool.
6.4 Interpretation of the Results
After determining the structure of Chechnya’s brand identity we can
interpret it in the light of our previous reconstruction of Chechnya’s brand image
within Russian culture. Comparing the findings of the two content analysis, some
relevant patterns can be pointed out. In both ‘Komanda’ and Vkontakte, the brand
identity of Chechnya is primarily based on the categories of Governance and
Culture (Appendix 1, Pic.1/ 6). This focus can be explained if we consider that the
brand image of Chechnya in Russia was negatively affected by stereotypes mainly
related to Chechen culture and politics. As we pointed out in the second chapter,
Russian literature and media portrayed Chechnya as a lawless and violent place,
inhabited by terrorists and criminals. Thus, it is only natural that Kadyrov’s nation
branding is oriented to counter those stereotypes. In particular, the sub-categories
Effective Administration, Enlightened Leadership and War on Terror are meant to
convey a sense of stability and trust towards the Chechen administration. Likewise,
the significant presence of Patriotism serves the purpose to counter the old image
of Chechen separatism and the perception of Chechnya as Russia’s
‘other’ (Appendix1, Pic.3/8). Kadyrov takes advantage of the current zeitgeist
presenting himself as a patriot and defender of the State in a time when Russian
nationalism and militarism are on the rise. Kadyrov’s criticism of western policy is
also concordant with Russia’s increasing antagonism with the West. Sport is a
central brand sub-category in both ‘Komanda’ and ‘Vkontakte’. In particular,
Chechens’ excellence in martial arts conveys the centrality of fight and
competition in male-centered Chechen society. Islam is probably the most
problematic cultural element to be encapsulated in the brand, due to the past image
of Chechnya as hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism. In both ‘Komanda’ and
Vkontakte, Kadyrov tries to counter the old image of Chechnya as the source of
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Islamic terrorism by presenting Islam as a peaceful and moderate religion. While
Kadyrov dedicates equal space to both Governance and Culture on his Vkontakte
page, in ‘Komanda’ Culture plays a dominant role (Appendix 1, Pic.6). This is due
to the fact that ‘Komanda’ was realized to boost tourism in the region; therefore it
represents the most colorful aspect of Chechen culture in order to attract visitors to
Chechnya. While on Vkontakte the only relevant cultural elements are Sport and
Islam, ‘Komanda’ gives a wider perspective on Chechen culture and habits
(Appendix 1, Pic. 2/7). Subcategories like Folklore and Landscape conveys the
sense of uniqueness which is likely to attract the tourists’ interest. The brand
categoriy Family and Gender Roles presents Chechnya as a conservative society
where traditional values are preserved. This can be also seen as a skillful
understanding of the zeitgeist: Kadyrov adapts the Chechen brand to the official
Kremlin’s discourse which has been promoting conservative values as the pillars of
Russian society. The absence of the category War on terror in ‘Komanda’ could be
interpreted as another sign of the tourism-focused nature of the TV show: Kadyrov
wants to convey the image of Chechnya as a safe region, where the threat of
terrorism belongs to the past. The category People is rather relevant in Kadyrov’s
Vkontakte. The high significancy of the sub categories Officials, Patriots and
Sportsmen is closely related to the importance of Effective Administration,
Patriotism and Sport. On the other hand, People is very little represented in
‘Komanda’ (Appendix1, Pic.1/6) where the absolute protagonist is Ramzan
Kadyrov. This also explains the prominence of Enlightened Leadership over
Effective Administration in the TV show (Appendix 1, Pic.8): while the first
category relates to the concerted efforts of the Chechen officials, the second relates
to Kadyrov’s personal leadership talents. The relatively high significance of
Tourism, in ‘Komanda’ reflects the importance of the tourism sector in Chechen
economy. In particular, the brand focuses on the natural beauty of the Chechen
territory (Appendix1, Pic. 10). Our interviewee Islam Khatulev confirmed tourism
as one of the economy sectors playing a significant role in improving the image of
the region. Murat Shakhidov states clearly that the show Komanda is a tool for
!71
promoting Chechnya ‘from a touristic point of view’ (Appendix 3). During the
show, Kadyrov defines the attraction of tourists as one of the priority of the
Chechen administration (08-11). However, even in ‘Komanda’, Culture and
Governance play a more prominent role than Tourism. This result
can be
explained by noticing that, as Murat Shakhidov said, the main obstacle for the
development of tourism in the region was the media representation of Chechnya as
a ‘dangerous place inhabited by wild people’. It can be argued that, according to
Kadyrov’s strategy, the restoration of the heavily damaged image of Chechen
culture and government has to precede the promotion of tourism facilities and
attractions. Khatullev mentioned ‘The establishment of order and law’ as the
prerequisite which allowed a new image of Chechnya to be established. He also
argued that tourists are attracted to the region mainly by Chechens’ hospitality,
which, according to my analysis, is among the qualities featuring in the Chechen
brand identity. The promotion of Chechen hospitality is clearly meant to counter
the perception of Chechens as aggressive and dangerous. Landscape has also a
very significant presence in ‘Komanda’ (Appendix 1, Pic.7). The beauty of the
North Caucasus is displayed in all its majesty, countering the perception of
Chechnya as a land scarred by war. The Governance sub category Enlightened
Leadership, presenting Kadyrov as a wise and strong leader is also functional for
encouraging tourism. In fact, as Shakhidov said in the interviews ‘Kadyrov himself
said that he is personally responsible for the safety of every single tourist’. In
general, it can be argued that a welcoming culture, a safe environment and a stable
political situation are the first and most important perceptions that Chechnya’s
contemporary brand seeks to convey. On the other hand, purely ‘economic’ sides
of the nation brand like Export, Investments and Immigration are significantly less
represented in the brand structure (Appendix 1, Pic.1/6). Therefore, it can be
argued that Chechnya’s brand is much more focusing on shaping national Identity
than reinforcing the Country-of-Origin effect. Framing of the National Past plays a
major role in both the branding channels taken into account (Appendix1, Pic.1/6),
with a clear predominance of sub-category Wars and Reconstruction Appendix1,
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Pic. 4/9). Kadyrov frames the last military conflicts to create a positive national
myth. According to this narrative, the Chechen nation was victim of international
terrorists’ manipulation, who tried to use the Chechen people in their war against
Russia. Chechens are portrayed as a strong nation that, enduring destruction and
sufferance, fought its way to peace and stability under Akhmad Kadyrov’s wise
leadership. Kadyrov remembers the past military operations, highlighting his
personal contribution to the restoration of peace. He evokes the past devastations
of the war in order stress his achievement in rebuilding the Republic from
scratches. Thus, through a process of reinterpretation, Kadyrov turns Chechnya’s
war-torn past from main source of Chechnya’s negative image into a positive brand
element. On the other hand, it is interesting to notice that Kadyrov never mentions
the events of the First Chechen War, when he used to fight on his father’s side
against the Russian federals. The complete omissions of these events in Kadyrov’s
narrative can be defined as an example of repudiation.
***
On a great extent, Kadyrov’s nation branding is addressing the damaged aspects of
the Chechen brand image in Russia. Focusing mainly on cultural and political
aspects, Kadyrov aims at conveying a sense of reconciliation in the aftermath of
the conflict between Russia and Chechnya. Therefore, it can be argued that
Kadyrov’s communication strategy effectively incorporates elements of classic
nation branding with public diplomacy. While on one side he preserves the
uniqueness and otherness of Chechen national identity, on the other he combats the
stereotypes generated by the historical antagonism between Russians and
Chechens, in the attempt to reconcile the two nations.
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Conclusion
In the course of our research we reconstructed the portrayal of the Chechen
nation in Russian culture as well as analyzed current attempts to modify that image
by means of nation branding practices. Drawing from secondary sources on
Russian 19th century literature, we reconstructed an early image of Chechnya as
Russia’s oriental ‘other’, a land inhabited by savage and violent people, unwilling
to submit to Russian ‘civilizing mission’. These romantic stereotypes remained
engrained in Russian culture for several decades of Soviet rule, until the revival of
nationalism in the years of perestroika provided them with new strength. In the
90s, the perception of Chechens as criminals and savage became widespread,
especially because of the media coverage of the first and second Chechen Wars.
!74
While during the first campaign government media portrayed Chechens as
criminals and bandits and Chechnya as a lawless enclave, during the second war
Chechens were commonly associated with Islamic terrorism. Negative stereotypes
about the region and its inhabitants lingered on after the resolution of the crisis. In
order to counter the negative brand image of Chechnya cultivated by the Russian
audience, the Chechen administration has been actively promoting a new nation
brand identity. Interviews with Chechen civil servants helped us to identify
Ramzan Kadyrov as the main promoter of the Chechen brand, as well as the
channels he has been using to communicate it to the Russian audience. Our
analysis of the TV show ‘Komanda’ and Kadyrov’s Vkontakte page allowed us to
outline the structure of the Chechen nation brand, pointing out its main features.
The predominance of Culture and Governance reflects a strategy aimed at
countering the preexisting negative brand image of Chechnya. In particular
Patriotism counters the image of Chechens as separatists and fundamentally alien
to Russians; Effective Administration and Enlightened Leadership counter the
image of Chechnya as a lawless enclave ruled by bandits; Islam and War on Terror
dismiss the image of Chechnya as a hotbed of Islamic terrorism. Cultural aspects
like Sport, Family and Gender Values convey the image of a patriarchal traditional
culture which is largely in tune with a significant part of Russian society. Finally,
Wars and Reconstruction plays an important role in framing the events of the last
Russian-Chechen conflict, transforming the main source of negative stereotypes
into a positive narrative to be included in the brand. The predominance of
reconciliatory elements in Kadyrov’s nation branding associates it with practices of
public diplomacy. We believe this nation branding case study could serve as
example for governments challenged by image crisis in the aftermath of interethnic and separatist conflicts. A rather obvious example is the case of eastern
Ukraine, which in recent years has been the theater of an analogous crisis. The
governments of the breakaway Donbass republics might find useful the example of
Chechnya for rebranding their territory once a stable agreement with Kiev will be
reached. Finally, our research represents a starting point for further investigations
!75
of nation branding practices applied to Chechnya. Indeed, a series of questions
were left opened: how effective is Kadyrov’s nation branding strategy? In what
degree Russian public opinion has been affected by it? Moreover, considering the
central role played by Kayrov in branding Chechnya, further studies may question
the legitimacy of such a centralized nation brand management and identify other
possible stakeholders of the Chechen brand.
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Szondi, G. (2008). Public diplomacy and nation branding:
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Tishkov, V. (1997). Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after
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Tishkov, V. (2001). Slova i Obraztsy v Postkonfliktnoi Reconstruktsii
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Tishkov, V. (2004). Chechnya: a War-Torn Society. Berkeley:
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Van Ham, P. (2008). Place Branding: The State of the Art. The Annals
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Ziolkowski, M. (2005). Alien visions. Newark: University of
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2008 Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brand Index Report Highlights
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Sources
52.
Channel ‘Russia-1’ (2016)
53.
Vkontakte (2017)
Appendices
!81
Appendix 1: Graphs
Vkontakte- Results
6
Pic. 1
6
Pic. 2
!82
6
Pic.5
‘Komanda’ - Results
6
Pic.6
!84
Appendix 2: Sampling
Pic.1
Position on the NB
Hexagon
Framing of the
National Past
Sub categories
Date
Link
Governance / Culture
Patriotism/ Sport
06-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39423
Culture
Sport
05-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39402
Culture/ Export/
Governance
Islam, Exports,
Patriotism
05-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39363
Others
05-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39321
Culture
Sport, Family and
Gender Roles
05-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39290
People / Culture
Family and Gender
Roles / Other
05-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39266
Governance
Patriotism
04-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39226
Export
Export
04-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39153
People/ Culture
Sport / Sportsmen
04-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39087
Culture
Others
03-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39056
Governance / People
Effective
administration /
Officials
03-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39027
!87
Governance/ Investments
and Immigration
War and
reconstruction
Culture
Effective
administration /
investments
03-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38986
Islam
03-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38976
Governance / People
War and
reconstruction
Effective
Administration,
Patriotism
03-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38911
Governance
War and
reconstruction
Patriotism
02-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38885
Effective
governance
02-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38834
War on terror,
Patriotism
02-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38795
Export / Culture
Islam
02-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38772
Tourism / People / Culture
Sport, Infrastructure
01-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38752
Export
Export
01-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38708
Governance / People
Patriotism,
Effective
Administration/
Patriots, Officials
01-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38677
Sport
01-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38676
Effective
Governance
01-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38646
Effective
Administration,
War on terror /
Officials
28-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38613
Governance
Governance
War and
reconstruction
Governance
Governance / People
War and
reconstruction
!88
Governance / People
Effective
Administration /
Officials
28-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38581
Culture
Sport
27-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38562
Governance
Care of the
Environment
27-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38498
Government, People
War on Terror,
Patriotism/ Warriors
27-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38469
People/ Culture
War and
Reconstruction
Family and Gender
Roles
26-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38413
Governance
War and
reconstruction
Charity, Foreign
Relations
26-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38370
Sport / Sportsmen
26-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38327
War on Terror,
Patriotism /
Patriots, Officials
26-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38291
People/ Culture
Sport/Sportsmen
26-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38282
People/ Culture
Sport/Sportsmen
25-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38250
Culture
Sport
25-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38241
Culture/People
Governance /People
War and
reconstruction
24-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38196
Culture
Islam
24-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38154
!89
Governance/ Culture
Culture
War and
reconstruction
Culture
Soviet Past,War
and reconstruction
Charity / Islam
24-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38123
Islam, Family and
Gender Roles
23-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38096
23-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38028
Culture
Sport
23-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
38004
Governance
War on Terror ,
Effective
Administration
22-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37977
Patriots, Warriors
22-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37933
Culture
Sport
22-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37898
Culture
Language
21-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37821
Landscape
21-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37780
Culture/ Governance
Islam /War on
Terror, International
Relations
21-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37754
Goverenance
Patriotism
20-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37659
Landscape
20-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37633
Islam
20-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37612
People
Culture
Culture
Culture
War and
reconstruction
War and
reconstruction
Soviet past
!90
Governance/ Culture
Sport ,Patriotism,
Effective
Governance
20-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37574
Governance / People
Effective
governance,
Patriotism /
Officials, Patriots
19-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37547
Culture
Sport
19-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37539
Culture/People
Sport/Sportsmen
19-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37513
Culture/People
Sport/Sportsmen
18-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37485
Governance /People
Effective
Administration,
Patriotism /
Patriots, Officials
18-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37454
Others
17-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37433
Islam
17-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37410
Culture
Culture, People
Governance
16-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37361
War and
reconstruction
Effective
Administartion
16-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37334
Investments and
Immigration
Investments,
Immigration
https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37314
Culture / People
Sport/sportsmen
15-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37284
Governance / People
Effective
Administration /
Warriors
14-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37248
!91
Governance
Effective
Administration
13-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37233
Governance
Effective
Administration
13-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37204
Culture / People
Sport/Sportsmen
11-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37174
Governance
Charity,
International
Relations
09-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37149
Governance
War on terror
08-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37096
Effective
Administration/
Patriots, Officials
08-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37070
Sport/sportsmen
07-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37028
Folklore
07-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
37007
Care of the
environment
06-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36981
Effective
Administration/
Investments
06-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36937
Governance/People
War and
reconstruction
Culture/People
Culture
War and
reconstruction
Government
Government /Investments
and Immigration
War and
reconstruction
06-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36907
People
Warriors
06-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36870
Culture/ Tourism
Architecture/
Infrastructures
06-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36836
!92
Culture / People
Sport / Sportmen
05-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36814
Culture/People
Sport / Sportmen
05-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36802
People/Culture
Religious leaders /
Islam
04-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36769
Government
Patriotism
04-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36762
03-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36736
People
Export
03-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36714
Warriors, Patriots
02-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36674
Culture / People
Sport , Landscape/
Sportsmen
02-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36654
Culture
Islam
01-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36618
Culture
Sport
01-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36592
Culture / People
Spor/ Sportsmen
01-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36572
Culture/People
Sport/ Spostsmen
01-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36560
Effective
Administration
01-02-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36521
Export
People
Governance
Soviet Past
War and
reconstruction
!93
Governance /People
Effective
Administration,
Charity/ Others
31-01-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36497
Culture/People
Sport/ Sportsmen
31-01-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36477
War on terror,
Patriotism
31-01-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36474
Effective
Administratrion
31-01-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36473
Effective
Administration,
Patriotism /
Officials
31-01-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36447
Culture
Islam
31-01-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36431
Tourism
Natural beuty/
Infrastructures
30-01-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36404
Culture
Landscape
29-01-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36327
Culture
Islam
29-01-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36322
Governance
War on terror,
International
Relations
29-01-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36283
War and
reconst6ruction
Islam / Religipous
leader
28-01-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
36261
Framing of
National Past
Sub categories
Governnace
War and
reconstruction
Governance
Governance / People
Culture / People
War and
reconstruction
Pic.2
Position on the NB
Hexagon
Date
Link
!94
International
Relations
12-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
42256
Effective
governance/
Officials
11-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
42203
Culture/ People
Sport/ Sportsmen
09-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
42162
Culture/ People
Sport/ Sportsmen
09-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
42147
Culture/ People
Sport/ Sportsmen
09-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
42126
Governance/People
War on terror,
Patriotism/ Patriots
08-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
42082
Governance
Patriotism, Foreign
policy
08-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41997
People/Culture
Language
07-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41971
Culture
Islam
07-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41959
Governance/Investments
International
relations /
Investments
07-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41952
War on Terror/
Family and Gender
Roles /Warriors
06-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41929
Culture
Sport
06-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41866
Governance
Patriotism,
International
Relations, War on
Terror
06-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41834
Governance
People/Governance
Culture/Governance/
People
War and
reconstruction
War and
reconstruction
!95
Governance
International
Relations
06-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41825
Governance/Investments/
Culture
Effective
Administration,
Investments,
Architecture
05-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41786
Tourism
Infrastructures
05-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41757
04-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41739
Investments
Governance/People
Effective
Administration /
Patriots
04-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41706
Governance/ Culture
Effective
Administration/
Sport
03-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41685
People/ Governance
Warriors
03-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41661
Governance
War on terror,
Patriotism
03-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41546
Celebrities
02-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41512
Culture/People
Sport / People
01-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41493
Culture/ People
Family and gender
roles/ Officials
01-04-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41487
Sport,
31-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41463
Investments,
Effective
Administration
31-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41431
Culture
Governance / Investments
War and
Reconstruction
!96
Culture / People
Sport/ Patriots
31-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41428
Culture
Sport
31-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41419
Governance
Others
30-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41350
Governance /People
Effective
Administration /
Officials
29-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41312
Culture
Sport
29-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41296
Culture
Sport
28-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41272
Governance
Effective
Administration
28-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41235
Governance
War on terror
27-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41198
Governance
International
Relations
27-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41164
Effective
administration /
Officials
27-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41136
Culture
Sport
27-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41116
Culture
Sport
27-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41105
Governance/ People
War and
reconstruction
26-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41083
!97
26-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41073
Governance/People
International
Relations,
Patriotism, War on
Terror, Warriors
26-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41044
Governance
Care of the
Environment
25-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
41014
Governance
Effective
administration
25-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40984
Culture
War and
Reconstruction
Folklore
25-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40947
Governance
War and
Reconstruction
War on Terror
25-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40931
Culture
Sport
25-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40915
People
Fighters
25-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40890
Culture
Islam
24-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40858
Governance
War on Terror,
Charity
24-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40824
People
Religious Leaders
23-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40806
Governance
War and
reconstruction
Effective
Administration ,
Patriotism
23-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40777
Governance
War and
reconstruction
Patriotism
23-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40755
!98
Governance
War and
reconstruction
Patriotism
23-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40713
Governance
War and
reconstruction
Patriotism
23-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40705
Governance/People
Patriotism /Warriors
22-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40681
Governance
Charity
22-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40639
21-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40602
Governance
Effective
Administration
20-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40591
Culture/People
Sport/Sportsmen
19-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40553
Governance / People
War on Terror,
Effective
Administration/
Patriots, Officials
19-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40509
Culture/People
Sport/Sportsmen
18-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40498
Culture/People
Sport / Sportsmen
18-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40462
Culture/People
Sport / Sportsmen
18-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40440
Culture
Sport
16-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40414
Governance
Patriotism
16-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40362
!99
Governance/People
Effective
Administration/
Officials
16-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40325
People
Others
16-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40288
Governance / People
War on Terror/
Warriors
16-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40271
Governance
War on Terror
15-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40242
Governance/people
War on Terror /
Warriors
15-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40221
Effective
Administration /
Officials
15-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40210
Infrastructures
14-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40191
War on Terror /
Islam
14-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40164
Governance
Patriotism
14-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40130
Culture
Sport
14-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40113
Investment and
Immigration
Investments
13-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40066
Governance
Charity, War on
Terror ,
International
Relations
13-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40049
Governance
Effective
administration
13-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
40002
Governance / People
War and
reconstruction
Tourism
Governance / Culture
War and
reconstruction,
!100
Culture
Sport
13-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39992
Culture / People
Sport/Sportsmen
12-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39974
Effective
Administration,
Patriotism /
Patriots, Officials
12-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39945
People\ Culture
Other
11-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39930
Culture
Sport
11-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39897
People / Culture
Sport /Sportsmen
11-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39881
Culture
Islam
11-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39873
Tourism/Investment and
Immigration
Investments /
Infrastructures
10-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39853
People/ Culture
Sport/sportsmen
10-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39840
Governance/Investments
and Immigration
Effective
Administration/
Investments
09-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39816
People/ Culture
Sport/Sportsmen
09-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39790
Governance / People
Effective
Administration /
Officials
09-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39766
Governance
Charity
09-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39724
Governace / People
War and
reconstruction
!101
Culture / People
Family and Gender
Roles / Patriots
08-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39664
Culture / People
Family and Gender
Roles / Others
08-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39625
Culture
Family and Gender
Roles
07-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39612
Culture\People
Sport / Sportsmen
07-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39562
Others
07-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39551
War on terror
06-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39503
Others
06-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39484
Effective
Administartion/
Officials/ Sport
06-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39464
Charity, War on
Terror, International
Relations / Islam
06-03-2017 https://vk.com/
ramzan?
w=wall279938622_1
39439
People
, War and
reconstruction
Governance
Governance / People /
Culture
Governance / Culture
War and
reconstruction
Pic.3
Episode
Governance
Culture &
Heritage
Investments
&
Immigratio
n
Tourism
People
05-10
Care of the
environment,
Enlightened
Leadership
(5), Effective
Administration
, Patriotism (2)
Landscape
(3,5), Family
and gender
roles (2),
Islam (2),
Sport (2)
Investment,
Immigration
Natural
Beauty(1,5
)
Hospitable
People,
Sportsmen
Export
Framing
of the
National
Past
War and
reconstruct
ion (7)
!102
12-10
Care of the
environment,
Enlightened
Leadership
Patriotism (2)
Sport (6),
Islam, Family
and gender
roles (2),
Folklore,
Landscape (4),
Architecture
19-10
Enlightened
Leadership
(3), Effective
administration
(2), Patriotism
(2)
Folklore (1,5),
Sport (3),
Family and
gender roles ,
Folklore (4),
Islam,
Architecture
(3), Landscape
(4)
Facilities
Hospitable
(3), Natural People (2),
beauty (2), Sportsmen
Natural
beauty (1)
War and
reconstruct
ion (6),
Soviet
time (2),
Pre-soviet
26-10
Enlightened
Leadership (2)
Landscape,
Folklore,
Islam, Family
and gender
roles (2),
Sport, Folklore
(4,5),
Landscape
(0,5)
Natural
beauty
Hospitable
People
War and
reconstruct
ion (3),
Food (2),
Islam , Sport,
Landscape
(1,5) Family
and gender
roles (2),
Folklore (0,5)
Natural
beauty
(1,5)
Hospitable
People
Investments
(2)
Facilities,
Natural
beauty
(1,5)
Fighters
Investments
Facilities,
Natural
beauty (2)
Immigration
(3) ,
Investments
Natural
beauty,
Natural
beauty
(1,5)
01-11
08-11
Enlightened
Leadership
(2), Care of
the
environment
(2) , Effective
administration
(2) , Patriotism
(5)
15-11
Effective
Landscape
administration. (2,5), Sport (2)
Enlightened
Leadership
22-11-201 Enlightened
6 Leadership
(4), Patriotism
(4)
Sport,
Landscape
(3,5),
Architecture
(2), Folklore
(1), Sport (2),
Family and
gender roles
(2)
Islam,
Landscape
(1,5)
Investments
Natural
beauty (2),
Natural
beauty
(1,5)
Fighters
War and
reconstruct
ion (5),
Soviet
time
Food
War and
reconstruct
ion (4),
Pre-soviet
War and
reconstruct
ion (5),
Pre-soviet
Time
Hospitable
People
Wars and
reconstruct
ion (1,5)
!103
Appendix 3: Interviews
Interview with Islam Khatulev, Director of the Media Monitoring Department
of the Chechen Ministry of Information, Chairman of the Union of
Journalists of the Chechen Republic
The image of Chechnya changed significantly in a positive way. This is connected
first of all to the changes that have been taking place in the republic. For a long
time there were illegitimate authorities here, which were not recognized by the
federal center of Russia and by the country's citizens. After the referendum which
took place in March 2003 called by Ahmad Hadji Kadyrov the people voted in
favor of being part of Russia, be a full member of the Federation. Since then, a
process of rebirth had started in the social, economic, cultural sphere, sport, mass
media. After that, legitimate presidential elections took place. A Constitution was
adopted according to the referendum. Overcoming problems such as crime,
abductions, violence, it already improved on a certain extent the image of
Chechnya in the eyes of Russian citizens.
!104
Did this process start right after the referendum?
Vladimir Putin appointed Ahmad Kadyrov, previously a mufti; he had a religious
education, he was religious activist. He was compelled to enter the political arena
since at the time Chechnya was on the brink of catastrophe. The federal forces
were sent here, the fighting, the violence, terrorism, terror attacks, the economy
was in ruin, Grozny was in ruins, together with other localities. All factories were
destroyed as well as schools, media, redactions, everything. Something had to be
done. The first step was the appointment in 2000 of Akhmad Kadyrov as the leader
of the temporary administration of Chechnya. From there the first steps towards
peaceful life were taken. Starting from elementary things such as electricity, gas,
literally from zero. There was still violence, the terrorists, separatists did not
recognize the authorities. Victims of attacks were not just the federal forces but
also locals. Many officials working in the administration died together with
policemen, religious activists who did not support Wahabism. In that time of
uncertainty, Akhmad Kadyrov decided to call a referendum.
So was there a real possibility to choose whether to stay in the Russian
Federation or secede?
Well in the period in between 1996 and 1999 Chechnya de facto was independent
from Russia, right?
De iure it wasn't recognized as such but de facto was
independent. But then with the terrorist attacks and the attack on neighboring
Dagestan we had to take a decision. The federal center didn't recognize the
authorities in charge in the 1996-1999 period. It was necessary to establish again a
civil life, rebuild schools, hospitals, elementary conditions for life. Something had
to be done. If the fight continued, it would have never stopped. A meaningful,
legal action had to be undertaken in order to stop that. After the referendum and the
elections were conducted, it was still complicated. Block posts were still
!105
everywhere. From 2003 to 2009, when the counter terrorist operation was declared
completed there were still terrorist attacks and so on. But after a while the amount
of those who oppose the return to civil life became less and less. A part of them left
for Western Europe. I am not saying that all those who left were our enemies. They
left for different reasons. Still many of these enemies left. After that, when the
situation became more or less stable there were no more block posts and other
traces of war time started being removed. Measures such as the curfew were
abolished. Other limitations were also abolished. The airport started working as
well other connections. Besides, the majority of those who died for the integrity
and the interests of Russia were Chechens. I mean public officials, members of the
security forces. Many of our people died defending Russia, so Russians
understood. Some of the mass media did not want to recognize that, they tried to
show that there was still a conflict between Russia and Chechnya, that (all
achieved) was temporarily, that (the conflict) was going to spark again.
What mass media exactly are you talking about?
For example ‘The Caucasian Knot’, ‘Novaya Gazeta’, ‘Echo of Moscow’ and
others. Those media with a chauvinistic position. They were saying that the
amnesty wasn't carried out in the right way. The guarantor of the amnesty was
Akhmad Hadji. Even television channels expressed different point of views about
the amnesty. On REN TV, MTV, a lot of talk shows transmitted the opinion of
those who were against the amnesty, because considered it not trustworthy.
What about State-owned channels? What positions were they taking?
If talking about the thick of the military conflict, when still no positive steps
towards peace was taken, practically all the mass media were talking about terror
attacks, banditry, battles, Wahhabis and so on. Little by little, Russian media and
Russian public opinion started changing. All the data can be found in open sources,
!106
like Levada Center. About the attitude towards Chechnya for example. Not
abruptly, but little by little the opinion of people changed in a positive way. It was
a long, progressive, difficult process. The military conflict started towards the end
of 1999 and now it is the end of 2016. It's not a short period of time. During this
period the negative attitude towards Chechens changed significantly. The most
important thing is the attitude of the law enforcement authorities in other Russian
regions towards Chechens. Individuals of Chechen nationality used to attract
automatically the attention of the law enforcement authorities. I mean document
controls and so on...
Was that happening more with Chechens than with representatives of other
Caucasian nationalities?
Yes, more than Dagestanis, Ingushes. Chechens were object of ‘interest’. So we
would be stopped, searched and so on. In 2004 or 2005 we were travelling by train
to Moscow. The passengers of our train (from Chechnya) were brought to a special
area where immediately the police searched us and controlled our documents. If
the police found out that I was a Chechen they would have controlled, checked
documents and so on. Of course that was humiliating. I knew I hadn't committed
any crime, but they would constantly check, check, check. Now it is no more like
that. Finally being Chechen does not mean that you are suspicious.
Do you think stereotypes about Chechens completely disappeared from
Russian society?
Well, I don't know if they fully disappeared. Maybe they didn't, they already
existed in Soviet times right? I mean that they significantly diminished. Not only
regarding security forces or the media. I also mean the Internet. When social
networks appeared, they also helped in improving the situation. Anti chechen
statements became rarer.
!107
What were the main instruments you used for the reconstruction of the image
of Chechnya?
First of all the establishment of order and law. For instance, certain kind of crimes
which are common in other regions, do not happen here. For instance we don't
have cases of raping at all. Practically no car thefts, no hooliganism. Several kinds
of crimes practically disappeared. That is also a noticeable achievement. Earlier
our region was ranked in the first places for the frequency of car thefts. Now there
are no car thefts at all. This is the first aspect. Another factor is the economical
development. Now we have people assembling cars, we export very good quality
mineral water, which is increasingly popular. Different industries are being
developed. Our production is spreading into other regions. And people see our
industry works. Many of our youngsters moved to other regions to study. Tourists
started coming in great amounts. The head of the region, Ramzan Kadyrov is
actively promoting the tourism business. We are build tourist resorts. The amount
of tourists is increasing. If 5 or 6 years ago the presence of tourists was considered
weird, surprising. Now tourists come from foreign countries and from other
regions of Russia. More than beauty of places, tourists are attracted by the
hospitality of the Chechens. We have always been hospitable people.
How much of the success is the personal merit of Ramzan Kadyrov?
The process started already with Akhmad Hadji Kadyrov and Ramzan Ahmatovic
continued it. His energy, will and determination is changing everything for the
better. His leadership talent, patriotism. All played a role. He assigned to
administrative responsibilities to those who also want Chechnya to flourish and
grow...He transmits his energy to other people and every day some positive change
happens.
!108
How important were federal funds for the reconstruction of the region?
Of course the federal center offered a huge help in reconstructing the region but
also investments were and are still attracted from private companies. (...) Nobody
is denying that the federal center gave a hand; likewise it did with other regions.
Other regions did not endure such a degree of destruction, we endured horrible
destruction. Now industry, agriculture and tourism are growing.
Can you mention the main sectors which you believe to be the most important
for the improvement of the region’s image?
The agricultural sector, we have traditions, we have the land. Tourism, industrial
sector, especially the oil and gas sector. Culture, especially sport . Our athletes
achieve more and more results (...) everything will go on successfully this way, as
long as there will be no interferences. We don't want interferences, we want help.
We want people to rejoice of our success together with us.
Who are you talking about?
I am talking about the terrorists, and those who don't like the idea of our republic
to be part of the Russian Federation.
Interview with Murat Shakhidov, Press Officer of the Chechen Government
Committee for Tourism
Could you please describe how the tourism industry developed in Chechnya in
the last few years?
!109
When the security issue was not anymore the first priority we founded the
committee of tourism. When the committee was founded, the only tourists coming
here were those individuals who took the risk to come here autonomously. No one
was managing tourism at that time in the Republic. After 2015 determined organs
started taking care of it. For example the tour operator ‘Visit Chechnya’ which
started bringing tourists to the region. The tour operator is our creation and now it
works autonomously. Currently it is the only tour operator of the Chechen
Republic; there are no other tour operators in the region. When we found the
committee, there were no touristic facilities. There were hotels, there was the five
star hotel ‘Grozny city’, Kezenoyam was still not an equipped touristic site.
Nevertheless, the necessary infrastructure was already there. Roads and other basic
infrastructures had been already repaired. Gas and electricity was working all over
the region. There was already some base to build on. The Chechen Republic is a
mountainous republic. Some mountains are difficult to access. All the villages are
accessible through roads. For example Zoy Pede is a place difficult to reach. No
one fears this inaccessibility, this place still attracts people, and everybody wants to
go there to see the necropolis. First you need to travel by car, and then you need to
go by foot. This last part of the route is tough but despite the toughness everybody
go there since the place has a powerful energy. It dates back to the times when the
Vainakhs, Chechens and Ingush, were pagans. The most difficult task consisted in
removing the paradox ‘Chechnya is war, Chechnya is tourism’. Which one of them
is prevailing in the minds of people? Chechnya is a militarized or a touristic
region. It was a huge work; titanic efforts were made on every level. From the
highest ranking officials to an everyday level. The committee participated in all
possible forums, exhibitions and fairs where it showed the region (...) We had to
convince people that Chechnya is safe. I am not talking about foreigners, but
Russian citizens. Especially Russian citizens used to fear Chechnya. Europeans
were braver, they would come, without problems. (...) So we had to convince
people that Chechnya is open and convincing Russians was much more difficult
!110
than convincing Europeans. Europeans were anyway willing to come to the
Caucasus and to Chechnya.
What is the reason for that?
It could be because of a difference in media coverage (...) because of inertia the
media still described Chechnya as dangerous place inhabited by wild people. This
was a big obstacle for the development of tourism.
What media are you talking about?
Commercial TV, they understood that the Chechen theme is profitable, it attracted
the audience, it generates rating. If you would pronounce the word ‘Chechnya’ or
‘Chechens’ everybody would turn to the screen. They played with it. The negative
stories would bring money at that time. The State TV was different. they were
working as usual, they weren't showing that kind of shocking material. (...) If a
Ukrainian or a Georgian commits a crime, nobody would pay attention, if a
Chechen did it, than all media would focus on it. And this negative image remains.
To solve this issue the State Duma, the Parliament , on the local level we managed
to convince the Tv channels that taking advantage of the Chechen issue is not a
good choice.
How did you manage to solve this problem?
(...) Let's say that a newspaper wants to make a scoop about Chechnya. They create
a sensationalist story. In that case authorities would take care of the issue and if
they find out that the story does not correspond to the truth, this magazine or
newspaper would be held accountable for its words. There was a fight with the
media, it was necessary to ignore these businessmen who were trying to earn
money by exploiting Chechnya. Until we solved the problem with the media, it
!111
was impossible to do tourism, even ridiculous. ‘Welcome to the Chechen Republic’
sounded like ‘welcome to the asylum’. It was ridiculous for a Russian citizen. We
have an amazing nature. In Soviet times tourism was very developed. Soviet kids
used to come to our summer camps from all the corners of USSR, people would to
come to the Chechen Republic to relax and heal. There were many itineraries. On
the shores of Kezenoyam could be found the base of the Soviet Olympic rowing
team. It was absolutely normal to come to the Caucasus, to the mineral waters
facilities. After the war the issue of tourism in Chechnya was something
contradictory. The most important task was getting rid of this stereotype. The head
of the region was given the task to develop the region and move ahead, which is
what we started doing. We started studying the region. What it was preserved, what
itineraries could be created. We created hiking routes, excursions around Grozny,
around the museums. We started searching for tour guides who used to work here
in the past. We restored old itineraries. It was a big amount of work. Taking some
old stuff, doing something new. This activity started working, breathing, attracting
people. The first tourists who started coming to Grozny were looked at with
astonishment by the citizens of Grozny. I'm talking about 2014 and fully in 2015.
In 2014 tourists started coming. For citizens of Grozny the appearance of tourists is
a sign that everything is ok. They started feeling more confident. It was the signal
that Chechnya became a peaceful region. There was no concrete advertisement
promoting the region. Our major source of advertisement is Ramzan Kadyrov. He
is the engine informing people about the Chechen Republic. He is moving towards
a specific direction. He acts in the interest of the Region. He is a high ranking
official, so he is more popular and
‘accessible’ than whatever ministry or
committee. I can't think about a better advertisement for Chechnya than the reality
show ‘Komanda’ . The project was created by Russia TV Channel and Ramzan
Kadyrov. If looking at the general effect, the show described Chechnya as a
beautiful, nice, quiet place from a touristic point of view. It was great
advertisement. The committee of tourism of Chechnya cannot hope to initiate a
several months long project on federal channels. Kadyrov enjoys a significant
!112
authority on a federal level. His initiatives are usually supported on a federal level.
It was hard to compete with ‘monsters’ of tourism like Sochi, Kabardino Balkaria,
Elbrus. The opinion of Russian about Chechnya has changed, not completely of
course but significantly. The best statistics proving that are the numbers. In 2015
according to Rostata Chechnya was the safest region of the country. According to
these data, Chechnya featured the smallest amount of crimes.
Of course not
everybody knows about that. Statistics is never very interesting but I can always
refer to it when people tell me ‘it is not safe over there’. Another way to prove that
the situation has changed is going to Moscow or Kazan and talking to people.
Saying that I work for the tourism committee of the Chechen Republic. While
earlier they would say ‘What are you talking about? Tourism? If I go there I will be
beheaded’. Now they say ‘it is OK’. Ramzan Kadyrov is contributing to our work
realizing special events: opening fountains, inviting stars, all this attracts the
attention and conveys a feeling of safety. Kadyrov provides the direction. These
are PR technologies. Gerard Depardieu came to Chechnya for shooting a movie
and he gave some interviews about the shooting. That was the main reason, but all
the rest was done for creating a positive image of Chechnya. We cannot afford PR
specialists; everything is being done by Ramzan Kadyrov and us. We can't afford
PR specialists on a federal level. We create events. For example in the summer
2017 we will organize an international regatta on the Kazenoyam Lake. There will
be a competition. It will be the regatta on the highest altitude in the world, and it
will be included in the Guinness world records. This will immediately attract the
attention of the media. We can create these kinds of events which will reflect
positively on the image of the region. Chechen cuisine is very simple but also very
filling. A lot of meat, very manly cuisine. In April 2017 we will organize a
gastronomic festival where we will cook the biggest shashlik in the world. (...)
How can you comment the rumors saying that in Chechnya the Federal law
doesn’t apply?
!113
The media are responsible for this. The most important thing is determining what
is true and what is not. Is Chechnya complying with the federal law or not? It is not
possible that an entire region fails to comply with the federal law and the
Constitutional tribunal does not know about it. If the Federal Constitutional
tribunal, the most important Russian tribunal, doesn't say anything, than it means
that everything is fine. It is impossible to deceive the tribunal. Of course there are
individuals who still go on talking. If you listen to them, of course Chechnya is the
most terrible place (...) the Russian law doesn't apply here ...Of course they do.
This is the Russian Federation. The first article of the Chechen Constitution says
that Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation (...) Of course we are afraid that
people might be worried about that and that it can prevent them to come. That
opinion is certainly an obstacle for the development of tourism (...). You know why
that perception exists? Some author or newspaper writes that Chechnya does not
comply with the federal law. Those who know about the topic are aware that this is
not true. Of course who is not an expert would believe this author. Reality is
established by law procedures and not by the authors of some articles who base
their statements on some unproved facts. Today the Chechen Republic is the place
where tourists can feel themself safer than in any other place. In no other place
tourists are so well protected like in the Chechen Republic. Kadyrov himself said
that he is personally responsible for the safety of every tourist. Right now
thousands of people are working for providing safety to you. You don't notice that.
My personal opinion is that it's a little bit like living in the past. These exaggerated
security measures are not needed anymore. It reminds a bit of Israel, right?
Another place which used to be dangerous and now there is a high level of security
(...).
What is the price of security?
!114
The price of security is very high. It costed the life of around 2000 Interior
Ministry servants who died while restoring the constitutional order. Many families
were deprived of their fathers, brothers. Some thousands Chechens sacrificed their
life to ensure that Russian law will work in Chechnya. The terrorist attack that
happened in Grozny in December 2014 was for sure a reason for negative news,
that negatively reflects on the region, but they shouldn't weigh more than those
happening elsewhere. But after all European countries are theaters of terror attacks
as well. But they are single cases. Like not long ago in France, an amazing country,
the most secure, touristy... but also there something can happen. Imagine yourself
in Moscow, summer night. There is a match Spartak-Milan going on. You are
Italian, going around Moscow alone, I guess you would feel a certain danger.
Tonight go around Grozny, you are not going to experience the same in any corner
of the city. If you are alone on the streets cars would stop asking if it is all ok. This
kind of familiar attitude. Not like in big cities where people are alien to each other.
Here you can knock at any door and say that you are hungry and you don't have
where to sleep. You will receive food and a bed where to sleep.
What recommendation would you give to the administration of other war-torn
regions, for instance Eastern Ukraine, to develop the tourism industry?
We immediately moved away from everything associated with negativity,
weapons. We could have used all that of course. Poligony, armored vehicles, we
could have cooperated with the federal troops, so that they would drive around
tourists on armored troops carriers, tanks and so on. But too much was linked with
guns, machine guns, pictures, videos where men in Chechnya go around with guns.
Guns, tanks , machine guns are all negative images which is better not to use,
otherwise Chechnya will remain forever known as a place where people shoot
firearms. Absolutely no way, it is necessary to eradicate all that. In Donbass they
could use all this imager if they want to, but it will attract just individual tourism.
!115
There will be no mass tourism in this direction. They should get rid of the image of
war like the Chechen republic did. In order to achieve that they need a program
‘Donbass without traces of war’ like the program ‘Chechnya without traces of
war’. Ramzan Kadyrov launched this program according to which everything that
reminded of the war should be removed in 100 days. All the traces of bomb
explosions, machine guns were removed. That helped us to develop tourism today.
If the traces of war were still visible today, we couldn't develop tourism the way
we do. Donbass should undertake this program ‘without traces of war’. When
nothing will remind of war anymore, of course infrastructure will need to be
restored, roads ecc. and then work on the image. The first thing to do is remove the
traces, rebuild infrastructure, and then determine what quality Donbass has. What
is the most important thing in tourism? It is the tourist. The image of the region,
our desires, nothing is worth the safety of a single tourism. Today we are
responsible for every single tourist. If a tourist breaks his leg in Rome nothing
would happen. If it happens in Grozny, all the headlines would read ‘A tourist
broke his leg in Grozny’ or even worst ‘a tourist was crippled in Grozny’. This
tendency is not that strong anymore but there are still resources which are not
subjected to any tribunal. They pursue their own political interest. They will
publish that immediately. Usually state media provide a more impartial coverage.
In other media what happens in Chechnya acquires more importance. We used
Grozny TV Channel as a platform to promote the region. We used it as a platform
for countering hostile media. If they show something, Grozny channel investigate
too and transmit the correct version of the facts. It plays the same role as Russia
Today, on a different scale of course. All the media in the region work with us. We
established very convenient relations with all of them. We are always open to
them, we always give them the information they need. In the region there are no
media which have a negative attitude towards the Chechen Republic.
!116
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